Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

201. Telegram From the Embassy in Finland to the Department of State⁰

Helsinki, November 21, 1961, 9 p.m.

266. Re our telegram 265.¹ Following numbered paragraphs give in summary–quotation remarks made by President Kekkonen, when I delivered President Kennedy’s message:

1. I am very grateful for this expression of President Kennedy’s consideration. I am also appreciative of fact that this is just between us two because if press were to get wind of your message my position in upcoming talk would be seriously damaged.

2. As I said in my speech Sunday, I will leave with grave thoughts. We Finns are concerned about outcome of talks, but I do not personally believe that situation is as serious as President Kennedy thinks. Perhaps some of the press speculation about Finland’s difficulties may have influenced him.

3. All Finn actions taken since receipt of note have had one aim in which so far we have not been successful. We want to avoid military discussions according to Article II of the 1948 treaty, because that would be tantamount to agreeing that threat mentioned in note actually exists. That was why we sent Karjalainen to Moscow. We wanted to have civilian rather than military delegation, for latter would have been construed as tacit admission that threat exists. That was why we decided to dissolve Parliament. I figured that in this way we could gain a 3-month breather. That breather lasted only 2 days. Now only remaining alternative is to send me.

4. I hope that I have necessary arguments to use in my discussions with Khrushchev to convince him that it is in interests of Soviet Union to permit Finland to retain its present position. If I can convince him of this and avoid discussions under treaty, then we will have come out on plus side. Worst would be if Khrushchev were to insist that Commies be put into positions of authority here in Finland. I do not think that this is realistic alternative, but in present situation all sorts of ideas go through one’s head.

5. If this were to happen, though, and if my policy were to be shown as unacceptable to Soviet Union, then I will not continue in this position. One of most difficult statements I ever have had to make was one in speech November 5 in which I said that if my policy is demonstrably unsuccessful, then I will resign. I have worked for fifteen years on assumption that my policy is right for Finland. If it develops that I have worked in vain, then I am not going to try to hold onto this job by hook or by crook. I would consider it my duty to resign and leave the area if my policy were to fail.

6. Regarding economic assistance offered by President Kennedy, I am grateful for his consideration, but do not believe that such assistance will in fact be required, because I do not expect any economic pressures.

7. My statement regarding Strauss visit to Norway² was part of effort to create favorable basis for negotiations with Khrushchev. I for my part don’t care much what Strauss was doing in Norway, but I said what I did in order to create better atmosphere for talks with the Soviets. Number of statements made in my earlier speeches, if taken out of context, would be unsupportable, but I made them with this same motive of creating favorable atmosphere and basis for discussing matters with Soviets.

8. Actually, you know, there is genuine fear in Soviet Union regarding West Germany. They are afraid that if present development continues West Germany will be so strong that it will be able to do what it wishes without worrying about its allies. This is fear they have, and it is only being realistic to acknowledge its existence.

9. Once again, I appreciate discreet way in which President Kennedy’s message has been delivered and am particularly grateful for wisdom and restraint shown by US Government in its attitude toward current crisis. Secretary Rusk’s recent statement was most helpful.

10. Please convey to President Kennedy my warm personal thanks for his consideration in sending his message.

With reference President Kekkonen’s statement regarding West Germany, I remarked that US had not helped form NATO and re-armed West Germany to support any military adventures by West Germany or anyone else in NATO. I added that West Germany was no longer Germany of Hitler either in size or spirit and that it was contained within framework of its Western alliances. I gave my opinion that Soviets know this and that their expressions of fear represent propaganda rather than reality.

I was impressed by real warmth and sincerity with which President Kekkonen expressed thanks for attitude of President Kennedy and Secretary Rusk.

At first glance President Kekkonen looked normal and reasonably cool. He began conversation in controlled, calm manner. When I looked at him more closely, however, I was struck with deterioration his appearance since I saw him at airport when he returned here on November 3. He had obviously lost weight and his skin looked slightly yellow. He looked drawn and heavily burdened with care. As he unfolded his thoughts, particularly when he referred to possible failure policy for which he has worked fifteen years, he revealed strong undercurrent of emotion and some sense of desperation.

He aroused in both me and Youngquist of our Embassy, who served as interpreter, feeling of sympathy for sorely tried man, who though he has made mistakes, is nevertheless trying to do what he believes is best for his country.

President Kekkonen is apparently going on his mission intent on playing as his only card himself and his past record of dealing with Soviets and their leader. It is to be hoped that things go as he expects but in the light of the rebuffs experienced by Finns within past two weeks it appears more likely that he may encounter situation beyond his control.

Gufler

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 660E.61/11–2161. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Received at 8:45 p.m. and passed to the White House. Also sent to Moscow and London.
1. Telegram 265, November 21, reported that Gufler had delivered Kennedy’s message to Kekkonen who expressed thanks for “President Kennedy’s thoughtfulness and for the inconspicuous way message delivered.” Kekkonen also praised Rusk’s November 18 press statement as “helpful.” (Ibid.)
2. West German Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss visited Norway November 16–17.