Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

127. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, May 29, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Meeting with Yugoslav State Secretary for Foreign Affairs

PARTICIPANTS

• US
  • The President
  • Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
  • George F. Kennan, Ambassador to Yugoslavia
  • Harold C. Vedeler, Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs
  • LS—Mr. Glenn
• Yugoslavia
  • Koca Popovic, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs
  • Marko Nikezic, Ambassador to US

During his visit to Washington the Yugoslav State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Koca Popovic, met with the President today for 70 minutes in a frank discussion principally concerning US-Yugoslav relations, Soviet-Yugoslav relations, and Yugoslav positions on international issues.

In response to the President’s question about his trip to Latin America, the Foreign Minister said that he was very interested in the process of development in the countries visited; Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, and Mexico. He agreed with the President on the vitality and dynamism in the development of Brazil, where there was a growth rate of 4 to 5% a year in spite of great inflation, in contrast to the stability but depression in Bolivia.

The President asked where the US and Yugoslavia were going together and what was the prognosis and prospects for our relations. He subsequently raised a number of subsidiary questions related to this theme.

The Minister thought that our relations were not bad and were developing. Because of the complex policies both of Yugoslavia and of the US it was not too surprising if some misunderstandings arose. It must be borne in mind that the Yugoslav purpose above all is to maintain independence. At the present time our two countries are engaged in putting their relations on a realistic basis. This is a necessary development.

In reply to the President’s question about a realistic basis for relations between Communist Yugoslavia and non-Communist United States, the Minister said it was important not to exaggerate ideological differences and not to use ideology to justify positions on international issues. The President wondered in this connection what the real differences, beneath the cloaking in ideology, were between the four regimes—Soviet, Chinese Communist, Yugoslav and Albanian—and whether the Minister considered nonideological factors more significant than ideology in relations among these states. In explaining these differences the Minister pointed to the differences in political conception, in policy, in interests, in development and in economic matters, especially as concerns the utilization of resources available to the Bloc and more specifically the extension of aid from Bloc states to China. He suggested therefore that ideology was an after effect of those factors and that ideological difference was not as important as it seemed.

The President asked why the Chinese Communists attacked Yugoslavia. The Minister indicated it was no secret that there were bigger things behind the Chinese attitude toward Yugoslavia, that is, the Soviet-Chinese antagonism. As to the President’s question concerning what might be done about Communist China, the Minister thought that the policy of the US had served to push China into isolation and make for its militant attitude. Referring to Communist China’s aggressive posture toward India, the President wondered whether the approach of the Communist Chinese would be much different if we had followed another policy.

The President turned to relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union with a question that if it is not ideological difference, what prevents a close rapprochement between the two states. Minister Popovic said this had been impossible because the Soviet Union had desired Yugoslavia to enter the Bloc in a dependent relationship. He explained the closer relationship between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union existing today, a matter which the President raised, as a result of Yugoslavia’s desire to have good relations with all countries, the development over the years of a more realistic attitude toward Yugoslavia on the part of Soviet leaders, a Soviet willingness to take into account the independent status of Yugoslavia and a change in the quality of relations generally between the Soviet Union and other countries. He found the present improvement in relationship due not to a change by Yugoslavia in the conception of its position, but to a change in the Soviet view of its relation to Yugoslavia. He asserted strongly that this did not mean Yugoslavia was becoming an ally of the Soviets and he saw no reason for putting a question this way. He did feel that there would be a steady improvement in Yugoslav-Soviet relations if there was no basic change in international relations generally.

The President commented that he was not attempting to pry into Yugoslav affairs but he was interested in the association of our two countries. From this standpoint he thought it desirable that as Yugo-slavia’s relations developed with the Soviet Union its relations should also develop with the US. Our problem of maintaining cordial relations with Yugoslavia involves the element of public opinion. It must be clear to our public that US policy toward Yugoslavia is in accord with our broad policy objective of establishing a world of free and independent states. It is to our interest if Yugoslavia becomes one of these states but does not become a member of the Soviet Bloc. The President hoped consequently that Yugoslavia was interested in improving its relations with the US.

The Foreign Minister replied that the Yugoslav people are the guarantee of Yugoslavia’s independence. They are not prepared to lose independence and they will pay again, as they have in the past, the cost of keeping it. Yugoslavia would not want to have good relations with the Soviets at the expense of bad relations with the US. The President noted that in insuring its own independence Yugoslavia contributed to the maintenance of Greek independence and the more independent position of Albania at the present time.

The President then asked what the Minister saw Cuba becoming, a Yugoslavia or a Communist China. The Minister referred to his conversation at lunch with the Secretary of State¹ who he said had taken exception to the invitation to Cuba to attend the Belgrade Conference because Cuba was not uncommitted. The Minister had replied to the Secretary that they had tried through such steps as this to encourage Cuba to move to a status of nonalignment. When the President questioned why this had not happened, the Minister answered that one of the reasons was that the US had closed the door on Cuba too early. Its future now depends on the policies and moves of the great powers.

