Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

2. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Kohler) to Secretary of State Rusk ⁰

Washington, March 10, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Berlin

1. Attached at Tab A is the text of our Berlin Modus Vivendi which might be handed to Gromyko at an appropriate point.

2. To supplement the President’s communication to you, the following tactical considerations seem pertinent:

a. In a formal sense, your conversations will be a continuation of your meetings with Gromyko in September and of the five Thompson conversations with him.¹ The theory has been that you and Ambassador Thompson were trying to ascertain whether a basis for negotiations existed. This formula was designed largely to accommodate the French and to provide a vehicle for their eventual participation in Four-Power negotiations. It now seems clear that nothing which is likely to emerge from discussions with the Soviets will be enough to obtain De Gaulle’s agreement to have the French join with the British and us in a conference. The problem, therefore, becomes one of finding a formula so that the French cannot legally block an arrangement on Berlin rather than trying to maintain an arbitrary and partly fictitious line between exploratory talks and negotiations.

b. It still seems desirable, however, that we should continue to represent the bilateral discussions at Geneva as exploratory talks to the Soviets, making clear that we are not in a position to commit our Allies but that, if a promising avenue towards a modus vivendi appeared to be opening up, we would undertake to obtain their approval.

c. As you are aware, Soviet intentions remain unclear. While Gromyko has made threats to Ambassador Thompson and the Soviets have put pressure on us in the air corridors, they have not shown an unmistakable determination to push ahead with their program of a unilateral peace treaty with the GDR and a turnover of their access responsibilities to GDR officials. This indicates a need for some caution on our part, lest by seeming over-eager we encourage the Soviets to think that harassments in the air corridors and their other pressures have already softened our position. Presentation of a new formulation such as the suggested Modus Vivendi on Berlin must be carefully worked out to avoid creating such an impression.

d. Given these considerations, an initial carrot and stick approach seems appropriate, prior to presentation of the Modus Vivendi. It will probably be desirable to begin by saying something about the air corridors (this to be decided in the light of the situation on March 12 and of the possible discussion of this subject during the tripartite meeting the previous evening). You may then wish to refer to the deadlock reached in the Thompson—Gromyko talks, adding that, as the President pointed out to Adzhubei in their recent discussion in Washington, both sides seem to be repeating static formulas. The President, it may be recalled, suggested to Mr. Adzhubei that, since any final solution of the Berlin problem seemed out of the question, both sides should seek to find an accommodation which would prevent tensions from mounting. You might then wish to continue along the lines of the attached talking points (Tab B).² Talking point papers for subsequent meetings with Gromyko will be prepared as required at Geneva.

Tab A ³

DRAFT MODUS VIVENDI

The US and USSR have been discussing a wide range of subjects. They have agreed, in regard to certain of these subjects on (i) certain general principles to which their governments subscribe; (ii) procedures for continuing negotiation on the basis of these principles by a Committee of Foreign Ministers’ deputies, which will be established specifically for this purpose, and which France and the UK will be invited to join; and (iii) certain interim steps to meet immediate dangers in the meantime.

1. Berlin

(a) General Principles: They believe that West Berlin should be free to choose its own way of life, that its viability should be maintained, and that its access should remain free and unhindered.

(b) Future Negotiations: They agree to study proposals for improving the situation in Berlin consistent with these principles in the aforementioned committee of Foreign Ministers’ deputies.

(c) Interim Steps: In the meantime, they declare that present access procedures should remain in effect, irrespective of the nationality of the persons performing these procedures at Nowawes and Marienborn checkpoints.

2. Nuclear Diffusion

(a) General Principles: They believe that further diffusion of nuclear weapons into the control of national government not now owning them would make more difficult the problem of maintaining lasting peace.

(b) Future Negotiations: They agree to seek, in the above-mentioned committee (or a sub-committee thereof) to develop policies regarding non-diffusion of nuclear weapons to which all states owning nuclear weapons might agree and to which states not now owning nuclear weapons might also subscribe.

(c) Interim Steps: In the meantime, they declare that they will not themselves relinquish control over any nuclear weapons to any individual State not now owning such weapons and will refrain from assisting any such State in manufacturing them.

3. Non-Aggression

(a) General Principles: They believe that force should not be used to change existing frontiers and demarcation lines in Europe or for any other aggressive purpose.

(b) Future Negotiations: They agree to seek in the above-mentioned committee (or a sub-committee thereof) (i) to develop declarations which all NATO and Warsaw Pact members might be invited to make in this regard; and (ii) to consider measures which might be taken to enable the governments represented on that Commission to communicate and establish their non-aggressive intent in the event of grave crises and otherwise to reduce the risk of war by accident or miscalculation.

(c) Interim Steps: In the meantime, they desire that they will not themselves use or support use of force to change the external borders of Germany or the demarcation line inside Germany, and they note with approval past declarations of the Federal Republic that it will not use force to achieve the reunification of Germany or to settle international disputes.

4. Procedures

Once the proposed Committee of Foreign Ministers’ deputies has been established, the Foreign Ministers of countries represented on it should meet periodically, as seems useful, to review its work. If and as the Foreign Ministers believe that this is warranted, the Heads of Government could meet from time to time to consummate agreements that these efforts had produced.

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2058A. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand on March 9 and cleared in draft by Bohlen.
1. For records of Rusk’s three meetings with Gromyko in September and Thompson’s five meetings with Gromyko in January, February, and March, see vol. XIV, Documents 156, 160, 164, 251, 264, 278, 284, and 314.
2. Not printed.
3. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information.