The attached paper, “Berlin in Light of Cuba”, arises from the work of
the NSC Subcommittee on Berlin but is not an agreed paper. It represents
my views after discussion with the group.
I believe that we should make every effort in good time to find a
long-term solution to the Berlin question and, if possible, the German
question. Otherwise we may find ourselves someday in a Berlin crisis,
where we all will wish we had taken more radical measures to lance the
boil despite the recognized risks, costs and difficulties. The view of
others of the group is that the attached paper underestimates the
difficulties in arriving at long-term solutions and that there are
unwarranted dangers in considering what they believe to be impracticable
ideas.
The key to practicability may well be in areas beyond Germany and Berlin,
the area assigned to the Rostow
group.1 I have passed on to Walt some of my ideas in this broader
area. They include the following:
A radical proposal, but one which I believe could be to our interest on
its own feet, would be Warsaw Pact-NATO
nuclear forces, limited on each side to the minimum necessary to cover
the problem of the inherent impossibility of being sure all warheads
have been destroyed. This might involve no more than 500 delivery
vehicles of our choice, with warheads of a yield aggregating no more
than 50 megatons, on our side, and an equal number and yield on their
side, with a complete prohibition on all other nuclear weapons, AICBM’s
etc., on both sides. The agreement to be contingent on their proposing
inspection procedures satisfactory to us and vice-versa.
These agreements would be coupled with appropriate test ban,
non-diffusion, and conventional force limitations.
1. Agreement by the USSR and CPR to eschew any military connection with
this Hemisphere.
Such arrangements have been unthinkable in the past context. I believe
they could be to the interest of both the USSR and the U.S. If both
sides agreed that this was so, I do not think it impossible we could
bring them about. The competition between the Communist system and ours
would continue but on quite different terms than otherwise
foreseeable.
The above ideas ignore all the tactical problems. The tactical problems
are immense and undoubtedly would greatly modify even the substance of
any program of action. But one can’t start putting a program together
without some idea of the direction one wishes to go.
The relation of all this to Berlin is that Berlin has been a focal point
in the over-all Western confrontation with the Bloc. The long-term
solution of Berlin can hardly take place except as part of a general
readjustment of the terms of that confrontation.
Attachment2
BERLIN IN THE LIGHT OF CUBA
I. The Problem
If the Cuba settlement goes forward as outlined in the President’s
letter of October 27th3 and accepted
by Mr. Khrushchev, a Summit
[Page 413]
meeting may be
necessary within a reasonable period, and may be desirable. At a
Summit, Berlin would undoubtedly be an important item of discussion.
Such Berlin discussions would take place against a variety of
proposals from the U.S. and the Soviets on other items of importance
to one or both sides.
It follows that we need a theory of our Berlin interest from which a
variety of positions can be developed, depending upon the actual
setting which emerges and which is not now accurately
predictable.
It would be useful to have the broad lines of this theory tentatively
agreed before Mr. Adenauer’s
visit, so that questions put to him can be appropriately aimed. Any
indication to Mr. Adenauer
that the U.S. is even studying drastic solutions should be carefully
handled,4 however, to prevent extreme
German reaction during exploratory phases.
II. New Elements of the
Situation
- A.
- The United States. The country has gone
through a traumatic exposure to the imminence of war, the
relationship of the military situation to the political outcome,
and the necessity for firm but moderate diplomacy. Its
confidence in itself and its leadership has been enhanced. It
does not, however, wish to live indefinitely with a series of
Cubas, one of which might be in a less favorable geographic
position, or might be handled, by one side or the other, with
less care and restraint, or might be the occasion for some
accidental aberration. Both this enhanced confidence and
enhanced concern dispose the U.S. to take a firmer line with our
Allies, where this is required to further our aims, as well as
affecting our attitude to the USSR.
- B.
-
The Soviet Union. A central question
is whether the Soviets will have emerged from the Cuban
experience with the feeling that avoidance of a comparable
crisis over Berlin is paramount and that they must therefore
be prepared to give on Berlin in light of demonstrated U.S.
determination, or whether they will feel they must counter
our Cuban success with gains of their own in Berlin or
elsewhere. While there is great uncertainty as to the Soviet
reaction, it probably combines a new wariness about U.S.
response with a compulsion to recover lost prestige.
