225. Memorandum of Conversation0
SECRETARY’S EUROPEAN TRIP (June 18–28, 1962)
PARTICIPANTS
- United States
- The Secretary
- Ambassador Bruce
- Mr. Bohlen
- Mr. Kohler (for the beginning)
- Great Britain
- Lord Home
- Sir Harold Caccia
- Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh
- Mr. Joseph Godber
- Mr. Ian Samuel
[Ramsbotham, Mason]1
SUBJECT
- Missiles for Finland
Lord Home said the Secretary knew the situation in regard to the Finnish request for anti-aircraft missiles instead of obtaining them from Russia. The Scandinavian countries had indicated that they thought that this was very useful and, in addition, there was a military problem if Finland received them from Russia. He very much hoped that the United States would agree with them on this subject.
The Secretary inquired whether there was any parliamentary reaction to this request. He said the Finnish Ambassador had recently told him that they would not bring up the matter again with the United States and had implied there was no great hurry in its solution. Lord Home said he did not understand since the Finns were telling the British that the delay was intolerable. Mr. Mason said that he had had some evidence which indicated a slight slowing-down of Finnish interest. The Secretary said it might merely be a difference in Ambassadors estimates of the national interest.
The Secretary then inquired as to whether it is conceivable that these rockets would shoot at anybody other than the West. Lord Home admitted that this was the case since if the Russians wished to take action against the Finns, they would not do it in this fashion.
The Secretary then inquired if the British had discussed this with their bomber command, and Lord Home said they had and they agreed [Page 464] that this might give a twenty-minute earlier warning to the Russians in the event of war. Mr. Mason explained that there were three cities that the Finns were trying to defend.
The Secretary again asked against whom. Mr. Mason replied the Finns say against anybody, but did feel that the protection of the cities was better from our point of view than the idea of a belt, which would fit in more with Soviet plans.
The Secretary then inquired whether the Bloodhound and Thunderbolt missiles could be used for training or whether they were too big. Mr. Samuel remarked that he had understood that they were about the same size as Honest Johns and doubted if they were small enough for practice or training, but that he would check into this with the technical people.
Mr. Mason then remarked that they did not feel that these rockets contained any classified information under the 1961 agreement defining basic concepts, and that as far as they could gather, this was completely on Finnish initiative alone, with Soviet permission particularly to use the ruble credits.
Sir Harold Caccia said the political arguments were strongly in favor of supplying missiles from the West, while the military arguments against it were minimal, and that the only problem of Western military defense was that they would be placed on the road to Russia.
The Secretary said if the Finns were not crowding for an immediate decision, he would like to hold off and he would go back to Washington and check further on this matter with our military and also in regard to the nature of the information. He inquired whether or not commercial considerations entered into the British calculations. Mr. Mason said that the commercial effects had not been considered in any British examination of this matter and that in reply to the Finnish Embassy here, it had been said officially that commercial policy was not involved. The only things involved were political and military considerations. The Secretary repeated that our concern was that these missiles could only be fired at us. Mr. Mason stated that the Danes, Norwegians, and the Swedes had all approved this idea. Lord Home agreed that they could hold up, but hoped that our response would come quickly.
The Secretary said he understood that the Finns had not yet voted any funds for the purchase of these rockets, and went on to say that the United States was perhaps more skeptical in regard to Kekkonen’s policy than the British. Lord Home said he understood this but felt that since the election there was less ground for suspicion since the elections had gone off quite well.
The Secretary then inquired what were the number of missiles and what was the total cost. Mr. Mason said there were approximately seventy-two [Page 465] missiles in groups of seventeen or eighteen. He said he did not know the exact figure but would check.
The Secretary said another aspect of the matter was that the Finns would pay out quite a lot of money for weapons which would only be useful against aircraft and in a short period of time, with the development of missiles, they would be useless. The Secretary said, however, he would consider it but he did not wish to imply that the result would be automatically favorable. He said we were having a great deal of difficulty with Congress on all matters affecting trade and foreign economics. He said the Executive was trying to maintain flexibility but that only yesterday the Senate, with one dissenting vote—the woman Senator, Mrs. Neuberg—had tightened up the financial export measure.2 He repeated his willingness to reexamine this measure did not mean any yielding on substance at this time.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11–RU/6–2562. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Bohlen and approved in S on July 3. The meeting was held at the Foreign Ministry.↩
- Brackets in the source text.↩
- S. 3161, a bill extending the Export Control Act of 1949 for 2 years, passed the Senate on a 59–1 roll call vote. For text of P.L. 87–515, approved July 1, 1962, see 76 Stat. 127.↩