357. Memorandum of Conversation0
SUBJECT
- Call of Greek Deputy Prime Minister on the Secretary
PARTICIPANTS
- The Secretary
- His Excellency Sophocles Venizelos, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Greece
- His Excellency Alexander A. Matsas, Ambassador of Greece
- NEA—Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary
The Deputy Prime Minister expressed the deep grief of the Greek people at the tragedy which had overtaken America. The Secretary responded with appreciation to Mr. Venizelos for having come at this time of great grief here. He was also glad to have this chance to talk with him.
Mr. Venizelos expressed his desire to speak briefly about both internal and external aspects of Greek policies. His party for 11 years had been in opposition before forming the present Government. This Government differed from Caramanlis’ Government in that while both opposed the Communists, the previous Government had depended on police measures, whereas this Government intended to use the more efficient measures of social action. The Secretary might remember that this party had fought Communists effectively in the past. Mr. Venizelos himself had been appointed Prime Minister specifically for the purpose of fighting Communist efforts to take over the country. After the liberation he had taken part in all efforts to fight the Communists and other Ministers in the present Cabinet had done the same. It was worth noting [Page 686] that in the 1961 elections the EDA was opposed by Caramanlis through repressive measures, whereas in the 1963 elections they came out with less support even though repressive measures were not used. If the present Government should remain in power long enough it would hope to limit the EDA to its normal 8% of the popular vote by providing a reef in the Center for those in the EDA who are not Communists.
Secretary Rusk said we understood what the new Government was seeking to achieve. We hoped we could be helpful to Greece in meeting its problems, but we were not interested in being too large an influence in Greece, nor for that matter in Turkey. The right balance was the question. It was important to consult on the security problems facing Greece, and on its relations with its immediate neighbors. At one stage it had seemed that our estimate of the threat from Bulgaria, for example, was somewhat different from the Greek estimate. We were not interested in an arms race if some way could be found to limit it.
Deputy Prime Minister Venizelos recalled that he had headed a Greek delegation to the United States in 1946 which had led to the Porter Mission, from which had come the great cooperation between Greece and the United States. Secretary Rusk responded that these broad policies of the West in the post-war period were developed by different parties at different times. We spoke of a bipartisan policy in this country. It was interesting to recall that it was the Labor Party of Britain that helped form NATO. The most elemental problems are national in character, rather than partisan. Thus we could see no difficulty in continuing our cooperation with Greece through one party or another.
Mr. Venizelos observed that all members of the present Cabinet in Greece are pro-West in orientation and great friends of the United States. It was under a government he himself had headed that Greece joined NATO. He wanted the Secretary to know that Greece is absolutely determined to maintain its commitments.
The only external question on which the present government would differ with the Caramanlis government, Mr. Venizelos went on, was Cyprus. In order for Cyprus to live on it would be essential to make some changes in the Constitution. He was glad to be able to report that the British understood this well. Here in Washington, Mr. Venizelos had called on Prime Minister Inonu and Foreign Minister Erkin of Turkey. They would meet again at the NATO meeting, and he hoped the Ministers of the three guarantor powers would also meet in Paris to discuss the Cyprus matter.
The great concern would be to eliminate from the Cyprus Constitution those parts that caused great friction between the communities in Cyprus and thus between Greece and Turkey, Mr. Venizelos said. He wanted the Secretary to understand that this had nothing to do with any step toward enosis, i.e., union with Greece. Its sole purpose was to eliminate [Page 687] those dangerous frictions. Contrary to the stories of desire to prepare Cyprus for union with Greece, the proposals were intended to make Cyprus livable for its own people. His Government would be content to see not Cyprus as part of Greece but a second Greece in Cyprus.
Secretary Rusk said we in the United States had no specific formula to suggest for Cyprus. Our great interest was in good relations between Greece and Turkey and in a stable situation in Cyprus. He would hope the Greeks would be in close touch with their colleagues in Turkey and with the guarantor powers. The situation had considerable delicacy, of course. The United States could be glad to keep in touch with the thinking of the Greek Government, but he doubted that we should take any initiative ourselves.
Mr. Venizelos said the Greek Government would be grateful to the United States if it would contribute to finding the solutions necessary so that Cyprus could go ahead as an independent state. Ambassador Matsas added that the Greek Government would be thankful if, when the amendment question was raised, the United States would view the problem with sympathy and understanding, as did the United Kingdom.
Mr. Venizelos commented further that the present situation, involving for example a Turkish veto, made the situation very difficult. He could say that Archbishop Makarios was ready to make concessions beyond the Constitution, as for example by agreeing that the Vice President rather than the (Greek) Speaker of the House should act in his stead when the President was absent from the country. This was still a confidential matter, but it indicated his intention and showed that the Archbishop envisaged the issue as a question of negotiation to amend certain articles of the Constitution while at the same time making serious concessions.
Secretary Rusk responded that we would hope this should be acknowledged as a problem in the first instance for the guarantor powers. He hoped that anything done would be accomplished by negotiation and agreement.
Turning to another subject, Mr. Venizelos said that his Government was putting greater emphasis on the internal situation. It did not fear isolated attack from its neighbors, for example, Bulgaria. Thus, it was mainly interested in the domestic health of the country, and especially the condition of the peasants who were its backbone.
Secretary Rusk asked about the Minister of Defense. Mr. Venizelos explained that the present Minister was a military man who had been a member of the caretaker government, kept on at the request of the King. He indicated that a new Minister would be chosen after the vote of confidence in the Parliament.
[Page 688]The Foreign Minister said that his Government had no intention of cutting its military expenditures in a unilateral way. It recognized that this could only be done in consultation with NATO. Secretary Rusk expressed himself as very glad to hear this. We had pledged ourselves to each other, and needed to consult closely. We might have talks in NATO and discuss the situation in, say, Bulgaria as we both saw it. If at times we had different estimates, it was particularly important that we consult.
Mr. Venizelos referred to a complaint of the Soviet Ambassador about recent NATO exercises. He indicated that the Soviets had not gotten much comfort from his response.
- Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Confidential. Drafted by Talbot and approved in S on December 9.↩