Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

57. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France⁰

Washington, May 24, 1962, 7:54 p.m.

6319. If opportunity presents itself in your meeting with De Gaulle you should attempt correct some misconceptions on his part on underlying rationale of US exploratory talks with Soviets on Berlin which became apparent during his May 15 press conference.¹ Same line could also be used as appropriate in Embassy contacts with FonOff.

By negative implication De Gaulle apparently under impression US is engaged in definitive attempt to settle problem of Germany. This may be among Soviet objectives as embodied in their concept of drawing line under World War II, but US is under no illusions on this point. Our position remains, as it has always been, that only lasting solution to German and Berlin problems would be reunification of country in freedom with reunited Berlin as capital of this unified Germany. We are also realistic enough to recognize that this goal is unlikely to be achieved in foreseeable future, given basically conflicting Communist and Free World interests in Central Europe.

What we are trying to deal with is factual situation, one of ingredients of which is capacity of Soviets to sign separate peace treaty with GDR and to refuse any longer to carry out their responsibilities towards Western Occupation Powers in Berlin. As one of powers principally concerned in involved discussions of this subject since Khrushchev first precipitated Berlin crisis in November, 1958, French Government should be very well aware that reasonable Western response to this Soviet threat must be first to try to prevent such unilateral action by Soviets, but if this cannot be done, to attempt in advance to achieve some arrangement or modus vivendi which will enable vital Western interests in Berlin situation to be preserved.

In explaining US approach, we have found useful conceptual framework analyzing discussions with Soviets as taking place on three levels. In this connection, you should draw on exposition in Deptel 5567 to Paris on April 17, reporting Secretary’s discussion with Dobrynin on previous day.² We believe use of this framework can be helpful in clearing up misconceptions as to purpose of “principles paper” handed to Gromyko by Secretary in Geneva on personal and informal basis.

We cannot agree that certain broader elements included in this paper, such as nuclear nondiffusion, NATO-Warsaw Pact nonaggression statements and possible West German/East German mixed commissions amount to attempt to settle German problem. These are either merely declaratory of existing US policy or attempt to provide mechanisms (as in case of mixed commissions which suggested by Germans themselves) to improve de facto situation for benefit of Berliners, West Germans and population of East Germany.

FYI. We would not, of course, anticipate that you could persuade De Gaulle of soundness US approach, given his position that mere posturing behind US nuclear deterrent will somehow or other suffice to prevent Soviets from taking unilateral actions which we cannot prevent and which will necessarily result in de facto deterioration of Berlin situation. On other hand, we do not wish to seem to agree, even by implication, with his assessment that present US/Soviet exchanges amount to tacit willingness on our part to join with Soviets in drawing line under World War II in manner they desire. End FYI.

You might add that we have been in full consultation with the German Government, as we have moved from meeting to meeting with Soviets, and have also tried to keep French fully informed to extent that French Government itself has been willing to permit this. We shall continue our probing of Soviet position. Maintenance of contacts with Soviets on this highly charged question is desirable and we consider that we must continue to explore possibility, consistent with our vital interests, of achieving some modus vivendi. In the event of breakdown and major confrontation over Berlin, we should be able to say that we have discharged fully our responsibility to our people in search for a peaceful solution. We have been glad to note from President De Gaulle’s press conference statement that France does not object to employment by US of its diplomatic resources towards this objective.³

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/5–2462. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Hillenbrand, cleared by Tyler, and approved and initialed by Kohler.
1. For a transcript of De Gaulle’s press conference, May 15, see Major Addresses, Statements and Press Conferences of General Charles de Gaulle, May 19, 1958–January 31, 1964, pp. 172–184.
2. Telegram 5567 to Paris is the same as telegram 2363 to Moscow; see the source note, Document 39.
3. Ambassador Gavin met with President De Gaulle on May 26, but was unable to make the points raised in this telegram, since De Gaulle ended the meeting before the Ambassador could respond to his exposition of the French position on Berlin. (Telegram 5700 from Paris, May 28; Department of State, Central Files, 611.51/5–2862; printed in vol. XIII, Document 252.