Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

282. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cyprus⁰

Washington, May 23, 1963, 8:14 p.m.

463. Ref: Nicosia’s 573 to Dept, 192 to Athens, 110 to London, 161 to Ankara.¹

1. Dept views with growing concern Makarios’ apparent developing idea that solution certain of his basic problems may lie in appeal to UN. We aware he has mentioned this possibility before but interpreted it as vague thought on his part to threaten referral in order to render UK and Greece more amenable his point of view. Now he may be seriously contemplating use of UN, perhaps as result (1) recent Averoff and Canellopoulos statements before Greek parliament (Athens 1151 to Dept)² to effect GOG might ask for changes in governing treaties or Constitution through negotiation, and/or (2) exaggerated and illusory notion, engendered by Amb Rossides during recent consultations Nicosia, of backing GOC might expect in UN.

2. We realize any eventual Makarios appeal to UN might be framed in indirect manner which could impose necessity difficult judgments and choices on US and UK as well as Greece and Turkey, and which might elicit wider UN member response than more straightforward question of sanctity of treaties, etc.

3. However, Dept feels it highly desirable promptly disabuse Makarios of preconception, which we consider dangerously erroneous, that any Cyprus appeal to UN would have backing, sympathy or even acceptance by US; we feel strongly that solution current aspect communal problem can and should be found in Cyprus by Cypriots. We suspect also that Greece, when chips are down, would be guided in its reaction to GOC attempt elicit its support for appeal to UN by considerations more important to it than Cyprus, i.e., relations with Turkey, UK and US, position within NATO and Common Market, etc.

4. We believe it desirable therefore have early separate approaches to Makarios by British and ourselves to provide him clear knowledge UK and US attitudes in this regard and to give him possibly more realistic view UN scene than he is likely to get from Rossides.

For London

5. You should elicit CRO and FonOff views approach described above and attempt obtain agreement that UK HICOM Nicosia will make similar demarche. Inform British we will make approach in any event.

For Athens

6. Further information or comment on Averoff and Canellopoulos statements referred to above would be most useful in attempting analyze GOG thinking this issue and foresee its possible plans. At your discretion, you may wish informally alert responsive level GOG to US lack of sympathy for UN involvement in any aspect Cyprus situation and, if possible, learn if GOG would be willing discourage Makarios from any plans in that direction. Suggest you coordinate with UK Ambassador.

For Nicosia

7. In May 21 conversation,³ Makarios may have been throwing out idea of possible appeal to UN to test US reaction before moving further with plans. It important, therefore, he be fully alerted as soon as possible to our thinking. Suggest, at early appropriate occasion, and after consultation with British HICOM Clark, you convey to Makarios substance US attitude as indicated first sentence paragraph 3 above. FYI: In your presentation you might wish avoid implication we overly concerned this matter and simply inform Archbishop of facts of life. End FYI.

For USUN

8. FYI. Would be useful if US and UK dels would consult and provide Dept with your assessment re above. Line taken in this tel is designed to discourage GOC from bringing matter to UN. We appreciate fully that Cypriots could refer matter to UN in such a way as to mobilize substantial support for UN third party intervention. We wish emphasize our belief that discussion with Rossides would not be helpful at this stage, but would appreciate having any indication you may be able to obtain discreetly regarding any steps he may be taking.

Ball

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 18 Cyp. Confidential. Drafted by King; cleared by IO, BNA, NEA, and GTI; and approved by Talbot. Also sent to London, Athens, and USUN and repeated to Ankara and Ottawa for the Secretary.
1. Telegram 573 from Nicosia, May 21, reported Makarios’ pessimism over the possibility of a compromise solution to the municipalities issue. (Ibid., AID (US) 15–8 Cyp)
2. Telegram 1151 from Athens, May 11, reported that Averoff had suggested that Greece might request revision of the London agreements. (Ibid, POL Cyp–Gr)
3. Wilkins reported on his conversation with Makarios in telegram 573, May 21. (Ibid., AID US 15–8 Cyp)