Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

138. Record of Meeting of the Military Sub-Group of the Washington Ambassadorial Group⁰

Sub BQD-Military 35

Washington, October 22, 1962, 6 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • Mr. Nitze, ISA, Chairman
  • General Gray, JCS
  • Dr. Mountain, ISA
  • Col. Meacham, ISA
  • Col. Armstrong, ISA
  • Capt. Cotten, ISA
  • Col. Preer, SG
  • Mr. Hillenbrand, State
  • Mr. Ausland, State
  • Mr. Blitgen, State
  • Mr. Smyser, State
  • Mr. Klein, White House
• United Kingdom
  • Lord Hood
  • General West
  • Mr. Brooke
  • Mr. Greenhill
  • Colonel Coke
  • Captain Fanshawe
• France
  • M. Winckler
  • Admiral Douget
  • Colonel Hounau
  • M. Pelen
• Germany
  • Mr. Schnippenkoetter
  • Dr. Wieck
  • General Steinhoff
  • General Huekelheim

[Here follows discussion of Cuba.]

M. Winckler: What is your assumption on possible reaction in Berlin?

Mr. Hillenbrand: One of the possible ways in which the Soviets might choose to react would be through measures in Berlin, as for example by harassment, possibly just against the U.S., possibly of a wider scope. However, Berlin isn’t the only place in which they might choose to react.

Mr. Nitze: They have several alternatives. One of the reasons for the use of “quarantine” and not “blockade” is to avoid the connection which Khrushchev is trying to make between Cuba and Berlin.

M. Winckler: Is your assumption now, considering the present balance of forces, that Khrushchev will not move in Berlin?

Mr. Nitze: I think it is wholly accurate to say that Gromyko stated more forcefully than has been done before the Soviet intention to proceed in Berlin.

Lord Hood: Regarding the Soviet promise not to act on Berlin before the U.S. elections, they said, “unless the U.S. acts”. This is the “unless”.

Mr. Nitze: It has become clear what they meant by holding off until the U.S. elections. Would it not be useful for us to explore in this group what we judge Soviet intentions are in the steps they have taken?

Lord Hood: Any statements I could make would be off the top of my head.

M. Winckler: I think it would be a profitable thing to do.

Mr. Nitze: I can give only my personal feelings, but from a long range point of view the Soviet intention could be to secure the removal of U.S. forces from overseas bases, which would include Western forces in Berlin. As an intermediate goal, the Soviets may be seeking to put pressure on the Alliance structure in the hope of producing fissures in it. The U.S., of course, has been under ICBM’s for some time, but this Soviet move in Cuba is a very extreme one. It changes the balance of power.

M. Winckler: This is a pretty big gamble.

Mr. Nitze: Yes, it is a quantum jump on Khrushchev’s part. This suggests to me, personally, if the crisis has been stepped up by this quantum jump, that the perspective in which to view some of the issues before this group has changed and some of the issues have become minor to the extent that we ought to settle them quickly or forget about them, and also that we have got to deal with some of the major issues. A failure to act is dangerous, and we might proceed on the basis that (a) we must have unity in the Alliance, (b) minor issues must be disposed of, and (c) we must deal with the major issues with both caution and resolution.

As to the tactical reasons behind this Soviet move, some have suggested that it was necessary to keep the momentum of Soviet leadership. This I regard as questionable, although you may remember the report of a Soviet Ambassador stating to someone that he had seen the Soviet plans for Berlin and they now meet the Chinese criteria. It is possible that Khrushchev’s interests in Latin America are behind this move, and that this is a major ploy in this direction. He may be thinking of setting up a negotiating position. Again, he might have contingent objectives, and depending on our reaction, may pursue one or another.

[Here follows additional discussion of Cuba.]

Mr. Schnippenkoetter: I have two points. First, are the number of topics to be discussed between Washington and Moscow now wider than before: What does this mean for Berlin? Is Berlin being put aside, or does it come into sharper focus in this situation?

Mr. Nitze: We can’t tell until we see what the Soviets say.

Lord Hood: Or, even more important, what they do.

Mr. Nitze: I would say that high on the list of probabilities, is some move in Berlin.

Lord Hood: I agree.

M. Winckler: I think this means that we must move on such matters as alerts, etc.

Mr. Nitze: I think it is fair to expect that our business here will boom.

Mr. Schnippenkoetter: My second point is that Berlin contingency plans have been made in a context which was principally limited to Berlin. Does the new picture which emerges from these actions taken by your government alter the general nature of our plans? Does this place new restraints on these plans or will this situation speed them up and strengthen them?

Mr. Nitze: Our planning has been based on the development of a crisis, and although the initiation of the crisis could be in Berlin, our planning has proceeded beyond that immediate area. I would therefore say that the basis for our planning has been sound and is not overturned by these recent events. (Discussion then halted so that the group could listen to the President’s speech. At the end of the speech, there was no further group discussion and the meeting adjourned at 7:20 P.M.)

0. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, 092 Germany. Top Secret. Prepared in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.