At a minimum, the Soviets can probably be expected to take
political and diplomatic steps to counter the effects of the
Cuban back-down on the Soviet power image, and to disabuse
the U.S. of any notion that tactics like those applied in
the Cuban crisis can be used to force concessions from the
Soviet Union on long-standing issues under dispute,
including Berlin. We cannot exclude the possibility that
they may feel driven to exert strong pressures in the
reasonably near future.
[Page 414]
The Soviets may estimate that the Cuban crisis will open up
room for maneuver. By making the danger of nuclear
confrontation real and visceral for all the world, the
crisis may seem to them to provide the catalyst needed to
put new flexibility into the stalemated Berlin situation. It
could create an environment where radical solutions are
possible.
The Soviet judgment of this possibility will probably be
conditioned by their assessment of the U.S. temper. If the
U.S. appears firm and sober after the crisis, and if
Khrushchev feels
impelled to do something about Berlin in the near future, he
may feel that serious negotiation at the Summit would be
preferable to unilateral Soviet action.
The Soviets may well be motivated toward a serious attempt to
stabilize the situation, not only by the prospect of nuclear
confrontation in a disadvantageous balance, but also by a
real desire to focus on economic competition.
The Soviets probably also face reappraisal of their strategic
posture. It was an inadequate deterrent in Cuba; they may
consider the alternatives of even more energetic efforts to
redress the imbalance, or measures to reduce
instabilities.
Finally, having apparently misread our reactions in the Cuban
case, the Soviets may confine themselves to highly tentative
moves until they reassess the situation.
- C.
- Allies. Our NATO Allies now have greater confidence in the U.S.
They have seen success result from our firmness and moderation.
The U.K., in particular, was reassured by our restraint; France
and Germany by our determination, under the risk of major
conflict. U.S. prestige is higher; its capacity and maturity
more respected; its freedom to lead enhanced.
We should be able to brush aside trivial Allied objections and
reservations, and insist on concentrating on major issues.
At the same time, while the Allies supported our Cuban actions with
minimum consultation, we can expect increased sensitivity about
consultation in the future, both because the issues will be closer
to them and more within their responsibility and because they
naturally oppose any U.S. disposition to act unilaterally. Further,
our Allies will be unsettled until they can explore the changed
situation resulting from Cuba and can know through consultation our
reading of it.
On balance, it appears that while our scope for unilateral action may
be restricted, we have increased our capacity, with consultation, to
bring our Allies along with us.
European suspicion that a sudden, secret, Berlin deal underlay the
Soviet withdrawal from Cuba is a possible side effect of U.S.
initiatives.
[Page 415]
A variety of Allied interpretations of the Cuban outcome is possible
(e.g., as to Soviet motivations, Soviet future intentions, the
effectiveness of various elements of U.S. power, and the validity of
the proposed sequence of actions in Berlin). It will be important to
present and support U.S. conclusions.
III. Possible Approaches
The basic source of instability is obviously the division of Germany.
Even if East Germany were prosperous, under a more liberal regime,
and without the problem of Berlin, it is doubtful that the
underlying sentiment for reunification would die out either in East
Germany or West Germany.
Other important sources of instability are the division of Berlin
symbolized by the Wall, the uncertain access to Berlin, the
unsettled boundaries, and the absence of a definitive German peace
treaty. The interaction of military threat and defense, viewed
differently from each side, adds to the seriousness of the other
instabilities.
Any long-term solution should cut as deeply as possible into these
instabilities. The Soviet Union has in the past had a clear and
unambiguous policy with respect to Berlin and Germany: a solution of
all the above instabilities, perhaps over an extended time frame, in
a manner acceptable to it. It has rejected all Western proposals not
consistent with eventual progress toward the Soviet objectives. The
Western powers, not having the means, diplomatic or otherwise, to
reverse this position, have attempted to stand firm against further
encroachments.
The question cannot now be answered whether Soviet policy on Berlin
will have hardened or relaxed as a result of Cuba. Undoubtedly,
however, it will be different. It is possible that they too will see
the danger of another Cuban crisis over Berlin. If so, it is
possible they will want a prompt solution of the important German
and Berlin instabilities in a manner mutually agreeable to them and
the U.S. Only on this hypothesis, which will be substantially
affected by the possibilities of U.S.-Soviet agreement on other
important areas of instability apart from Germany, can one see the
possibility of a long-run solution of the Berlin situation
satisfactory to the West.
