Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

165. Memorandum From the Assistant to the President’s Military Representative (Legere) to the President’s Military Representative (Taylor)⁰

Washington, December 19, 1962.

SUBJECT

• JSSC Paper on “Berlin Planning” (JCSM-981–62)¹

1. General

a. In response to your request for my views on the subject paper, I think it is an imaginative initiative which deserves a decent hearing that it is not likely to receive. Attached at Tab A is a brief memorandum on the paper which I sent to Mr. Bundy on 12 December, hoping to stimulate his interest without asking him to focus on the entire paper itself.² As you will see from my memorandum to Mr. Bundy, I think that the paper represents the sort of proposition which, even though it may appear initially to be “non-negotiable”, in the sense that the Sovs/GDR would not accept it, should nevertheless be advanced and publicized.

b. Since my 12 December memorandum to Mr. Bundy, I have talked further with Mr. David Klein about the subject paper, and he still thinks that it is rather outlandish. I can only say that, much as I like and admire Mr. Klein, “Old Berlin Hands” today are very much like the “Old Chinese Hands” of yesteryear, in that they have been in the game for so long that they shy away from anything except the compulsory ballet figures. In addition, I am certain that Mr. Klein’s attitude quite understandably reflects his concern, and that of everyone in State, over the fact that Defense (and in this case JCS) is trying to intrude itself into the conduct of foreign policy. It is for this latter reason that I have said in paragraph 1 a above that I fear the JSSC paper will have trouble receiving a decent hearing.

2. Specific

a. The reasoning in paragraphs 5 and 6 is a little too theological for me; I simply fail to follow the overly fine distinctions and contrasts between political and military vital interests. In the interest of simplicity and vitality, I would cut out these two paragraphs entirely.

b. Paragraphs 10 and 11 strike me as “pussyfooting” a little, at a point where I think the paper should call a spade a spade. In my view, the paper should be crystal clear at this point in the development of its logic that what the paper is proposing is a stark withdrawal of all US, UK, French, and Soviet troops from both Berlins, and, what is more, I think that this withdrawal or disengagement feature should be made a part of the initial package offer to the Soviets. The reason for this latter view of mine is that it would increase the likelihood of Soviet acceptance or serious consideration, and would also tend to pull the teeth of some of the opponents of the paper, such as Mr. David Klein.

P.S. Walt Rostow might be a good man to furnish a bootleg copy at staff level.³

LJL

0. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 38, 505 Berlin Contingency Planning. Top Secret.
1. Document 161.
2. Not printed.
3. Legere added the postscript by hand. General Taylor wrote “OK” below it.