Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

108. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State⁰

Belgrade, November 14, 1961, 7 p.m.

757. Wish to draw attention to implication of statements on US-Yugoslav relations in Tito’s Skoplje speech.¹ To facilitate consideration, full text these passages submitted in next following message.²

Department will wish to make its own study this language, but it seems to me from careful study Serbian text that for Yugoslav reader or listener following inferences were inescapable:

(A) US has recently been refusing to sell wheat to Yugoslavia on normal commercial terms or any other.

(B) US has recently declined to sell planes to Yugoslavia, though we had previously done so.

(C) US is refusing to accept Yugoslav visitors in US.

(D) All these positions have been taken by us with view to bringing pressure to bear on Yugoslavia.

(E) Yugoslavia has in recent years not received from us any grant aid, nor is it asking for any. (This last is flatly stated and goes beyond limits of inference.)

I have no information as to what action our Government is considering taking on 1962 Aid Programs, but understand decisions of some sort may be expected in near future. Wish to point out that if above inferences are allowed to stand uncorrected, any decisions we may make known along these lines can only lead to further misunderstandings among Yugoslav public. If, for example, in face of these statements, we now go ahead and simply express readiness to conclude contract for further surplus wheat, we create erroneous impression that, shamed by Tito’s logic and sobered by threatening reference to bitterness of Yugoslav people, we have yielded to pressure and agreed to do what were unwilling to do before he spoke. Same applies to DLF. If, similarly, we offer to renew contracts for grant aid, it will look as though we are proffering a type of aid Yugoslavs have not recently been receiving, do not want, and did not ask for. In these circumstances, to ignore Tito’s statements and to act on aid requests as though nothing had been said would be to compound a confusion not our own making. It would also bring discouragement to those people within the regime who have been trying to warn against Tito’s anti-Western course.

For these reasons, I feel we must react in some way. Several courses are open to us. It is difficult for me to recommend any course in absence information our intentions with respect to 1962 Aid Programs. Before we do anything at all, we should make up our minds about PL 480 Aid. Assuming that we are inclined, other things being equal, to make further contract for delivery PL 480 wheat, would suggest course of action along following lines:

1. Make private communication to GOY, complaining of Tito’s innuendoes, asking for their clarification by Yugoslavs, and stating that we ourselves will be obliged in any case to put facts before public. At same time we state to Yugoslavs our readiness, notwithstanding Tito’s misleading statements, to conclude further contract PL 480 wheat in near future.

2. We make public statement announcing our readiness, in view recent drought and resulting difficulties, to conclude new PL 480 wheat agreement, reminding public we have always been ready, in addition, to sell Yugoslavia any amount of wheat she required on normal commercial terms and that GOY has never been left under any doubt about this. At same time, and with specific reference to Tito’s statements, we publish full factual data on recent sale of planes to Yugoslavia, on reception Yugoslav officials in US, and on form and amounts of grant aid extended in recent years. In same statement we make it plain that at no time have any threats been made to Yugoslavs or has pressure been brought to bear on them in connection with any of these matters.

3. We use every means at our disposal to bring these statements to attention Yugoslav public, using VOA and USIS media to limit. (Something of this sort should in fact be done even though decisions on aid should be further delayed.)

4. Until this last has been thoroughly done, we refrain from making any statement to Yugoslavs or public concerning any other positive decisions we may have taken about 1962 Aid Programs.

In explanation of above, would say I think we would be inviting further misunderstanding in public mind if we were at this time to refuse to supply further surplus wheat or to delay much longer in making known our readiness to supply it. In the particular case of grant aid, fail to see how we can consider further extension such aid until Tito in some way corrects his flat statement that no one-sided aid has been received from us by Yugoslavs in recent years.

Kennan

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.68/11–1461. Confidential; Priority.
1. The Embassy transmitted a summary of Tito’s speech in telegram 752 from Belgrade, November 14, and made a preliminary analysis of the speech in telegram 755 from Belgrade, November 14. (Both ibid., 768.11/11–1461) In his speech, Tito charged that the United States was using food as a weapon to try to force Yugoslavia to follow its policy line. He rejected aid on such terms and insisted that Yugoslavia would go it alone.
2. Telegram 758 from Belgrade, November 14. (Ibid.)