Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

94. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State⁰

Belgrade, July 31, 1961, 6 p.m.

115. Following message partially cleared with Bowles.

Under Secretary Bowles¹ and I visited Brioni yesterday, talked for one and half hours with Tito, in company with Foreign Minister Koca Popovic and President’s Secretary General Crnobrnja, and then lunched with Popovic, Crnobrnja and FEC member Vladimir Popovic, former ambassador to Washington, Moscow and Peking. Discussions were friendly and frank. They confirmed full depth of differences between Yugoslavs and ourselves, as revealed in previous exchanges; but we feel visit was useful and some progress made in dispelling misunderstandings.

Under Secretary Bowles explained in detail our position on Berlin, in particular reasons why we had long been obliged to take measures of military precautions. Points set forth Department telegram 58, July 26² were all developed. It was pointed out that Berlin situation operated in many ways to impede or delay more constructive undertakings to which we would like now to turn in other parts of the world, and that any help Yugoslavs could give at forthcoming Belgrade conference to moderate Soviet stand on Berlin and to increase prospects for peaceful composition Berlin problem would facilitate our response to other world problems.

In general, Tito’s observations followed course of previous discussions I have had with him. Following points deserve particular note:

1. While not denying Khrushchev’s responsibility for producing Berlin situation, Yugoslavs earnestly plead that we, in interest of peace, make effort to sit down and talk over problem in constructive manner with Russians. They felt we had now adequately proved we were neither weak nor timid, and were convinced we had everything to gain and nothing to lose by such procedure. World would assuredly take it as a sign of strength and confidence rather than weakness. Though not denying depth of Ulbricht’s political failure, they pleaded for recognition of GDR, feeling that this lay at heart of difficulty with Russians.

2. Under Secretary asked their view on Khrushchev’s motives: Was he merely trying to tidy up situation around Berlin which had become dangerous and embarrassing to him, or was it his purpose to embarrass and weaken US. They replied unhesitatingly that everything in Koca Popovic’s Moscow conversations had indicated the former and they were convinced this was the case. They recognized Khrushchev’s impulsive nature and tendency to flamboyant, provocative statements, but considered that beneath it lay a cold and realistic political intelligence, and that he could be sober enough when it came to responsible negotiation.

3. They reiterated and stressed at length their strong feelings on colonial problem, emphasizing once again that this constituted their major difference with US. They thought we should have put greater pressure on the Portuguese and on French over their African problems. Tito stated frankly that he had never been able to understand our attachment to NATO pact overriding priority we gave its interests. He felt this, more than anything else, stood in way of our adoption of full hopeful and constructive policies in Africa.

4. It was clear that they strongly suspected US of having opposed participation of uncommitted nations in Belgrade conference, and were deeply affected and hurt by this impression. Failure to date of any moderate invitees to agree to attend has been serious blow to them. We assured them US Government, to our knowledge, had been careful to take no position on this matter, pro or con, and had made no representations or suggestions to any government one way or another; but I am not sure we convinced them. Koca Popovic said pointedly that whereas European neutrals had been sounded out informally, none had indicated a desire to attend. Yugos felt, it was inferred, that this could not have been the case had our attitude been other than unfavorable. The same applied, I gathered, in case of South American invitees. Nigeria, they told us, had now definitely declined to attend. They did not suspect US of having made direct representations to Nigerians, but they could only view Nigeria’s answer in light of Sir Abubakar’s presence in US at time it was given, and felt that position had clearly been taken in deference to American position.

In his reply to these various points, Under Secretary described recent developments of our African policy, noted particularly lack of political conditions on our aid as witnessed by their own experience and that of African governments highly critical of our policies which had, nevertheless, continued to receive our aid, and pointed out that to put pressure publicly on French with regard to North Africa would be to forfeit all real possibility of exercising moderating influence of them. He also traced effect of Korean War on development of NATO policies.

So much for discussion. Our impression is that Yugoslav positions at forthcoming Belgrade meeting will be importantly influenced, rightly or wrongly, by impressions they gain on following points:

A. Whether we, in meantime, have made forward effort at peaceful composition of Berlin problem on basis which takes some account of Soviet prestige and interests, and goes some distance to meet their feelings about GDR;

B. Whether we have been able to overcome their belief that we have influenced moderate countries against attending Belgrade conference;

C. Whether we have given further evidence of effort to restrain French and Portuguese in Africa.

They will be watching intently development of US policy in intervening period.

If nothing develops to give them encouragement on any of these lines, they will go into the conference with strongly negative and almost bitter feelings toward US, and disinclined to expend their influence to restrain the strongly anti-American tendencies which will certainly be represented among other delegations. In our opinion, there is not much more that can be done to alter this state of affairs by personal argument and pursuasion.

Both Under Secretary and I are convinced this state of mind reflects no personal anti-Americanism on part of present Yugoslav leaders, and no complaint arising out of our bilateral decisions, but flows rather from deep and honest disagreement about wisdom of certain our policies on world arena. On other hand, we feel Yugoslavs have it in their power to be distinctly helpful at Belgrade conference, and would in principle like to do so. They are visibly impressed with Under Secretary’s reminder that if Berlin crisis could be surmounted this might be starting point for new and much hopeful era of world affairs. There can be no question of their present unhappiness or of their desire to contribute to such development if they can see their way clear to doing so.³

Kennan

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7–3161. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Nicosia.
1. Bowles stopped in Belgrade on his way to the July 31–August 2 regional conference of Chiefs of Mission in Nicosia.
2. Telegram 58 outlined the U.S. position on the German question. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–BE/7–2161)
3. In telegram 116 from Belgrade, August 1, Kennan reiterated the concern he and Bowles felt about incorrect Yugoslav impressions of U.S. policy regarding the conference and outlined the principal points of a statement designed to promote comprehension. (Ibid., 396.1–BE/8–161)