Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

340. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

US/MC/9

Paris, December 14, 1962, 4 p.m.

UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE THIRTIETH MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

Paris, France, December 13–15, 1962

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The Secretary
  • Ambassador Finletter
  • Mr. Willis Armstrong
  • Mr. Charles Breecher (Reporting Officer)
• Greece
  • Foreign Minister Averoff
  • Coordination Minister Papaligouras
  • Ambassador Palamas
  • Deputy PermRep Phrydas

SUBJECT

• Problems Affecting Greece at NATO Meeting
• Greek Defense Problem

The Secretary said he knew Mr. Averoff realized that the US Administration had a stronger and stronger political problem at home on defense aid because the Congress kept asking what the Allies of the US were doing both to help themselves and to help less wealthy Allies. Mr. Averoff replied he thought that the other members of the Alliance did not realize the full extent of the Communist danger and as a result they were not doing in the defense field what they should. In particular the people in Europe did not understand the military threat and were therefore not ready to counter it. The Secretary commented that it seemed governments were not making enough of an effort to educate their people on the Soviet threat and what was needed to meet it.

Mr. Averoff said he had to agree that the failure of the Alliance to mount an adequate conventional defense was due to psychological and political reasons. The Alliance was not fully awake to the dangers of local conventional wars. The Secretary remarked that certainly the Berlin problem threw a special light on this situation. Mr. Averoff said that was true but the Europeans were counting on the US deterrent alone to protect them and not on conventional forces. The Secretary stated one could perhaps understand this type of reasoning better regarding the central front but one could understand it even less for the flanks. He then asked Mr. Averoff what information the Greek Government had concerning Bulgaria. In particular, did the Greek Government think society was being thrown open to somewhat freer discussion such as seemed to be taking place in the Soviet Union, where more freedom of speech was being given to writers? Further, was there a noticeable difference in living standards between the Greeks living on the Bulgarian border and Bulgarians living 50 miles further north?

Averoff replied the Bulgarians had found some scapegoats for their bad economic situation. The Greeks did not feel any destalinization had taken place in Bulgaria, because the Bulgarian regime was just as rigid or even more so than in Stalin’s time. The Bulgarian army had been reinforced. There was a lack of consumer goods. As to living standards, these were appreciably lower in Bulgaria than in Greece. However, the Bulgarian army was stronger than the Greek army and had means which the Greek army didn’t have. They had advanced firing technology which only the Soviets had in remainder of Communist world and had very modern airplanes. Greek pilots were better trained than Bulgarian pilots but Bulgaria’s planes were faster and could fly higher. He didn’t feel that the Bulgarians intended to attack Greece on their own but thought the Soviets considered Bulgaria a faithful Ally that could be used for any purpose the Soviets desired. The Bulgarians were rightly called the Prussians of the Balkans. If there was any Bulgarian attack the Greeks would have to withdraw well inside Greek territory. This was hard on morale within the Greek Government though the facts of the situation were fortunately not known to the Greek population.

The Secretary said that apparently Greece was also concerned with “forward strategy” and seemed to feel that the most likely danger was a local war with conventional means. However, it was hard to imagine that the Bulgarians might attack Greece without full Soviet backing and it seemed questionable that the Soviets would wish to become involved to that extent. Averoff replied that after Cuba one could be more optimistic that the Soviets would not think that the West would accept as a fait accompli a land grab carried out within 24 to 48 hours. That seemed to be the real danger. The Soviets might rely on the theory that the Allies would accept a limited extension, by the Soviets, of their territory. This was the reason why Greece needed stronger armed forces which could prevent occupation of Greek territory. However, Greece was already spending for its armed forces more than it was spending for education and for welfare together. This obviously created internal political difficulties. There was for instance a strong drive in Greece which had Communist backing, to increase educational spending by 15% at the expense of defense spending. If the Government instead put its money into defense it was most important that it could say that the other members of the Alliance were also helping this Greek defense effort.

Mr. Papaligouras added that at the NATO Ministerial meeting at Athens it had been agreed to deal with the Greek military problem in NATO and with the Greek economic problem in the OECD. So far, the OECD Consortium for Economic Aid to Greece had not produced anything. If the NATO side failed too, the Greek economic problem and even more important, the Greek political problem created by this failure would be very serious. The Greek populace would interpret failure of the two exercises as a refusal by the Alliance to help Greece. There would also be unfavorable comparisons with Turkey. Greece wanted a strong Turkey and had been glad yesterday to support the Turkish case in NATO. However, as he had stated to NATO Acting Secretary General Colonna 13 December it was necessary that the pledges to Greek defense as recorded in the NATO “protocol” be firmed up. Since particularly Germany wanted to make its pledge conditional on pledges by others, it might be desirable to postpone discussion of the NAC defense resolution on Greece from this afternoon to tomorrow 15 December. The Secretary said he had talked to German FonMinister Schroeder and the Germans were aware of the problem. He could not say more on this at this time.

Averoff said that it was pertinent to recall that the personal prestige of Mr. Karamanlis was engaged in getting help from Greece’s allies. Nobody but Prime Minister Karamanlis had the prestige to keep Greece together, so it would be a very serious matter if Mr. Karamanlis were to be unsuccessful in his endeavor. Greece did not want to turn into another Turkey and face a “post-Menderes” situation. This would not happen in Greece because the Greek army was sound and the population was more advanced than in Turkey. Nevertheless, if Mr. Karamanlis was hit seriously by the opposition over the issue of aid to Greece this could lead to political instability since there was nobody else who had the personal prestige to do the job.

The Secretary said that while he was fully aware of Mr. Karamanlis’s great value to Greece and to the Alliance he felt sure one would not want to think of the future of a NATO country in terms of one life which might depend on a car accident. He recalled that when Mr. Pusey who was then quite unknown, had been offerred the presidency of Harvard he said that he simply did not have the prestige to take on that type of job. The Harvard trustees replied that the day after Mr. Pusey had become president of Harvard he would have the necessary prestige. The Secretary of course did not mean these words as any disparagement to Mr. Karamanlis who was so greatly admired throughout the Alliance.

The Secretary asked whether the present pledges made in NATO if firmed up would not help the Greek Government domestically. Papaligouras said yes they would. If $23.5 million were made available that would certainly help, particularly if it was “presented right” to the Greek people. The difficulty was of course that the Greek Government had continuously been saying that something was going to be forthcoming from Greece’s allies in the aid field and this event was being continuously postponed. So it was important that a firm announcement should be made now. The Secretary agreed this might be desirable but pointed out that as of now the Greek delegation could not yet tell its Government that the whole matter was settled in NATO. Therefore, and in line with the wish of the Greek Delegation he would suggest to Mr. Colonna that the Greek defense item on the agenda this afternoon be postponed to tomorrow, 15 December.¹

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–PA/12–1462. Confidential. Drafted by Breecher and approved by S on December 15. The meeting was held in the U.S. Delegation headquarters in the NATO Building.
1. On December 15, the NATO member states agreed to provide Greece with $24.4 million in defense assistance through a combination of grants, spare parts, equipment, and raw materials. Acting NATO Secretary General Colonna informed the Greek Government of this decision. The Karamanlis government accepted the offer and informed the Secretary General that it would raise its defense budget by $6 million. See vol. XIII, pp. 462–467.