In this situation, the U.S. interest is:
- —at the maximum, for a long-term solution of the Berlin
situation, one apt to last for twenty or more years;
- —at the middle, for an agreed modus vivendi to carry us
along with reduced friction, at least for some years;
- —at the minimum, for measures in other areas which will
hold off serious Berlin discussions or pressures until a
more propitious time for negotiation.
[Page 416]
IV. Long-Term Approaches
Possible long-term approaches toward stability include All-German,
All-Berlin, and removal of West Berlin, solutions.
A. All-German
Objectively, and certainly from the U.S. interest, the best end would
be an all-German solution in which, ultimately, the GDR would in effect be absorbed by The
Federal Republic. It would remove all the instabilities listed in
III (above).
Such a solution, running directly counter to central Soviet
objectives, would probably be considered by Khrushchev only in the context of
broad European security arrangements. To achieve it, we should be
prepared to make substantial concessions on our side, short of
removing Germany from the Atlantic and European political and
economic communities.
Some form of merger of the existing two states would seem called for
initially, and a wide variety of sequences and phasings of the
various steps toward eventual unification would be possible. The
nature of the arrangements, and the duration of the process would
have to be designed to reduce Soviet resistance. Among the steps
toward, or elements of, an all-German solution would be:
- —Increased economic intercourse between the two Germanies,
with substantial economic aid from West to East designed to
equalize the economies.
- —Arms control measures in the Germanies: a surprise attack
inspection and warning system, progressive limitations on
external forces, perhaps a phased reduction of GDR and FRG forces.
- —Evolutionary integration of political institutions,
beginning with a central administrative organ, progressing
toward ultimate common government.
B. All-Berlin
If the unity of Germany cannot be achieved, the other major sources
of instability could be removed or mitigated through an all-Berlin
solution. It would eliminate the wall dividing Berlin, though it
would probably require, from the Soviet viewpoint, maintenance of a
barrier surrounding all Berlin.
The instability of access could be greatly reduced by the cession, or
perhaps long-term lease, of an autobahn corridor to the city. Were
this not obtained, access instability would remain high. An access
authority with clear non-bloc control would mitigate but not
eliminate the instability.
Under an All-Berlin solution with a corridor, we might be able to
force through a definite peace treaty signed by both East and West
(or perhaps parallel treaties), a settlement of German boundaries,
and the recognition of the GDR. It
would then be possible to remove occupation
[Page 417]
forces and rely on a UN presence and guarantee of the unified city. Other
instabilities could be mitigated through liberalization of the
GDR regime and increased trade
with and credit to the GDR.
This solution, which would in essence accept the permanent division
of Germany, would find strong resistance in the FRG. It would be politically difficult
for any West German government to give it more than de facto
acceptance. The German objective of reunification would remain a
serious source of instability.
C. Removal of West Berlin
It is possible to conceive of solutions in which a substantial part
of GDR territory, say all that part
lying south and west of the Elbe, from Magdeburg to the Czech
border, is transferred to the FRG in
return for removal of the West Berlin populace out of West Berlin.
The populace of Berlin, and all of the GDR, would be given a free choice of staying in the
GDR or moving to the enlarged
FRG.
The area south and west of the Elbe is the industrial heart of the
GDR. The political wrench to
both sides would be immense. Boundaries, access, etc. would,
however, be definitely settled. It is conceivable that as a part of
a serious effort to resolve the whole East-West tensions problem,
the USSR would prefer some such long-term solution to those
suggested under IV. A and B (above).
V. Modus Vivendi
If a long-term settlement is not feasible, a modus vivendi may not
now be impossible.
Intermittently since Geneva in 1959, and steadily over the past year,
we have been seeking without success to establish such an agreed
modus vivendi, but it may be that the Cuban crisis will increase
elasticity to some degree on both sides. The Soviets have had an
example of U.S. firmness. They could now feel that rather than test
us again, closer to the jugular, it would be preferable either to
continue the debate, in the vicinity of the status quo, or to agree
on a workable modus vivendi. On the Western side, the Cuban success
has made less compelling the need to avoid any appearance of
elasticity in order to preserve Allied confidence in our
guarantees.
