Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

331. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State⁰

Paris, April 7, 1962, 3 p.m.

4766. Department pass Defense. From Stoessel. Embtel 4723 and Polto 1333.¹ Following text (non-essential words omitted) memo for record dictated by Gen Norstad regarding his discussion with Greek PriMin April 6:

Begin text.

1. Friday 6 April, lunched with Caramanlis, FonMin Averoff, and Secy Gen Fon Office home Amb Melas, Greek PermRep NATO. Since I warned Caramanlis extremely disturbed about econ Wise Men’s report² and he wished discuss this with me, I myself broached subject by asking if he wished spoil his digestion by discussing Greek mil budget problems during luncheon. Ensuing discussion extremely frank throughout.

2. Caramanlis without question seriously disturbed, in fact angered, conclusions Wise Men’s report. He indicated Averoff already stated strong objections NATO Secretariat and Melas would be instructed reject report at early meeting NATO Council. Stated he failed persuade Americans on problems Greece on recent visit in States and attitude United States, together with Wise Men’s report, very discouraging. Assured me lack external assistance in proper form would not change his policy and he would continue support NATO wholeheartedly; however, Greece’s contribution would have be seriously curtailed.

3. I responded by stating I felt rejection report would be mistake since such action would not help him achieve any results and same time would tend alienate others, including many his friends. I very definitely indicated outright rejection at this time would not be well recd by United States. I gave this as my opinion and not result any indication from United States. I indicated Greece could state her objections parts report if she felt that had be done, but an outright rejection would be most unproductive. This position clearly had support Melas and I believe also Averoff. PriMin, as translated by Secy Gen of FonOff, did not yield on this point at this time.

4. I reviewed my meeting with Frontistis on 7 March 62, taking advantage this opportunity make it abundantly clear that I had given Frontistis figure $50 mil as gap ceiling, indicating limits within which he should work, with no suggestion as to how gap would be filled or in fact, without any indication it could be filled by any means. This point there discussion whether it best consider matter on NATO basis or bilaterally, and I suggested that, while I knew no decision on part United States on this particular point, there some indication willingness consider joint Greek-American approach in first instance (see DEF 911870).³ There appeared be general agreement bilateral approach would be better course, at least as initial step. There followed brief consideration level at which such discussions should take place, in course which I stated in reply to question that United States side would probably be headed, at least nominally, by Amb or Assistant or Under Secy level, depending location discussions took place.

5. I suggested Frontistis be encouraged provide us with reply on force goals as early as possible, since this essential basis for any further discussions.

6. Caramanlis ended talk by stating because Greek public opinion he could not promise not publicly reject Wise Men’s report, but because my advice he would give it further consideration. As Melas saw me to door, he suggested, since Averoff seemed sold this line, he quite hopeful.

7. From this meeting I conclude Caramanlis will not publicly reject Wise Men’s report, NATO Council. Greeks will probably make effort separate Greek and Turkish parts report, hoping former can be held up on basis Wise Men will consider additional information which has become available since visit to Greece—an action for which appears be some justification. It obvious Greeks hoped subject would not be discussed Athens since do so could be embarrassing hosts and guests alike.

8. I recommend United States take initiative in proposing bilateral consideration Greek def budget, basing action in general on long association in creating and maintaining Greek mil strength and specifically on request made by PriMin in letter to SecState 28 June 61,⁴ which has been acknowledged, but to which, according Greeks, no real reply of substance recd. Fact meeting would be directed toward def problem would in no way preclude consideration broader econ and financial problems Greece.

9. Believe this joint approach problem would not only contribute directly solution but also prove most useful smoothing over what has become quite sticky situation. For instance, Greeks claim have been told Wise Men’s report reflects American thinking and Averoff said he had been told report itself written by State Department. I dismissed remark by simply saying I did not believe it. Whatever action taken, early indication most important.

End text.

Gavin

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 375/4–762. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Athens.
1. Telegram 4723 from Paris, April 5, reported that Norstad and Frontistis had agreed that, pending the completion of NATO’s study of the Greek defense situation, Greek forces would remain at existing levels. (Ibid., 375/4–562) Polto 1333 from Paris, April 6, reported that Averoff was dissatisfied with the Wise Men’s report and believed that it would cause considerable political harm to the Karamanlis government. (Ibid., 375/4–662)
2. NATO document AC/213.D/2.
3. Not found.
4. Not further identified.