213. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany 0
607. Following for earliest convenient delivery is text of letter from Secretary to Schroeder:
“Dear Gerhard:
Thank you for your letter of August seventeenth.1
[Page 576]I share your satisfaction that the Federal Government has signed the Test Ban Treaty. As you may have observed, the Treaty is being subjected to a thorough and careful examination by our Senate, but I am confident that it will be approved by a very substantial majority.
Since the President has written to the Chancellor2 about the general question of consultation, I shall limit myself to saying that the Department of State, our Embassy in Bonn, and I are all anxious to maintain the closest liaison on questions of mutual interest.
Judging by the reports I have seen on the discussions thus far in the North Atlantic Council, they are likely to go into the questions of observation posts and nonaggression arrangements very thoroughly. We have not ourselves arrived at any final conclusions as to our own views on these subjects. Nor will we wish to do so, pending our learning more of your views and the attitudes of the other members of NATO.
I must confess that I am concerned about a recurring dilemma in the process of NATO consultation. Quite naturally we wish to take fully into account the views of our allies in the shaping of our own attitudes on important questions. On the other hand, it frequently is not possible to get the views of other governments except as a reaction to specific proposals or points of view from the American side. It seems to me that we should work toward a process of genuine consultation in which governments, in the first stage, are ready to put in provisional or tentative views for the consideration of the other allies in order that these views can be taken into full account by all of us in reaching conclusions.
You raised one specific question regarding observation posts—how the Soviet Zone of occupation could be included in such an agreement. So far, the Soviets appear to be linking their proposal on observation posts with unacceptable conditions. If, however, an agreement on this subject should prove negotiable, there is no question but that the problem of including the Soviet Zone of occupation would become one of the key questions. I would think that, from a military point of view, you as well as we would want arrangements affecting surprise attack to include an area in which there are more than twenty Soviet divisions in direct contact with NATO forces. We are examining various alternative solutions, but have not yet come to any conclusions. If you have any suggestions, I should be glad to hear them.
Although not mentioned in your letter, I should like to refer to your proposals concerning your draft of a Revised Peace Plan. I appreciated your raising the subject with me in Bonn before coming to any conclusion and am gratified to learn that you decided to consult in the Ambassadorial Group rather than proceeding direct with the publication. I [Page 577] have more difficulty with the timing and procedure of your proposals than with their substance. As you know, this plan has a long history. I believe that the textual differences between us are not insurmountable and could be overcome if the necessity arose.
As to timing, I think we are agreed that your proposal would not now be negotiable. As you know, the Sino-Soviet quarrel is now in an acute stage and the Soviets have been accused by the Chinese of not defending the interests of the so-called GDR. Moreover, the Soviets appear to be sensitive to articles in the Western press suggesting that because of their differences with the Chinese, they are obliged to turn to the West. In these circumstances, I fear that putting forward your plan as a concrete proposal at this time may precipitate Soviet actions, particularly in Berlin, designed to demonstrate the firmness of their position.
My greatest concern, however, relates to the proposed procedure of the German Government publishing an exact text of a proposal submitted to its allies in the absence of any prospect of serious negotiation upon it with the Soviet Union. This would have the disadvantage of focusing public attention upon even the most minor change which might be made in the plan should negotiations upon it become possible at some time in the future. Moreover, it would give the Soviets ample opportunity to attack and discredit the plan and possibly take a position which would make it difficult for the four of us to put it forward at an appropriate time.
I am, however, in full sympathy with your desire to keep attention focused upon our common objective of reunification, and I wonder if a better way to do this could not be found. For example, could you not make a major address in which you would outline your views on the questions dealt with in the Peace Plan, particularly the problem of reunification? If you would advise us in advance of what you were planning to say, we could be ready to comment in a constructive way.
Although we will probably be discussing these questions when we see each other in New York, I should appreciate any reactions you might have before then to these suggestions. I think it most important that our Governments keep in step, and I hope that we can arrive at an early agreement on how best to proceed.
With warm personal regards, I am
Sincerely, Dean”
- Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Confidential. Drafted by Rusk and Thompson and cleared by Bundy.↩
- Not printed. (Ibid.)↩
- See Document 211.↩