Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

350. Paper Prepared in the Department of State⁰

Washington, July 15, 1963.

RESPONSE TO NSAM 251

U.S. POLICY AND THE POLITICAL OUTLOOK IN GREECE

U.S. Policy in Greece

1. As set forth below, the most probable outcome of the present Greek cabinet crisis is one which will be relatively favorable to basic United States interests—namely, a return of Caramanlis and the ERE to power. Since any United States actions which could be construed as interference in Greek domestic politics would almost certainly reduce rather than enhance this probability, and would be welcomed by both the Palace and opposition elements as grounds for attack against Caramanlis, the U.S. should refrain from such steps. We should, however, continue our current programs in Greece and proceed with the delivery of the projected aide-memoire, which will signify the continuity of our policy of cooperation and our interest in the welfare of Greece.

2. In the current context it is to the benefit of the largest parties, ERE and the Center Union, as well as to the benefit of U.S. interests in Greece, that elections be held by about October. Through an unfortunate combination of developments not now foreseeable, such as an indefinite postponement of elections, the currently favorable outlook might be reduced. Under such circumstances, we will consider what United States actions might be necessary and possible to increase the chances for an outcome compatible with our basic interests in Greece.

3. In any such consideration we must constantly bear in mind that Greeks are in general suspicious and resentful of real and imagined foreign intervention in their domestic political affairs. Greek public opinion is particularly alert to the operation of the so-called “American Factor.”

Political Outlook in Greece

1. The Pipinelis government will be under pressure from several directions during its period in office. The Communist-dominated EDA, of course, will oppose the government at every turn and will try to secure the cooperation of the non-Communist Center Union in some of its anti-government activities. The Palace probably will attempt to intervene more directly in governmental affairs in an effort to weaken Caramanlis’ position. The Center Union is likely to continue its attempts to harass the government, though it will be wary of joint action with EDA. The Center Union probably will devote much of its energies toward securing a favorable electoral law and ensuring that the election is a “fair” one, threatening to continue its struggle of the past two years if its demands are not met. Pipinelis has already met some of the Center Union’s demands—such as equal radio time—and probably will attempt to work out acceptable compromises on other issues. Despite the pressures from all sides and his desire to compromise, Pipinelis is dependent on the support of Caramanlis’ ERE, and is unlikely to take any steps that would seriously weaken Caramanlis or the ERE. It now appears that the ERE will retain its cohesion. Pipinelis will strive to push through an electoral law and complete the formation of the electoral rolls in time for an election within the next few months.

2. The outcome of the coming election is likely to depend to a considerable extent on the type of electoral law adopted. Caramanlis and many members of the ERE favor the majority system, and several years ago Caramanlis forced such an electoral law through Parliament. However, the Center Union, EDA, and some elements of ERE are opposed to such a system. So are many sections of the public, who fear that it would drive the Center Union and EDA into an electoral alliance, and create new bitterness between the government and the opposition. While the opposition parties and probably the Palace favor a relatively straight proportional representation system as one most likely to reduce Caramanlis’ strength, the ERE is strongly opposed. The most likely outcome of the struggle, after considerable political maneuvering, is the adoption of a reinforced proportional representation system—such as was used for the last election—which would benefit the ERE and the Center Union, so long as the ERE and the Center Union maintain party discipline.

3. The timing of the election will also have a bearing on its outcome. Caramanlis appears to have strengthened his popular appeal by resigning over his dispute with the Palace. As time passes, however, this issue may be superseded by other issues less favorable to Caramanlis and ERE. The now electoral rolls now under preparation apparently cannot be completed much before October or November. The Pipinelis government could attempt to rush the election by taking short-cuts in preparing the rolls, but such a maneuver probably would spark accusations that the government was rigging the elections in favor of ERE, and seems unlikely to be attempted. A more serious danger is that the Palace, fearing that Caramanlis might curb the royal family, might undertake desperate political moves to postpone elections in the hope of somehow preventing his return to power. For example, it might seek the cooperation of opposition leaders and perhaps some disgruntled ERE elements to form an openly political government. However, it is likely that the ERE will remain united and the government will carry out electoral preparations thoroughly and as speedily as possible, and probably will be able to hold elections sometime during the fall.

4. Caramanlis and the ERE will be in a strong position for elections held under such conditions. After many years in power ERE is relatively well-organized throughout the country, while the Center Union’s organization is weak in most rural areas. Greece has had seven years of stability and progress under Caramanlis, and there is widespread confidence that such progress will continue. Satisfactory crops in most parts of the country, expanding industrial activity, and a booming tourist business are elements of strength for the government. These factors are somewhat offset by the solid core of support possessed by both the Center Union and EDA and by the feeling of many Greeks that Caramanlis and ERE have been in office too long. However, it seems unlikely that these considerations will be enough to overcome Caramanlis’ assets, and he is likely to be returned to office with at least a working majority. No basic change in the Parliamentary strength of EDA or CU appears likely.

5. Such an electoral outcome would result in a further period of political stability and economic progress in Greece, as well as a continuation of Greece’s present foreign policy. The need to compete with the other parties in promising greater welfare benefits might create some fiscal problems for a new Caramanlis government. If relations with Greece’s neighbors become a prominent campaign issue, it could limit the flexibility of a new government in dealing with some perennial problems. However, even if these developments do occur they would create relatively minor difficulties. Friction between Caramanlis and the Palace might be a more serious problem, for Caramanlis may insist that the royal family play a more circumspect role—a prospect which the Palace, particularly the Queen, would find most unpleasant and would attempt to evade.

6. If for any reason—a long-delayed election, changing popular sentiment, or unexpected economic difficulties—Caramanlis failed to obtain a majority of seats in Parliament, Greece’s political stability would be substantially reduced. Even if the Center Union obtained a majority, conflicts within the leadership, the lack of cohesion in its components, and lack of a clear policy, would result in at least a modest decline in stability. However, it seems quite unlikely that the Center Union could secure a majority itself. A more likely result would be the failure of any party to win a majority of seats, with the consequent need for a coalition government. While such a coalition, which almost certainly would not include EDA, would not inevitably be short-lived or characterized by a preoccupation with political maneuvering to the exclusion of dealing with the problems of a nation entering the modern world, there would almost certainly be strong tendencies in these directions. There is no reason to fear that a Center Union government or a coalition government excluding EDA would, at least in the foreseeable future, represent a threat to Greece’s pro-Western foreign policy.

0. Source: Department of State, S–S/NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 251. Secret. Drafted by Schott, Barnes, and Lagoudakis and cleared by Talbot and RNA. An annex entitled “Background of Current Greek Political Situation” is not printed.