Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

289. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

SecDel/MC/61

New York, October 1, 1963, 12:30 p.m.

SECRETARY’S DELEGATION TO THE EIGHTEENTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

New York—October 1, 1963

SUBJECT

• Situation in Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS

• American
  • The Secretary of State
  • John W. Bowling, NEA
• Foreign
  • H.E. Feridun Erkin, Foreign Minister of Turkey

PLACE

• USUN, New York

Foreign Minister Erkin opened the conversation by describing a talk he had arranged the day before with Cypriot Permanent Representative Rossides, at Rossides’ request. Rossides attempted to assure Erkin that the current actions of President Makarios did not mean that the constitutional guarantees of the Turkish Cypriots were in question. Erkin told Rossides that Turkey had signed the London–Zurich agreements in the firm belief that they would be thoroughly and solemnly implemented. Turkey considered the London–Zurich agreement to be a sui generis document, recognizing the existence of two communities on Cyprus, and believing it to be a good and feasible instrument for the attainment of the welfare and happiness of all the people of Cyprus. Turkey had found, unfortunately, that this spirit was not shared by “others”, who appear determined to destroy the agreement and reduce the Turks to the status of an ordinary minority left helpless under the Greek majority.

A symbol of this conflict, said the Foreign Minister, is the municipalities question. It is not a question of perpetual partition of the municipalities, but rather a question of good will and mutual confidence. Turkey feels that the sooner the Greek Cypriot leaders are able to create the necessary degree of inter-communal confidence, the sooner the partition of municipalities can be ended, at which point no one could be happier than Turkey. Unfortunately, the Greek Cypriot leaders, rather than acting to create confidence, had abruptly served a three-months ultimatum to the Turkish community on the municipalities question. Greek Cypriot leaders have apparently forgotten the principles of London–Zurich, and are openly talking of a unilateral revision of the Constitution, and of Enosis.

The Foreign Minister noted that he had at several times been forced to act publicly and privately to keep the Turkish minority in Cyprus from exacerbating the situation. The Government of Greece appears to share Turkey’s basic outlook and has several times attempted with little success to warn Greek Cypriot leaders of the probable consequences of their folly.

The Secretary asked if the Greek Government had done this publicly; the Foreign Minister replied in the affirmative. The Foreign Minister went on to say that Turkey had addressed remonstrances to the Cypriot Foreign Minister, but he had replied that communal problems were a matter of domestic concern to Cyprus.

The Secretary asked how serious is Greek Cypriot talk of Enosis. The Foreign Minister replied that it is difficult to say, and that much of it may be only lip service to an outworn idea. However, the Foreign Minister continued, the creation of a Republic of Cyprus based on a simple political majority would in a mystic way represent Enosis to many Greek Cypriots, since Enosis has facets other than simple political union.

The Secretary asked if the Constitution provided for amendments and if it was an integral part of the London–Zurich accords. The Foreign Minister said it had no provision for amendment and that it was an integral part of the London–Zurich agreements.

The Secretary asked for Erkin’s comments as to the time factor involved, noting that the Greek Cypriot leaders are threatening to take further steps soon. The Foreign Minister replied that he was not certain, but quoted Makarios to the effect that the Cyprus Revolution is a continuing process and that its objectives will soon be attained.

The Secretary asked about the British attitude, and Erkin replied that the British had made repeated representations to Makarios in favor of the existing relations between the communities and warning against unilateral changes.

The Secretary noted, and the Foreign Minister agreed, that the Greek Government had been a moderating influence.

The Secretary asked who had any real influence over Makarios, and Erkin said that while House Speaker Clerides was the only other really important figure in the Greek Cypriot community, it was apparent that no individual possessed any real influence over Makarios.

The Secretary remarked that Makarios had not been completely frank with U.S. officials during his American visit. Erkin said Makarios had been described to him by a leading Greek statesman only two weeks ago as an example of the worst type of politician. During Makarios’ visit to Turkey in November he had made a flat promise that on his return he would speak at length with Turkish Cypriot leaders, and had broken his promise without even an apology. He has no intention of creating a spirit of confidence in Cyprus, and rather wishes to create confusion, on which he thrives.

Erkin suggested that U.S. aid to Cyprus might be withheld to pressure Makarios into adopting a more sensible communal policy.

The Secretary replied, and Erkin appeared to agree, that such action, even if otherwise deemed desirable, would allow Makarios to turn to the Bloc and thumb his nose at the U.S. and the West.

Erkin went on to say that he had never mentioned partition of the island as a solution, since he realized the hardships and difficulties which would be involved. However, if compelled by circumstances, Turkey would have to fall back on partition as the only way to save the Turkish minority.

Replying to a question by the Secretary, Erkin said that partition would require mass movement of population. He added that Turkey didn’t want partition, and that he was not proposing it; Turkey wanted a continuation of the existing Constitution of Cyprus.

Erkin recalled that Makarios had accused the Turkish Cypriot leadership of misusing its prerogatives. Turkish leaders had assured him that they wanted to make Cyprus survive as a bicommunal state, and that they would be happy to exert influence on Turkish Cypriots who misused their prerogatives, if Makarios would provide details.

The Secretary asked what the effect of joint representation by the three guarantor powers would be.

The Foreign Minister replied that this would be a grave step which is not justified by events so far. The British Government, which advises calmness and continued negotiations, might not be willing to go so far, and any Greek Government which participated would face extremely serious domestic problems.

The Secretary promised to talk with Lord Home about Cyprus and to look into the Cyprus problem with particular reference to U.S. policies and plans.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL Cyp. Confidential. Drafted by Bowling and approved in S on October 2. The source text is labeled “Part I of II.” A second memorandum of conversation dealing with U.S-Soviet relations is ibid.