Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

6. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

SecDelMC/4

Geneva, March 11, 1962, 4 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The Secretary of State
  • Mr. Bohlen
  • Mr. Kohler
  • Ambassador Thompson
• United Kingdom
  • Lord Home
  • Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh
  • Sir Frank Roberts

SUBJECT

• British-American Bilateral Talks

Negotiations with the Soviets

The Secretary opened the conversation by reviewing briefly his talk with German Foreign Minister Schroeder.¹ Following this he set forth our estimate that while there had been absolutely no give in the Soviet position during the bilateral talks we have had with them, still there is no evidence they are preparing for a showdown. However, it seems likely that they consider that they are stuck with public positions. We had considered whether we could develop a sort of generalized formula under which it would be possible to set up a continuing negotiating forum such as Deputy Foreign Ministers. Lord Home wondered whether this would fill the Soviet requirements since he felt that a summit conference was an immediate goal of Khrushchev. The Secretary replied that it might even be possible to have a Summit Conference which would serve to launch the continuing Deputy Foreign Ministers forum. In response to a further question from Lord Home as to the content of the formula, the Secretary said this might provide for a continuance of existing access procedures (that is, at a suitable date, not as now under harassment) to which could be added items regarding non-transfer of nuclear weapons, no use of force to effect boundary changes and a NATO-Warsaw Pact non-aggression arrangement. At least this would enable us to put forward an agenda broad enough to be of some interest to the Russians. This idea was based on an assumption that the Russians were not out really to take over access and that such a formula would give them a chance to draw away. If this assumption proved to be wrong then we were faced with a crisis and showdown in any event. Lord Home observed the Secretary’s formula did not touch on the status of the city of West Berlin which seemed a prime Soviet point or the question of the presence of Allied troops in Berlin. He suggested that we might also be able to add something about practical dealings with the GDR. If we did not add such elements Lord Home feared we would simply face a Soviet charge this was another Western delaying tactic.

Turning to Sir Frank Roberts, the Secretary asked his opinion as to whether the Soviets would be more receptive to his formula if it were launched at a Summit meeting in May. Sir Frank thought that this would enhance the attractiveness of the proposal. Ambassador Thompson agreed but went on to point out with reference to Lord Home’s remarks that our position was that the matter of our staying in West Berlin was not negotiable and that this would have to be made clear. The Secretary resumed, saying that it might be possible to add to the formula some reference to the ultimate reunification of Germany and the setting up meanwhile of technical communications between the FRG and the GDR. Ambassador Thompson commented that two recent developments might be interpreted as a good sign. Khrushchev’s speech to the Central Committee Plenum had made clear that the conflict with the Chinese would continue. Furthermore it seemed possible that the big Soviet loan to Ulbricht might be a sort of sop to him in lieu of positive action with respect to the peace treaty and status of West Berlin. Lord Home, who had been reflecting on the conversation, then agreed it would be useful to try out a formula along these lines. Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh asked whether we would envisage the result of this as parallel declarations or what? The Secretary replied that he thought it was possible that a quadripartite paper could be developed to which all four powers would adhere. However he felt that there was no use to consult in any detail with the Germans and French unless there was some indication of Soviet interest.

Air Corridors

The Secretary then turned to the subject of the air corridors and reviewed briefly the very serious Soviet maneuvers and harassments of our access. He felt that the use of chaff to jam radars was particularly outrageous and little short of the actual use of firearms. Ambassador Bohlen commented on the surprising nature of this Soviet action contrary to their usual practice of trying to cover their acts with some semblance of legality and expressed the opinion that it would be important to hit Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on this promptly tonight. As evidence of the seriousness with which the US regarded this the Secretary then pointed out to Lord Home that if the dropping of chaff in the air corridors had happened two days earlier it was quite possible he would not be here today. However the news had been received too late to enable him to touch base with the British and others. After some further discussion of the details of the Soviet actions in the air corridors and particularly the filing of flight plans between the altitudes of 7500 and 10,000 feet, the Secretary suggested that the time had come when we should perhaps authorize Norstad to put flights through over 10,000 feet. Mr. Kohler explained that the US had already given such authority to Norstad but that it was for the time being contingent on British and French agreement. The Secretary then gave Lord Home a copy of the talking points prepared for his meeting with Gromyko tonight. (Attachment) After they had been looked over by the British Delegation it was agreed that these talking points were very suitable for use with Gromyko tonight except for the last sentence of numbered paragraph (1). It was noted that the British could add specific incidents involving British aircraft. The Secretary then suggested a number of possible courses of action that might be taken as follows:

A. In the corridors:

1) schedule Allied flights in the same altitudes as Soviet flights, with ten minute time lags;

2) schedule Allied flights exactly to coincide in time and altitude with Soviet flights;

3) delay schedules and inconvenience LOT flights in the same measure as the Soviets have affected our flights; and

4) orbit fighters at the entrance to the corridors at normal operational flight elevations.

B. Outside the corridors:

Harass Soviet flights over Western Europe, and over the Atlantic, Mediterranean, and North Sea with:

1) regular fighter escorts;

2) fighter harassment, close buzzing to match Soviet actions with our aircraft; and

3) delay of airport clearances.

We would also harass Soviet bloc flights over Western Europe.