Referring to differences from time to time between Yugoslavia and the US in Africa, the President asked what kind of Africa does Yugoslavia support. The Minister replied that Yugoslavia can go along far with the US in its policy toward Africa. It desires to see an end of colonialism there and supports moves in favor of independence, both political and economic independence.

The President said that the US has no real history of a presence in Africa and not an interest as in Latin America. The US therefore has taken a clearly disinterested attitude toward African developments. In the Congo we have supported the independence and unity of the country and in this interest the government of Adoula, whereas Yugoslavia supported Gizenga. The Minister commented that Yugoslavia’s support was first for Lumumba and then for Gizenga as the heir of Lumumba against Tshombe. Yugoslavia is for the unity of the Congo. They took account of the realities of the situation by inviting both Adoula and Gizenga to the Belgrade Conference and now by having diplomatic representation at Leopoldville.

The President then put a question to Minister Popovic about ways of improving relations between the US and Yugoslavia. The Minister said that he agreed with Ambassador Kennan on this subject. Ambassador Kennan remarked that he agreed with the Minister to a considerable extent but was concerned about a possible tendency of Yugoslavia to take positions on international issues on the basis of ideological principles and to become in effect a political ally of the Soviet Union without being a military ally. If we can feel that Yugoslavia judges us only on the merits of issues we and other Americans will be relieved. The Minister thought that any conclusion about the existence of such a tendency was not correct and saw no danger in this regard. The US and Yugoslavia differed in substance on a number of international issues and often because of the US position in relation to allies on questions involving colonialism. The US position on disarmament in the past was harder for Yugoslavia to understand than the Soviet Union’s. Until recently the US, for example, had not declared in a general statement its positive attitude toward disarmament.

The President suggested the Minister look at our position on Angola in the UN, which led to differences with Portugal; on the Congo, which raised problems with the UK; on West New Guinea, which complicated our relations with the Netherlands; on Berlin, which was against some elements in Europe; on the diffusion of nuclear weapons, which was in conflict with the view of De Gaulle. How could Yugoslavia help but object to East German developments if it followed principle as well as reality in determining policy. We think our policy stands up very well and should receive the sympathy of Yugoslavia if it takes positions on principle. It would contribute to our aim of maintaining good relations with Yugoslavia if it would show more sympathy or support for our positions. This would count with public opinion here which is influential in policy matters.

The Foreign Minister indicated that Yugoslavia has no reason to present American policy in bad colors. They agree with the US position when it is also Yugoslavia’s but not to please the US. Ambassador Nikezic commented that if Yugoslav positions were examined by the other side the latter would find a number of them unsatisfactory as was brought out in the statement of March 5 by the Secretary of State (statement before the Kitchin Committee).² The Minister referred to a speech of his in the UN in 1958 which satisfied neither side and which must therefore have been all right.

Ambassador Nikezic said that if the Yugoslavs had not been not only willing to seek independence but also struggling to maintain it they would have been sucked up under foreign control long since by reason of factors of geography, power, etc. This attitude to preserve the independence of Yugoslavia is the will of the Yugoslav people and not just of the Tito Government. The will to preserve independence is the essence of Yugoslav history and he thought they could be trusted to go that way in the future.

The President said that our position in the world was thrust upon us and considerable isolationist opinion, which was not sophisticated, still existed here. In maintaining friendly relations with the US it was important to take this into account. In connection with this background we had our troubles in relations with Yugoslavia over the Belgrade Conference and the planes deal³ as the supporters of those who said we were soft on communism took up the issue. We have had to carry our policy toward Yugoslavia against these difficulties. If Yugoslavia takes account of this and shows good will it will help to make it possible to maintain and develop our relations with each other. The basis for maintaining a friendly policy is the preservation by Yugoslavia of its independent status. Anything Yugoslavia can do to manifest this status makes it easier for us. The President asked whether the Minister would carry this message home and he replied that he would of course.

The President wondered whether the Minister as a Communist has an explanation of any new development in world affairs. The latter replied that they did not believe that “we with Mr. Khrushchev” would bury you. They do think that a gradual socialization is in process everywhere including the US which has some degree of socialization already. They consider that socialism will evolve in different ways in different countries and it is impossible to have uniformity of development even if all countries were socialist. This had been and is a basic issue with the Soviets.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.68/5–2962. Confidential. Drafted by Vedeler and approved in the White House on June 8.
1. No record of this conversation has been found.
2. Secretary Rusk made a taped statement on trade expansion on March 5. The Rusk Appointment Books do not indicate any personal appearance before the House Committee on Armed Services of which Representative Paul Kitchin (D.–NC) was chairman and which, at that time, was preparing legislation modifying the Export Control Act.
3. Reference is to the sale of military aircraft to Yugoslavia by the Eisenhower administration and the training of Yugoslav pilots in the United States. For documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. IV, Part 2, pp. 1677 ff. This arrangement, which was terminated in 1957, became public in October 1961.