132. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (Dutton) to Secretary of State Rusk0
SUBJECT
- Reconsideration by Wilbur Mills of Prohibition in Trade Bill Against Availability of Most-Favored-Nation Clause for Poland and Yugoslavia
Although we appear to be faced with a fait accompli, I want to urge that a vigorous effort still be made no later than Friday to get Wilbur Mills to reconsider the prohibition he has insisted on in the trade bill against the availability of the most-favored-nation clause for Poland and Yugoslavia.
I recognize that Mills has already talked with the President and you on this issue, and that the Conference Committee has made a decision. I have also talked with him and realize his adamacy. However, the conference report will not be submitted until very early next week, and it is therefore at least theoretically still possible to get the conference to reconsider the issue.
The information that I have obtained is that Mills was the principal, if not only, major advocate in the Conference Committee for this prohibition and the Senate Conferees held out against him for quite awhile. In [Page 277] both the Senate and House strong sentiment exists, of course, against trade, aid, or intercourse of any kind with the two communist countries. But Mills has been the moving force for including this prohibition in the trade bill in the Ways and Means Committee, then in the House, and now in the Conference Committee. If he could be turned around, it would seem that the whole situation might be reversed.
He has stated that the Conference Committee report on the trade bill would be rejected on the House Floor without this prohibition. However, I have talked with several key members, including the Speaker, and they indicate a contrary opinion, although I doubt that they are anxious to press this matter. Their opinion of the situation on the House Floor is relevant, however, in that if Mills could be persuaded by the President, the prospect of smooth sailing thereafter is in sight.
If the prohibition remains in the trade bill, it would seem only realistic that a similar ban will have to be included in the aid bill. The Congress can hardly be expected to approve giving away money and food to the two communist countries if it has already declared we are going to penalize trading and making a profit from them.
My principal reasons for seeking further consideration of this matter are that (1) the issue was resolved quickly and quietly without orga-nizing a vigorous stand on it, and (2) great substantive damage apparently will be done to our economic offensive against the Communist Bloc in Eastern Europe. If we do not fight for this issue, great damage will be done to an international relationship and intrusion on Communist solidarity accomplished over the period of the last decade. After the damage done by the trade issue, we must face further injury in the aid ban that would likely follow, and then in a possible effort later to intercept their trading with Cuba. In this series of events we are giving in to Mills on the point on which it would be easiest to take a defensible stand.
All of this damage is occurring, of course, just at the moment that the Soviets are trying to win them back—and just at a time when the Yugoslavs have shown through their new constitution that they want to expand Western concepts of individual initiative. Our default at this juncture would appear to be difficult to rationalize in later periods tactically as well as strategically.
If the present problem cannot be resolved on its merits, as I would hope, I would think that the Administration would at least want to make a strong public record of having sought to continue trade with the two countries and place elsewhere the responsibility for any events in the coming year which clearly demonstrate that Yugoslavia is turning back towards the Soviet Union. Surely this Administration would not want to be left open to a later charge that such progress as the previous one had made exploiting the loosening of the Poles and Yugoslavs from the [Page 278] Communist Bloc had been defaulted without major effort. I believe that at the very least a good strong record needs to be made before anyone charges we have let these two countries slip back behind the Iron Curtain without publicly raising even a finger.1
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Yugoslavia. No classification marking. A copy was sent to Kaysen.↩
- On September 28, the Secretary of State sent a memorandum to President Kennedy protesting the denial of MFN status to Yugoslavia and Poland; see Document 66.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