These were discussed at some length. It was suggested during this discussion that many of these measures could be taken within Norstad’s present authority if they were suggested to him by governments; also that the original British condition to authorize flights over 10,000 feet, i. e. that the Soviets attempt to preclude flights in the normal commercial channels of 7500 to 10,000 feet had now been met. While no definite decision was made on these proposed countermeasures it was agreed that the Secretary would serve notice on Gromyko before the dinner tonight of his intent to bring up this serious matter and that the Secretary and Lord Home sometime following the dinner take Gromyko aside and take this question up with him. Meanwhile the Secretary had been attempting to place a phone call to General Norstad. He finally reached the General though with a rather bad connection. General Norstad informed the Secretary that he had sent his recommendations with regard to the Soviet maneuvers which should reach us within the hour and that as of tonight he needed no new authority.²

Attachment³

BERLIN AIR CORRIDORS

Talking Points

1. I have observed with increasing concern the activities of Soviet aircraft in the Berlin air corridors. We had hoped that it would be possible, in the course of the next week or ten days, to have some fruitful discussions with you regarding Berlin. We cannot and will not hold such discussions, however, when the Soviet Union is carrying on a policy of deliberate harassment of Allied flights through the Berlin air corridors.

2. I would like to leave you under no illusion as to the risk you are running in seeking to interfere with Allied exercise of their rights in the Berlin air corridors. This was brought to the attention of the Soviet Government as recently as February 15 following harassment of United States aircraft by Soviet fighters on February 14.

3. On February 14, 1962, Soviet aircraft on three occasions seriously threatened by close approach United States aircraft flying in the North corridor to Berlin in accordance with quadripartitely agreed flight rules under flight plans on which customary flight information had been made available to the Soviet element of the Berlin Air Safety Center (BASC). Soviet MIG’s performed acrobatics around the nose of two United States Air Force C/124’s, approaching at times as close as twenty feet. A Soviet MIG also approached to within one plane length of a Pan American World Airways aircraft loaded with passengers.

4. On February 19, the Soviet controller in BASC began to file individual flight plans for Soviet military transports. Although the Soviet Government has, in the past, flown occasional individual aircraft along the air corridors, this was the first time it was done on a systematic basis. The Soviet controller sought to portray these flights as “normal”, but they were a patent attempt to preempt space in the corridors by flying unnecessary flights. This intention was clearly demonstrated on March 7 when the Soviet controller filed a flight plan for a Soviet LI–2 at the same altitude and time that a scheduled Pan American World Airways plane was due in the corridor under a flight plan filed in BASC. When the United States controller asked the Soviet controller to refile his flight plan for another altitude, the Soviet controller refused. Although the Pan American plane reached Berlin safely, the Soviet flight was an obvious attempt to interfere with use by United States aircraft of the air corridors.

5. On March 9 on two occasions, Soviet aircraft made runs across the three air corridors some four miles West of Berlin, employing measures, including the dropping of chaff, designed to interfere with radar. This was a direct and deliberate effort to threaten the safety of flight. There can be no justification whatsoever of such practice in or near the corridors.

6. On March 10, the Soviet controller filed flight plans for Soviet aircraft for March 12, in the South corridor at altitudes between 7,000 and 10,000 feet which are those normally used by aircraft flying to and from Berlin. The Soviet Government knows that these flights will conflict with scheduled flights by Pan American World Airways and Air France aircraft. This tactic represents a further obvious attempt to inhibit legitimate air access to Berlin provided for under the quadripartite agreements.

7. The Soviet Government should not overlook the fact that up to this point the Allies have shown great restraint in the face of severe provocation. The Soviet Government should understand that the Allies have the means to respond with vigor and effectiveness and that they are not prepared to tolerate persistent Soviet actions directed toward restricting exercise of their rights of air access to Berlin. We expect the Soviet Government to cease its interference in the air corridors. Allied aircraft will continue to fly in the corridors at times and altitudes deemed necessary. We will take the necessary steps to ensure the safety of such flights and will hold the Soviet Government responsible for the consequences of any incidents that might occur.

8. We note that these activities are being intensified on the eve of the Disarmament Conference. This Conference is being held pursuant to a statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations signed by both the US and the USSR and unanimously approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations. In this statement of principles it was agreed that, in order to facilitate the attainment of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world, all states should refrain from any actions that might aggravate international tensions. Actions of the Soviet Union which deliberately interfere with well established rights of air access will make the achievement of this goal much more difficult. They will jeopardize the Conference, and threaten most seriously the prospects for discussions on Berlin and other important items.

9. I should add that the Soviet assertion of alleged “GDR” sovereignty over Berlin and over the air corridors overlooks the basic fact that the arrangements for both Berlin and the air corridors antedate by some years the setting up of the “GDR”.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.41/3–1162. Secret. Drafted by Kohler and approved in S on March 13. The meeting was held at the U.S. Mission. A detailed summary of the conversation was transmitted in Secto 10 from Geneva, March 12. (Ibid., 762.00/3–1262)
1. During a working luncheon with Rusk at the Hotel Lausanne at noon, Schroeder stated that he had no doubts about U.S. intentions with regard to Berlin. Rusk outlined the U.S. appreciation of the discussions with Gromyko. (SecDel MC/1, 6, 9, and 10; ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2074) During the conversation the Germans presented the U.S. Delegation with a 3-page paper on how the talks with the Soviets might be continued. (Attachment to SecDel MC/10)
2. See footnote 1, Document 5.
3. Secret.