26. Telegram From the President’s Special Representative in Berlin (Clay) to the Commander in Chief, United States Army, Europe (Clarke)0

1076. POLAD USAREUR for Clarke. Bonn for Ambassador. Geneva for SecDel. From Clay. Reference: Bonn 785 Berlin, 2300 Dept.1 I do not want to belabor the shooting incident. However I must say that sending a letter of protest while doing nothing is the surest way to make it meaningless.

That the GDR police would shoot up an occupied American military vehicle is shocking to the thinking German and I might add to me, also, when we do nothing but write a letter of protest while we wait for a reply. That this was done by GDR police was much more damaging to our prestige than had it been done by Soviet personnel.

I appreciate the importance of the intelligence you obtain from our Mission, but you must also appreciate the loss of American prestige which is involved and its effect on the confidence of the German people.

We seem to think that unless there is public hue and cry there is no threat to morale. Thus, we argue that air harassments have not damaged morale as air traffic has increased. This is far from the real truth as the Germans who influence public thinking are watching every move in the air to see what we will do. These same Germans are equally concerned to find out how we will react to this most flagrant GDR attack. Secret harassment of Soviet Missions will be no answer as an effective response must be evident to the public, nor will reactions so long delayed as not to be instantly identified with the cause.

I must admit that as I am queried by responsible Germans and Americans, I do not find them particularly impressed by our firmness and determination when I tell them that we have reacted by writing another note.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/3–2662. Top Secret; Priority. Also sent to Bonn, Geneva, and to the Department of State as telegram 1817, which is the source text.
  2. See footnote 3, Document 21.