Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

246. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Helsinki, December 13, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Discussion with President Kekkonen

PARTICIPANTS

• President Kekkonen, Max Jakobson, Director of Political Affairs, Ambassador Carl T. Rowan, and Mr. Glenn Gordon, USIS, Interpreter

President Kekkonen began by saying that his recent trip to Moscow¹ served to confirm his views as to the attitude of the Soviet Union toward the Johnson Administration—that is, that it would follow the same line as the Kennedy Administration.² Kekkonen said he assumed that he was at liberty to tell Khrushchev of his discussion with Ambassador Rowan about the views and attitudes of President Johnson,³ and that he did so. Khrushchev reportedly was pleased to have Kekkonen’s report, and both Khrushchev and Gromyko emphasized their desire to continue to cooperate with the United States and the West.

Kekkonen said that the first thing that impressed him was Khrushchev’s good physical condition. At Novosibirsk in 1961 Khrushchev had seemed ill and fatigued. During this visit he hunted with great vigor and joked almost incessantly. Kekkonen concluded that Khrushchev apparently will be around awhile. Ambassador Rowan said that this was good to hear in as much as we know of no one on the Soviet scene who is certain to be any more reasonable than Khrushchev.

Kekkonen said he watched closely when Khrushchev was in the midst of Mikoyan, Kosygin, Malinovsky, Kozlov, Podgorny, and Polyansky and concluded that Khrushchev is in “complete control.” He said Khrushchev joked and talked freely, seeming to hold back nothing. He said Khrushchev appeared to be a man completely secure in his position. Kekkonen contrasted earlier visits when Khrushchev talked at length about Molotov and “the anti-Party group” and felt it necessary to explain at great length his opposition to the Stalinists. This time Khrushchev seemed totally unworried by the anti-Party group.

Kekkonen said that for the first time he felt free to question Khrushchev about Stalin, and that Khrushchev talked very freely and frankly. Khrushchev said that during Stalin’s last years the latter was mentally ill and hardly ever left the Kremlin. Khrushchev said that in 1951 he and Mikoyan were on a trip with Stalin when the latter often said, “I don’t trust anyone, not even myself!” Khrushchev said he and Mikoyan later got together and agreed that “those were not the words of a sane man.”

Kekkonen also discussed the Sino-Soviet split with Khrushchev who asserted that there is no real ideological difference, not even on the question of peaceful co-existence. But Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders admitted that they are befuddled by the strangely belligerent tone with which Red China states her position. Kekkonen said Red China troubles the Soviet Union “and will continue to do so for a long time.”

Kekkonen said his talks with Khrushchev were less directed to current burning political issues than was the case in the past, largely because Khrushchev seemed preoccupied with the coming meeting of the Central Committee. Thus, Khrushchev talked at length about Soviet domestic affairs. Khrushchev said the Soviet Union will abandon the Kolkhoz (collective farming system) and move to a state farm system. Khrushchev said that only the “human factor” prevented him from ordering even more drastic changes.

Ambassador Rowan asked if Khrushchev indicated from what sector of the economy he would divert resources for the economic reform programs he recently announced. Ambassador Rowan explained that he was interested in whether the Soviets might of necessity be less interested in an arms race and perhaps a bit more interested in some meaningful steps toward disarmament and world peace.

Kekkonen said Khrushchev had mentioned the cost of 42 billion rubles over a period of seven years, and had said that if the West refused to grant the credits for the machinery and other items necessary in the Soviet economic program, the program would go forward because the Soviets would divert resources from their own economy. Kekkonen said Khrushchev did not specify which sector of the economy, but that he stated emphatically that the Soviet Union needed peace in which to get its economy in order and to the point where it could compete more effectively with the capitalistic nations. He said Khrushchev placed great emphasis on scientific education.

Ambassador Rowan asked if, in discussing the new Johnson Administration, Khrushchev had mentioned any problem areas where he was particularly concerned, such as Cuba, or Berlin, or if, in discussing the Soviet Union’s need for peace, Khrushchev had given any idea as to the areas in which the Soviets were ready to make new steps toward peace.

Kekkonen said Khrushchev had simply indicated that his policy on Berlin had not changed, but had indicated that the Soviet Union was not taking any steps that might precipitate a crisis.

Ambassador Rowan said there was considerable confusion in Scandinavia as to whether Khrushchev planned to visit Finland as part of his Scandinavian tour next year. Kekkonen said Khrushchev will probably visit Finland but not when he visits the other Scandinavian countries. He said that when the other Scandinavian countries indicated next June would be suitable, Finland had offered the same time in the interest of Scandinavian solidarity, but that to visit four countries on the same trip apparently involves too much time to suit Khrushchev.

Kekkonen said he wished he had more to report, but that his journey turned out to be even more of a hunting trip than he had expected. He said there was less political talk than on any of his trips to the Soviet Union.

Kekkonen said that it was interesting to note that his proposal for a Scandinavian nuclear free zone was never mentioned in his talks with Khrushchev and was not even mentioned until the two of them referred to it publicly. He said that both he and Khrushchev apparently felt the matter had been discussed conclusively in the public forum, and that there was no need for them to take it up.

Ambassador Rowan said that he had taken note of Kekkonen’s feeling that some circles looked upon him with suspicion for making the proposal. Ambassador Rowan said that his government looked with disfavor upon the proposal, but not because of a belief that Kekkonen had made it with evil intent or because of a desire to do Khrushchev’s bidding. There was reason enough for the United States to disfavor the proposal because it is an unnecessary disturbance of the power balance in Northern Europe. “We can understand and appreciate your making a proposal that you think is in Finland’s interest,” Ambassador Rowan added, “just as I am sure that you can understand our reluctance to see any proposal put forward that would affect Norway and Denmark in such a way as to disturb deeply the situation in this part of the world.”

Kekkonen switched back to his Moscow discussions, asserting that “everything seemed to be in order in the Soviet Union” and he found great confidence in the prospect of maintaining peace.

“I began to talk about the new Johnson Administration and about any possible changes in the US posture,” Kekkonen chuckled, “then I discovered that Gromyko had just read the US News and World Report article on which I was basing my assessments.”

Ambassador Rowan suggested that under those circumstances President Kekkonen might want to join him in a resolution to give up reading newspapers and magazines. “You know that they almost wrote me out of Finland while you were away,” said the Ambassador. “Yes,” said Kekkonen, “and it all prompts me to say that there is never smoke unless there is some fire.”

The Ambassador replied that he had every expectation that he would spend a quiet winter by the firesides of Finland, for he knew of no plans of President Johnson to call him to Washington, though press speculation may suggest a recall.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 Fin. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Gordon and initialed by Rowan.
1. Kekkonen visited the Soviet Union November 29–December 4.
2. President Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas on November 22.
3. Rowan had discussed the policies of the Johnson administration with Kekkonen on November 27. He reported on these discussions in telegram 302 from Helsinki, November 27. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 US)