Office of the Historian

291. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State0

Ankara, October 20, 1963, noon.

498. Talbot, Jernegan and I called on PriMin Inonu and Deputy PriMin (Acting FonMin) Feyzioglu separately yesterday morning. Both devoted most of their remarks to Cyprus. PriMin went into less detail, but it was clear both wanted to impress us with importance they attach to question and firmness Turkish position. Essence of presentation was:

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1.
London–Zurich agreements and Cyprus Constitution represented compromise hammered out with great difficulty and involving sacrifices all concerned.
2.
Turkey could not contemplate any revision. Turkish popular reaction to any change affecting Turkish minority would be “volcanic” and no Turkish Govt, present or future, could possibly stand against this reaction.
3.
Makarios and Greek Cypriots were not attempting execute provisions of Constitution in good faith. During Archbishop’s visit to Turkey, he had hinted at need for Constitution changes; Turks had tried gently but firmly to impress on him impossibility of such action, but this evidently had failed to change his attitude.
4.
If London–Zurich agreements and Constitution were not upheld, only alternative would be partition of island, which would be tragic return to bitter conflict prior agreements. Strain on NATO Alliance both in this region and generally would be most unfortunate.
5.
Greek electoral campaign introduced special dangers. Cyprus issue would figure in it and undesirable statements would undoubtedly be made for local political purposes in Greece which would have serious repercussions here.
6.
Turkey attached special importance to role U.S. could play in influencing Cypriots and guarantor powers.

Talbot expressed our continuing concern over Cyprus situation and our desire that it be worked out among the parties. Urged that Turkey should remain in close and continuing consultation with other guarantors. On this point, Inonu asserted Greece and Britain could not act freely and impartially because of special relationship of each to Cyprus. This emphasized importance of U.S. role.

When Talbot suggested Turks should not oppose all change in Cypriot Constitution and pointed to demonstrated advantages of flexibility U.S. Constitution, Feyzioglu replied firmly that, while certain modifications might be made in due course, Turkey could not possibly agree to modifications of those constitutional articles which London–Zurich agreements excluded from amendment process. (At lunch afterwards, Secy General Bayramoglu said it would be impossible for Turks and/or Turk-Cypriot [garble] talk on basis of constitutional changes but that talks between two communities on island could well be undertaken if they were directed toward interpretations and means implementation of constitutional provisions in dispute. Added that if it seemed desirable guarantor powers could be brought into such discussions, always provided fundamental constitutional changes were not involved.)

Comment: This approach by Turks unusual largely because of high level and intensity. Believe intervention of PriMin probably caused by concern over repercussions likely to be caused by imminent Greek elections.

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  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–5 Cyp. Confidential. Repeated to Nicosia, Athens, and London.↩