Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

96. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State⁰

Belgrade, September 3, 1961, 4 p.m.

377. Belgrade Conference. Tito’s statements on Berlin and on Soviet resumption of tests came as deep disappointment to Western observers here, including myself. Passage on Berlin contains no word that could not have been written by Khrushchev; and that on testing, leading off with reproach to French and accepting in full Soviet explanations for resumption, is weaker and more pro-Soviet than even those of Nasser and Nkrumah.¹ Private information indicates Tito has been endeavoring behind scenes to play down issue of tests ever since beginning of conference, probably fearing it would adversely affect success of meeting.

I have repeatedly called attention to strong Yugoslav feelings over rearmament of Western Germany and their negative reaction to impression we have given of unwillingness to negotiate or at least to make any positive proposals for settlement of Berlin problem, as confirmed by Kohler to Nikezic on August 29 (see Deptel 254, September 1).² But neither I nor any of my Western colleagues were prepared for so one-sided an attitude on Tito’s part as this; and I think we must reflect carefully on its implications for our treatment of conference and, in more long-term, our attitude towards role of Yugoslavs at this juncture.

I am stuck with Tito’s expressed understanding that we are proposing to go to war over specific issue of signing of peace treaty itself and his evident failure to understand that our military interests could be actively engaged only if subsequent effect of treaty were to create intolerable limitations on Allied rights in Berlin or on freedom of city’s communications. I recently urged, in conversation with Secretary,³ that we take steps to make plain that crucial issue in our eyes would not be signature of treaty itself but situation which would arise if attempt were made to give to treaty an interpretation and implementation which would affect these factors just mentioned. Would like now to repeat this recommendation. So long as we let stand present ambiguity on this score we will lead with our chin for line of reproach which Tito took in this respect.

At conclusion Tito’s speech I had occasion talk alone with Nehru during intermission. I expressed to him my shock over image conveyed by Tito of juxtaposition in Germany of stable East German state peacefully developing under happy socialist system, as against Western Germany seething with “Fascist and revanchist conceptions and tendencies.” Pointed out this was fantastic distortion of facts, and that no attempt by neutrals to play positive role in reaction to Berlin crisis could conceivably be successful if it ignored fact that heart of difficulty was incredible political failure of Ulbricht regime, which could not even stand comparison with other Communist regimes of Eastern Europe. This, I said, was problem not only for us but for Russians themselves, and no action of this conference based on fiction this problem did not exist could come anywhere near root of difficulty or have any particularly helpful effect. Nehru listened attentively but was non-committal. Private knowledge that same thesis was forcefully put to him this morning by personal envoy of Willi Brandt leads me to hope all this may have some effect on his thinking.

Archbishop Makarios’ speech, which followed Tito’s, was very constructive on Germany and nuclear testing, calling for reunification Germany on basis plebiscite and characterizing Soviet test resumption as “shocking”, while expressing concern over French nuclear tests in Africa.

It is unfortunately plain that if moderation and balance are to be brought into final resolutions of conference on Berlin question, the impulse will have to come from Nehru, Nasser, U Nu and others, not from Tito.⁴

Kennan

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–BE/9–361. Official Use Only. Repeated to Moscow.
1. Excerpts and summaries of the statements at the Belgrade Conference were published in The New York Times, September 4, 1961.
2. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9–161)
3. Apparently in a telephone conversation. The Rusk Appointment Books have no annotations indicating any conversations with Kennan and no record of any discussion has been found. (Johnson Library)
4. In telegram 323, September 13, the Department of State provided Kennan with detailed instructions to use in his discussions with Yugoslav officials, which stressed U.S. disappointment with Tito’s “immoderate and pro-Soviet statements.” (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–BE/9–1361)