2. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State0
325. Camsky, subject Dean’s March 31 letter to Tims,1 is fourth case past six months of CSSR secret police whittling away veteran local employees, indicating systematic pattern. Heretofore we have laboriously absorbed loss using American ceiling complement. This cannot be done in case of language instructor; good teacher essential to long-range aims of Embassy. Moreover, next logical targets salami tactics are library assistants and publications procurement clerk who have access local circles now impossible for Americans. Replacement theoretically possible but loss present personnel would seriously impair efficiency and morale of Embassy, increase risk planned incident. Furthermore, if Camsky case should actually come off as described, receiving large-scale publicity treatment, adverse effect on development relations and on implementation our own aims in CSSR might be considerable; this is probably conjecture of instigators though we do not know how highly they are placed or how their actions are reconcilable with such actions Foreign Ministry as proposal cultural exchange.
I feel strongly we must make clear to governing CSSR personalities that harassment our employees can also have adverse effect on CSSR national interests rather than having no adverse effect whatever as heretofore. US action now might protect remaining local employees, forestall further development Camsky case.
Believe therefore we should make demarche based Kadainkova case, which is only overtone, making it stand for situation all local employees. Believe also essential that action be taken rapidly if at all before police make irrevocable move Camsky gambit; deadline may come tomorrow. Therefore recommend Department either authorize me see Hajek or that Department will call in Ruzek. After general exchange on status mutual relations, progress economic negotiations, et cetera (it preferable in interests of locals that employee issue not be sole subject of discussion) would mention Kadainkova note of March 28 (text, pouched Somerlatte April 1, merely summarizes my oral interventions, asks final favorable response), express hope for positive reply and then state that we did not believe that US Government would desire take final steps toward conclusion economic agreement, lifting personnel ceiling or reopening of Consulates, until clear assurances received that operations [Page 4] Embassy Prague will not be impeded through difficulties with local employees who have infringed no CSSR law and whose services satisfactory to us. We must reserve right to insist that law-abiding employees of Embassy should not be harassed or interfered with by Czech authorities in any way because of Embassy employment; we consider Mrs. Kadainkora’s case to stand for all local employees. If further details asked for would remark that participants aware facts of life in CSSR society and for that reason do not propose go further than state our problems in Prague not figments of imagination.
Because it overt, possibility of using Kadainkova case in combination with Czech interest in economic agreements and increase of personnel presents what may be our last handhold to limit police operations and get some understanding on this point; if not used field will continue open. With present circumscribed access for Americans and unimpeded police operations against both American and local Embassy personnel, an economic agreement, lifting of personnel ceiling and opening of Consulates would be of dubious value to US.2
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.49/4–461. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.↩
- Not found.↩
- In telegram 277 to Prague, April 5, the Department of State instructed the Embassy to avoid linking economic issues with harassment of U.S. employees and instructed the Ambassador to stress the deleterious effects of harassment on the normalization of U.S.-Czech relations. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.49/4–461) In telegram 333 from Prague, April 7, Ravndal reported he had made a demarche to the Foreign Office as instructed that afternoon and that Vice Foreign Minister Hajek “got the point.” (Ibid., 611.49/4–761)↩