Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

149. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, January 16, 1963, 5 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Yugoslavia

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• Ambassador George F. Kennan

Yesterday, on January 16, I spoke with the President on the subject of our relations with Yugoslavia, and particularly the question of the denial of most-favored-nation treatment to Yugoslavia. I explained to him that so long as this latter issue remained unresolved, the effect of the Congress’ action was to paralyze our policy towards Yugoslavia and to make it impossible for us to undertake useful initiatives.

The following is my understanding of the President’s views as expressed in this conversation:

(a) There has been suggested to him some sort of a scheme whereby action to achieve the removal of the m.f.n. denial would be initiated not in connection with the Trade Bill but rather in connection with the new Aid legislation. This proposal was not explained to me in detail, but I gained the impression that the initiative was to be taken by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The President, as I understand it, is favorably disposed towards this suggestion, and means to pursue it.

(b) With a view to facilitating this procedure, he wished me to see Senators Fulbright and Mansfield and to present to them my views on the effects of the m.f.n. denial.

(c) The President considered that if this procedure were successful, action could scarcely be expected in less than 5 to 6 months.

(d) The President was prepared to consider making a public statement about the m.f.n. problem in reply to a question at his press conference. He desired that I should submit to him a suggestion for wording he might use in this connection.

The President said he thought he had been told he had sixteen months’ grace in denouncing our Treaty with Yugoslavia on the basis of which m.f.n. treatment is extended, and he was not sure what this meant. I told him my impression was that the wording of the Trade Act made it incumbent upon him only to give notice “as soon as practicable” of our intention to terminate operation of the Treaty, and that one year would have to elapse, after such notice was given, before the Treaty would cease to be in effect. He asked me to see to it that he was put right about it in case my understanding was not correct.

I gave it to him as my opinion that if the new Congress was in any way seized of the question of revoking the m.f.n. denial, or if this was the subject of active consideration by any Congressional committee, he would be justified in finding that this was not a “practicable” moment for giving notice of the termination of the Treaty.

I believe the President understood, and concurred in, my view that while a statement by him in press conference would, of course, be helpful in steadying the reaction of the Yugoslavs, the latter cannot be expected to be fully reassured until it becomes clear that favorable action is to be taken by the Congress; and that in the meantime no major initiative by us, designed either to deflect the Yugoslav President from his present political course or to achieve a better understanding in American public opinion of the Yugoslav situation and the requirements of a constructive American policy there, could be expected to be useful.

0. Source: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Kennan on January 17 and approved in the White House on January 28.