On the other hand, if the Soviets feel their recent losses strongly,
they may find it even less possible to make concessions on
long-debated issues.
Components of a modus vivendi have been combed over many times,
especially in the last year. Aside from significantly reduced
tension in Berlin and prospects for reasonable stability there,
several other general criteria would have to be met. Allied vital
interests would have to be safeguarded; these appear to be unchanged
by the Cuban outcome, so that the presence and security of Allied
troops, unhindered access,
[Page 418]
and economic viability cannot be adversely affected. On the Soviet
side, assured control over East Germany and some enhancement,
possibly nominal, of GDR status
appear to be minima. Having these in hand, and depending on how one
assesses the likely tone of Soviet policies toward Berlin,
micrometer adjustments could be made in the following general
schemes:
- 1.
- A series of interlocking declarations by the USSR, GDR, FRG, and tripartite powers about guaranteed
access, troop presence, the name “Free City”, and a separate
treaty.
- 2.
- Some form of international access authority, accompanied
by a separate treaty and unilateral declarations about
Berlin (troops remain, no nuclear weapons, etc.).
- 3.
- Some new form of purely local arrangement involving the
removal or amelioration of the Wall, guarantee of access,
addition of UN administrative
presence without changing the occupation powers’ troop
strengths or responsibilities, and a separate treaty.
VI. Hold-Off Serious Berlin
Discussions; Improve Climate in Other Areas
A third broad line of approach is to refrain at this time from
further initiatives on Berlin, on the assumption that the Soviets
will also be willing to let the atmosphere cool before making new
moves in the hyper-sensitive Berlin area.
This approach aims at allowing both sides to reassess the situation
without altering the outstanding issues which underlie instability
in Berlin. It attempts to create a more favorable environment for a
Berlin solution by progress toward agreement and easing of tensions
elsewhere.
Since the status quo is the essence of the existing Western Berlin
position, this approach might seem to appeal more to us than to the
Soviets, but it leaves us still exposed to the basic dangers of the
situation.
Soviet receptivity to a hold-off approach on Berlin is uncertain. It
might appeal to them as a way to dissipate U.S. momentum from Cuba,
and to allow time for strengthening the Soviet posture against a
future confrontation. Apart from possible repercussions of the Cuban
crisis upon the Soviet attitude toward Berlin, a Soviet hold-off
position is supported by some evidence that GDR and Soviet propaganda is stressing that further
delay must be expected before the signing of a peace treaty. It
would also be consistent with the trend noted in current discussions
between West and East German representatives on the inter-zonal
trade.
Measures for a hold-off approach might include:
- —Progress in arms control: a test-ban agreement, a
non-diffusion agreement, surprise attack measures, perhaps a
Latin-American nuclear-free zone.
- —A NATO-Warsaw Pact
Non-Aggression Agreement.
- —Satisfactory carrying through of Laos neutrality
measures; reduction of external pressures on South
Vietnam.
- —Progress toward space cooperation.
VII. General
The effects of the Cuban crisis cannot yet be accurately seen. In any
event, many elements of any solution are not under our control. In
this situation, we must clearly analyze and be prepared to work
toward a full spectrum of outcomes.
Insofar as we do control the movement of events, it would seem
desirable to aim at a long-range solution. Long-range solutions face
much the greatest obstacles; they may well, in the event, prove
impossible to achieve. Lesser measures, however, and in particular
the hold-off approach, leave us with the possibility of a Cuba-type
crisis over Berlin only postponed. Even if there is a Soviet
disposition to avoid Berlin initiatives for the time being, an
extended moratorium is unlikely, and we could be faced with a
challenge under no better conditions, perhaps with some of our
bargaining counters expended on peripheral issues. It would
therefore appear improvident to overlook any chance to get an
enduring solution.
(Ambassador Thompson, on the
other hand, holds in general that in the present tensions, and in
the face of the present obstacles, acceptable movement in the Berlin
problem is unlikely to be possible, and attempts in this line could
do damage by arousing Allies and USSR alike. He would therefore
support a hold-off approach, seeking to get useful agreements in
other areas, improving the climate generally, and approaching the
complex of Berlin issues later.)
