Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

363. Telegram From the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (Norstad) to Secretary of Defense McNamara⁰

Paris, April 25, 1961, 5:50 p.m.

ALO 403. Personal for SecDef McNamara and CJCS from Gen Norstad. Department for Secretary Rusk only. Chief USELM CENTO Ankara for Gen Lemnitzer only.

1. Reference the Jupiter squadron for Turkey which is considered in the report, “A Review of North Atlantic Problems for the Future”¹ and State message no. 4429,² I am sure the detailed background is familiar enough to Washington to obviate repeating it here. I wish remind you only that the project was initiated as part of a NATO requirement and was proposed to the Turks by NATO authority through Allied channels. The Turkish squadron is part of a requirement for six IRBM squadrons which appeared in MC 70.³ NATO did not, of course, specify the particular missile to be used; the United States selected the Jupiter for this purpose since the research and development on it was complete and the project had reached the stage where there were at least production commitments, if not an actual production program.

2. You know my views on the need for mid-range ballistic missiles in Allied Command Europe. The critical shortage of missile-delivery systems, which it was anticipated would continue up into 1963 to 1965, was an added factor when the Jupiter program was established. This was considered important militarily, but was perhaps of even greater significance from a psychological or political standpoint. In both these respects, I believe the program continues to be of value.

3. The Polaris submarine is clearly a superior weapons system, but I am impressed with the fact that these weapons will be in short supply for a number of years. The question therefore is not whether a Polaris submarine in Eastern Mediterranean will be better than a Jupiter squadron; rather, it is whether submarine plus squadron gives us greater strength than submarine alone. I believe that it does. If this question of quality is introduced, I hope thought will be given to the effect talk of obsolescence would have on the British Thor and Italian Jupiter positions.

4. Any kind of fixed installation, whether in Europe or North America, is vulnerable. This includes air bases and some of the longer range missiles on which NATO and the United States must place major dependence for the next several years. Even surface ships, when deployed close-in enough to be subject to continuous visual or radar surveillance, cannot be considered invulnerable.

5. Although I am convinced that custody and control arrangements either exist or can be developed to prevent unilateral action on the part of the Turks, the U.S. must still man these units to a considerable extent and for considerable time. In fact, the present program provides for almost complete U.S. manning until Jan 1964 and very probably this will have to be extended. Thus we could easily make a virtue of this necessity and continue substantial U.S. manning for the useful life of the Jupiter squadron. I do not believe, therefore, that the control problem referred to in the cited message is a valid concern.

6. From figures available here, about 80 percent of this project’s cost through FY 63 has been spent or is committed, and thus is not recoverable. It appears that much of the remaining 20 percent (maintenance, operations, etc.) would have to be spent on the same general items if another system replaced the Jupiter. All in all the savings over two years would be relatively small and would not make an impressive contribution if applied to other Turkish Armed Forces projects.

7. Since this project was initiated by NATO authorities through NATO channels, I believe it would be contrary to U.S. as well as NATO interests for the U.S. to consider it now on a bilateral basis. Should there be any modification of the program, action should be taken first through NATO rather than Turkish authorities. It is an admission against interest to say so, but I must express my belief that it may be possible to mold Turkish attitude so as not to bar such a change, even though the mere suggestion of a curtailment of the project would cause NATO and the United States some embarrassment.

8. In conclusion, it is my opinion, as you know, that this is the time to create strength, not reduce it. I believe therefore that this project should continue.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.6512/4–2561. Top Secret; Niact; Noforn. Also sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and repeated to the Department of State and U.S. Element CENTO. The source text is the Department of State copy.
1. Not found.
2. Printed as telegram 4936 to London, Document 362.
3. MC–70, “Minimal Essential Force Requirements, 1958–1963,” was prepared by the Military Committee of NATO early in 1958 as guidance and a yardstick for the 1958 and successive Annual Reviews. Documentation regarding MC–70 is in Foreign Relations, 1958–1960, vol. VII, Part 1, pp. 314 ff.