Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

207. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State⁰

Moscow, August 6, 1963, midnight.

Secto 26. Second session tripartite talks held at Spiridonovka beginning 1545 and ending 1725.¹ At Gromyko’s initiative session was entirely devoted to Germany and Berlin. Following is uncleared summary subject to revision. Full report follows.²

Gromyko began by stressing need to reach settlement of German question and on that basis question of West Berlin. To leave German problem indefinitely unsettled fraught with danger. Soviet Government attached great importance to German peace settlement.

Lord Home replied first, stating as Khrushchev yesterday rightly pointed out settlement could not be one-sided.³Khrushchev had added that people ought to be allowed to decide own destiny. Until system can be found where German people can express by means of secret ballot their desires there can be no satisfactory settlement. Knew Soviets cannot agree but Lord Home said he had concluded no settlement possible now. Hence this question should be put aside and we should address ourselves to more modest steps such as test ban. For instance, if agreement could be reached on observers not only in US, UK and USSR but also Western Germany and East Germany tensions would be reduced. He would not say anything about Berlin at moment.

Secretary said he had one or two observations. First, looking at objective elements of tension, these have shown considerable improvement in the last one to three years. Some of elements which have caused tensions between two Germanies and therefore between countries responsible for Germany have been eased and therefore tensions have slackened.

There was more normal atmosphere in Central Europe as whole referring to both socialist as well as capitalist parts that area.

Secretary continued we still believe valid approach expressed in our March 22, 1962 draft of principles handed Gromyko.⁴ Asked Mr. Gromyko if he did not think procedures and approach suggested therein still had significance. We don’t believe matter is urgent or critical unless one chooses to make it so. Expressed readiness to sit down and discuss ways to prevent tension arising.

Gromyko replied Western powers quite aware of Soviet proposals, some of them written, regarding access routes to Berlin which is not at all most important question. Soviet Union had not received answers. Had received some general statements but on some proposals no answers at all. Soviets have put forward proposals for settlement of German question and on this basis question settlement West Berlin. Important to liquidate remnants Second World War. Recalled Khru-shchev’s statement that “without settlement of German problem and on that basis question of West Berlin difficult to contemplate progress in disarmament measures.”

Gromyko continued by recalling past discussions in Geneva, New York and Washington. We faced most complicated question because no agreement reached on presence Western troops. Impossible for Western troops to stay forever. Western powers should say how they propose to regularize situation in West Berlin. Would not repeat Sov Govt views but USSR proceeds from point of view that West Berlin ties to rest of world should be unhindered. Also sovereignty of East Germany must be respected. Called upon Governments US–UK to make sober evaluation of situation. Elimination remnant World War II corresponded to interest of powers concerned and to all other states. Secretary Rusk had said situation more quiet lately but Soviet Government thinks situation dangerous and pregnant with uncertainties. Thinks this is question which must be settled.

Lord Home suggested there was nothing much better than present machinery of Rusk-Dobrynin talks though thus far no solution. As regards Mr. Gromyko’s complaint Western powers had advanced no new proposals, Lord Home pointed out it was Soviets who wished change existing situation and hence they should come forward with acceptable proposals. Western interest was only that West Berlin remain free and access unhindered. Gromyko’s statement concerning unhindered access gave Lord Home some hope. But question was how Soviets would underwrite this and guarantee with us unhindered access.

Gromyko asked what kind of freedom existed in West Berlin which is guarded by foreign bayonets. Main thing was presence of occupation troops. How could this be justified after so many years. Important draw line under World War II. Soviet proposals well known.

Gromyko continued, Lord Home had referred to free elections. This argument reeked of “moth balls.” As to Khrushchev’s statement impossible change situation by either side engulfing the other, why not take logical conclusion and recognize existence two sovereign German states. Gromyko then took up Lord Home’s reference to machinery and said while it was useful and perhaps necessary, still there was danger of relying only on this machinery. No matter how capable Secy Rusk or Ambassador Dobrynin were this could go on 10–25 or 100 years. He was not referring to them in a personal sense. There was no known instrument which could detect progress in these discussions.

