334. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State0

119. Eyes only for the Secretary. Because I fear we are about to contribute unnecessarily to the differences which exist between us and the Greek Government on the question of our aid to the Greek defense effort, I would appreciate your personal consideration of our position. Embtels 113 and 1141 are the last of a series of exchanges which involve not only the question of the amount and form of our aid to Greek defense, but also the manner in which we propose to provide it.

The Greeks have undoubtedly exaggerated the harm they will suffer by the withdrawal of our defense support in 1963; they have chosen to look at the “deeper implications.” I have lost no occasion to make clear to them the basis for our decision and how we foresee they should be able to solve their defense budget problem. Although they understand our position intellectually, they continue to entertain a substantial suspicion that we are drawing away from the intimate relationship which has existed since the beginning of the Truman Doctrine.

It is only natural that unreasonable and exaggerated Greek reaction to our policies should generate impatience on our part, however much we try to avoid it. But I hope we will take Greek attitudes into account (as an important and unavoidable factor in our problem) not only as concerns the substance of our decisions, but also for the manner in which we choose to carry them out.

More is at stake than the Greek defense program (which I hope we think is important). The departments of our government enjoy many privileges in this country. Because of our special relationship these privileges are not only extensive but given ungrudgingly, without condition or demand for quid pro quo. To the degree we dilute that relationship by what the Greeks consider a lack of understanding, we will find it increasingly harder to get and keep such privileges.

As this relationship is important to us and as there can be no question of the Greek need for assistance in their defense effort, I feel strongly that we should follow the line recommended by the Embassy, particularly in Embtels 113 and 114.

Labouisse
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 781.5/7–3062. Confidential; Priority.
  2. Telegram 113, July 28, reported Labouisse’s belief that the Greek Government was ready to increase its defense spending to the $165 million level and suggested that talks be held in Athens, preceded by indications of U.S. willingness to contribute an additional $5 million to its 1964 Greek economic assistance package. Telegram 114, also July 28, outlined Labouisse’s objections to NATO procedures and tactics for negotiations with Greece on the interrelated issues of economic development and defense assistance. (Both ibid., 375/7–2862)