Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

17. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State⁰

Geneva, March 19, 1962, midnight.

Secto 65. Eyes only for President and Acting Secretary from Secretary. After informal meeting of heads of disarmament delegations this afternoon,¹Gromyko asked me to stop by his office. He handed me paper,² saying he had been thinking about our discussion of general principles applicable to Berlin situation, and he had tried to put down what they might look like. He proposed we try to agree on general principles and implementing agreements here in Geneva, so that if agreement reached it could be referred to Heads of Government.

After examining paper briefly, I commented that there were obviously a number of points on which we were very far apart and which would have to be discussed further. We would have paper containing our own position and two papers would then have to be considered together.

I am inclined not to treat this as formal document requiring transmission to Allies at present stage, since Gromyko and I will be discussing at dinner tomorrow evening. Though the outlook is dim, I shall do my best to make some progress.

Our preliminary estimate of Soviet paper (text of which being transmitted in separate telegram) is:

1) Although some formulations are new and relate to our previous discussions, paper as whole is essentially restatement in guise of principles of basic Soviet position on Germany and Berlin as it has developed over past three and one-half years. With Berlin portion cribbed liberally from proposed statute of a free demilitarized city of West Berlin handed Ambassador Thompson by Gromyko on January 12, 1962³ language completely disregards very flat negative positions we have communicated Soviets during series of conversations here on following points:

a) Presence of Allied forces

b) Rejection of free city concept

c) Attempt to associate Western Powers overtly with peace treaty approach, and

d) Banning of certain activities in West Berlin on discriminatory basis which might provide justification for subsequent intervention.

2) Concept of viability of West Berlin is borrowed, but in context which implies this essentially an economic matter.

3) Soviet “principles” no longer allow, as one of possible alternatives, retention of token forces of three Western Powers along with Soviet units. This may be response to our insistence that we could not consider reintroduction of Soviet forces into West Berlin.

4) Apparent concession in allowing West Berlin free city authorities to determine who may or may not visit city is offset by need for agreement with GDR as well as by entire context. Soviet language does not resolve ambiguity between alleged willingness to allow free access and insistence on respect for GDR sovereignty. Moreover, reference to internal legislation and provisions of free city statute presumably intended to exclude categories forbidden in final paragraph of section 2.

5) Language of procedures to be followed by “military traffic” is vague but would not necessarily be incompatible with observance of present procedures by GDR officials at Land check points if Soviets intend as fallback formulation also to apply to Allied military units. However, limitation of volume of military traffic to actual needs of these contingents seems directed towards removing possibility civilian air traffic under military aegis and under existing basic procedures.

6) Soviets have taken our term “international access authority” and attached it to completely different concept involving no administrative functions and presumably Soviet veto in event cases arise when authority is to have last word.

7) Language on non-transfer of nuclear weapons, although lacking precision, seems designed to prevent any development of NATO nuclear deterrent.

8) Language on NATO-Warsaw Pact non-aggression treaty raises GDR recognition problem. Moreover, Federal Republic and GDR are linked in such a way as to make procedure suggested certainly unacceptable to Federal Republic.

As to giving Soviets US principles paper, our present thought is not to hand it over during session tomorrow evening but to devote this to pointing out that Soviet statement of principles is unacceptable along lines suggested above. In light of this conversation, will then make recommendations as to whether advisable give our paper to Soviets.⁴

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/3–1962. Secret; Priority. According to another copy, this telegram was drafted by Hillenbrand and concurred in by Bohlen and Kohler. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2060)
1. The U.S. Delegation reported on this meeting in Disto 54 from Geneva, March 19. (Ibid., CF 2061)
2. A copy of this paper, which had nine numbered paragraphs and was entitled “General Principles,” was transmitted in Secto 66 from Geneva, March 19. (Ibid., Central Files, 762.00/3–2062)
3. See footnote 2, Document 8.
4. In his next telegram to the President, Secretary Rusk offered the following additional analysis: “Seems obvious this merely restatement their standard position in guise of our suggestion about modus vivendi. Deeply regret unable report any appreciable progress Berlin thus far. Unless you have other views, I intend to have further talk with Gromyko alone tomorrow night and make it quite clear we cannot accept any such far-reaching diminution Western position. Will then return to our modus vivendi as only way out of situation where we find ourselves unable to agree. I see no possibility peaceful settlement this problem unless Soviets really understand our complete determination to stand behind your clear statements to Khrushchev and Gromyko that we cannot accept significant reduction Western position. Only if this is accepted by them can many questions rapidly fall into place.” (Secto 67, March 19; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3–1962)