Secy said, as he had mentioned to Gromyko in past, question was more of access to what and this involves presence Western troops in West Berlin. Almost waste of time to go on if this is not accepted. We ready to explore what access arrangements are possible. Recalled that Western powers had once talked among themselves on this problem and story had broken in press whereupon Moscow Radio had rejected proposals even before receiving them.

Secy emphasized what he had said before—need for genuine reciprocity. Hard believe few thousand troops in Berlin threatened several Soviet divisions in East Germany. We have been told East Germany was gone, East Berlin none of our business and instead all demands were concentrated on diminishing Western position in West Berlin. We see no reciprocity in this. We readily concede Soviet Union is great power but so are we. We not interested on theoretical basis on maintaining remnants World War II but had living commitment to more than two million people. We should like to remove remnants of World War II but we do not want this to become seeds of World War III. Tensions have been reduced in both parts of Central Europe by developments in last two years.

Secretary commented though his discussions with Dobrynin have become repetitious, farreaching fundamental problems involved. As responsible powers we ought to find way to handle peacefully, hence our Principles Paper 1962 tried take into account elements affecting USSR not only in regard to question West Berlin and access thereto but also concerning no use of force change borders and question of nuclear weapons, in short, one small word could transform nature whole problem. This word was “reciprocity”.

Gromyko replied Soviets do not fear word “reciprocity”. Soviet proposals took into account common interests. After repeating Soviet line on presence foreign troops and status West Berlin Gromyko said if he mentioned partial measures which ought to be implemented, this should not be taken to mean they disregarded fundamental measures for liquidation remnants World War II.

Secretary said would be glad hear anything Gromyko would wish to say while he is here, before or during GA.

Lord Home suggested they could talk about partial measures in tomorrow’s bilateral Soviet-UK session. Perhaps Dobrynin and Secretary could talk again before GA and then Foreign Ministers could have basic review in New York.

Gromyko then asked if Ministers had 10 more minutes. He would speak to partial measures though without prejudice to Soviet belief in urgency settlement main problem of Germany. These partial measures concerned payment of all services rendered by GDR for communications between GDR (not clear whether he meant West Berlin) and FRG, i.e., it concerned transit communications. Mentioned (1) new tariffs for passengers and military transport by rail; (2) tolls for using Autobahns by troops and military goods by auto transport of Western powers; (3) payment by occupation troops for use of communication cables going through territory of GDR to and from West Berlin; (4) question of air communications. Gromyko said in this regard situation not at all normal when international companies now using these routes and some West German cities planning also to use these routes. This was clearly untenable situation. There were also plans for aircraft bearing mark of fourth country appearing in air routes between West Berlin and FRG.

Gromyko continued, existing communications situation discriminatory against GDR.

As last point he mentioned discrimination against GDR in international events such as sports, scientific conferences, etc. All this was part of NATO campaign against GDR.

Gromyko said he had named only a few points. There were other practical questions which needed solution and all these steps should be taken without delay. Even solution these measures would not affect main problem settlement of German problem and West Berlin. Soviet Union was not against “fresh look” suggested by Secretary but present mechanism was squeaking and not working. Called upon US–UK to consider long-range and basic interests of all our countries and not quarrel endlessly about West Berlin. Our governments have many mutual interests other than interests of militarists of West German circles.

Secretary said we must give further thought practical measures to increase well-being and prosperity peoples in this area. Rejected designation of Bonn as militaristic. Soviet Union supported self-determination almost everywhere except in Central Europe. Germans want to live in their own country in their own way. This is not militarism.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL US–USSR. Secret; Operational Immediate; Eyes Only. Received at 9:07 p.m. and passed to the White House.
1. A report on the first tripartite session on August 6, which dealt with the Test Ban Treaty, was transmitted in Secto 20, August 8. (Ibid.)
2. Secto 28, August 7. (Ibid.)
3. Home and members of the British delegation, like Rusk and his colleagues, had met with Khrushchev on August 5.
4. Document 20.