88. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State0
228. My conversation with Khrushchev—Berlin.
I started to take my leave of K but he said he had additional subject to discuss even though he disliked bringing up unpleasant matter on my last visit. He had read report first Rusk-Gromyko conversation and half of second but it was already clear our dialogue was coming to end. He would have no choice but to proceed with signature of treaty after which our rights there, including right of access, would end. He emphasized that East Germans were allies and Soviets would stand by them. On this occasion and others in conversation he showed great sensitivity to what he considered threats and said Soviet Union great power, not small country which could be threatened with impunity. President had suggested time would make solution easier but he could not wait indefinitely. From some things Secretary Rusk had said, we apparently had idea of unending talks, but this not acceptable. Soviet Govt had tried many different proposals to find solution but we insisted on maintaining occupation in center of sovereign GDR.
[Page 254]I replied Secretary discussing this matter with Gromyko and in any event our position had been made so clear there was little I could add. I pointed out however that in 1959 we had endeavored to meet Soviet problem and find ways to take Berlin out of cold war. These proposals had not been accepted. It was Soviet side and not we that had focused world attention on Berlin to point where smallest thing became test of our intentions. I pointed out that psychology of people of Berlin and West Germany had become very important. Many people on our side felt that acceptance of Soviet proposals meant we would lose not only Berlin but rest of Germany and consequently all of Europe. I said that they and we knew what Ulbricht wanted in West Berlin. K had himself said that our troops in Berlin had no military value and we agreed with this appraisal, but they were essential to maintain confidence of people of Berlin.
K said we often referred to prestige but did not take into account prestige of Soviet Union. Continuance of occupation would be humiliating to East Germany and Soviet Union. He said we also referred to our commitment to people of Berlin but we had no right to make such commitment when it involved interests of Allies who had made enormous sacrifices in war. I said I thought in matters of this kind it was important to try to get other person’s point of view. I asked him what he would do if he had Soviet troops in similar situation and we said we would cut them off. I knew he would respond that he would sign treaty and withdraw (before interpreter reached this sentence K interjected to say exactly that). I got impression that this remark had some effect. K said he was considering bringing matter before UN and in this connection made some vague reference to possible commission of jurists—in order that Soviet Union could make clear its position before signing treaty. He said he was discussing this possibility with his colleagues but no decision had been taken and he had not made up his own mind whether this was best course but it had certain appeal for him.
K took usual line on German reunification.
This part of conversation ended by my telling him he should find way to give us better choice of alternatives than those now before us and I illustrated this with a long anecdote. He was cordial throughout discussion and I had impression he considered he had to move ahead but deeply troubled. He emphasized many times this was the one problem standing in way of good relations between us and I believe he is sincere in this.
I said I hoped he would study carefully reports Rusk-Gromyko conversations as Secretary had fully set forth our position. At dacha in afternoon he had Semenov, their German expert, present, indicating he expected continue Berlin talk, but did not do so in any specific way.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/7–2662. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.↩