203. Telegram From the Embassy in Finland to the Department of State0

274. Embassy has endeavored on basis information available in Finland assess motives behind present Soviet action against this country. This action might be result mere desire gain control all or part of Finnish territory or at least establish directing influence over policies of Finland. It may look opportune do so while world preoccupied with Berlin, South Asian and other crises synthetically created by Soviets or raised from minor to major scale by their fostering and under shadow of multi-megaton bombs recently exploded. Cynical way in which Soviets showed contempt worldwide public opinion by this latter act augurs ill for Finland.

In order better understand what may be principal Soviet motive, brief look at past history may be revealing. In 1939 Soviets using opportunity created by their then ally Hitler began to move against former Russian imperial possessions, Baltic states and Finland. Finns alone successfully [Page 427] countered this by “winter war”. Following Finnish defeats this war and “continuation war” Soviets probably found it inexpedient take over Finland completely as they needed their forces elsewhere. At end winter war they distrusted their ally Hitler. At end continuation war they were able use Finnish army against Germans in northern Finland and free Soviet troops for drive into Germany. In second instance Soviets were probably limited, partly too by circumstance that British and other allied nations were co-belligerents and parties to peace treaty.

That they did not subsequently lose their desire take Finland may be assumed from efforts made 1948 to seize it from within by Communist coup d’etat and by nature their continued support Finnish Communist Party. They may have decided that time is ripe at least begin process making good what they failed do in 1939 and 1948.

Following considerations may also have given Soviets motives for action:

Prior October 30 principal topic in this part of world was how can EFTA members and affiliates, including Finland, and other neutrals work out some method of association with augmented Common Market. As one observer has said success already attained and hope for future was “making even neutral flags blow westward.” This must have created concern in Soviet Union which doubtless fears integrated Western Europe both as economic power and ultimately as military one. Since West is standing firm in Berlin, Soviet-Finnish treaty may have seemed next best available instrument for pressure on West in general and Scandinavia in particular and good point departure for terror operation against member Nordic Community and EFTA affiliate.

Gufler
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 660E.61/11–2261. Secret. Received at 10:58 a.m. on November 23. Repeated to London, Bonn, Paris, Oslo, Copenhagen, Stockholm, and Moscow.