Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

299. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, December 12, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS

• Ambassador Turgut Menemencioglu, Turkish Ambassador
• Mr. Ilter Turkmen, Counselor of Turkish Embassy
• NEA—John D. Jernegan
• GTI—Myles L. Greene

Ambassador Menemencioglu came in on instructions from Ankara to discuss GOT views on the current situation in Cyprus. He opened the conversation by tracing recent events revolving around the proposals made by Archbishop Makarios to Vice President Kuchuk. He tied this to the Cypriot crisis of the 1950’s which he explained in terms of Greek and Turkish public opinion developing extreme opinions and dragging their respective Governments into similar positions. The GOT wants to avoid a repetition of this now.

The Ambassador said his Government had known that Makarios was about to present some thoughts, but had no idea they would go as far as these proposals. The proposals skip over incidentals and go to the heart of life-and-death issues involving Turk-Cypriots. First among these is the veto power. This is particularly important as a safeguard against communist strength on Cyprus, a subject which President Kennedy had referred to in his conversation with Foreign Minister Erkin last June.¹ Other critical proposals made concerned the army and police. All of this had been put forward purposely by the Archbishop at a time of Cabinet change in Turkey. Makarios failed to understand that any Turkish Cabinet would have precisely the same reaction as the Inonu Government.

Ambassador Menemencioglu reviewed the Makarios visit to Washington in June 1962. It was his impression that Makarios had been disappointed by the firm USG statements to the effect that present communal arrangements on Cyprus must remain unchanged. He continued that of course the GOT would be pleased to cooperate in making the implementation of present arrangements easier, but neither the GOT nor Turk-Cypriots could consider changes in the arrangements themselves. He hoped the USG could urge moderation on the Archbishop.

Mr. Jernegan replied that the USG had, in fact, been urging moderation on all parties concerned in the present dispute. We too had been surprised at the sweep of the Makarios proposals, but we do not share the GOT view on the impossibility of studying and replying to the proposals. We have been slightly hopeful over reports that Kuchuk will take some time before making a reply. We very much regret the quick public reply from the GOT. At the very least, the GOT could have refrained from making any comment.

The Ambassador said the GOT had no choice but to reply. For one reason, there are no real Cypriots, only Greek-Cypriots and Turk-Cypriots, and the Turkish Government must, as certainly the Greek Government would also do, speak up for its fellow nationals. Once Greek Foreign Minister Venizelos commented saying the proposals were entirely an internal Cypriot affair, the GOT had no choice but to give its own views.

In reply to Mr. Jernegan’s question about possible points that might be discussed, Ambassador Menemencioglu replied that there is the question of joint community arrangements. Above all things, however, Turk-Cypriots could not accept the Makarios proposals as an agenda for any kind of discussion.

Mr. Jernegan then commented that it would be best for all if Kuchuk would at least reply by listing points that he would be willing to discuss. The Ambassador said that might be possible. Then in reply to Mr. Jernegan’s question, he said the only way to get the Cyprus situation back to something resembling a balance was for Makarios to accept the fact that Cyprus is an exceptional place requiring exceptional governmental arrangements. The heart of such arrangements is the present minority guarantees, without which the situation would be most grave.

In further discussion of a reply to the Makarios proposals, Mr. Jernegan commented that it would be a most serious error if Kuchuk submits a flatly negative reply. Not only would this harm the international image of the Turk-Cypriots, but it would also give Makarios an excuse for more extreme future steps. The Ambassador agreed with both of these points, adding that perhaps Kuchuk might reply by listing issues that fall short of the life-and-death category. He then repeated his request that the USG speak up with Makarios on the need for moderation.

Mr. Jernegan concluded the conversation promising that we would continue to do all that is possible to urge moderation on all parties. This would be done within the limitations placed on us by the fact that prime responsibility rests with the guarantor powers. This particularly refers to the United Kingdom, whose present efforts toward a solution of the Cyprus problem we are prepared to support.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL Cyp. Confidential. Drafted by Greene on December 13 and initialed by Jernegan.
1. President Kennedy and Secretary Rusk met with Foreign Minister Erkin and Ambassador Menemenciouglu on June 1 from 9:45 to 10:10 a.m. (Kennedy Library, President’s Appointment Book) No memorandum of conversation has been found.