Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

132. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany ⁰

Washington, October 15, 1962, 9 p.m.

997. Paris pass USRO. Following based on full and uncleared memorandum of conversation which being pouched.¹

In two and one-quarter hour discussion with Secretary this afternoon Schroeder reviewed at some length German estimate of Soviet intentions re Berlin and situation in GDR.² On balance, did not believe Khrushchev prepared to risk major confrontation over Berlin if Western determination maintained. Re GDR concluded that despite allegiance 75 to 90 per cent of population to ideals of freedom, uprising unlikely in view of anticipated harsh repressive measures. Population apparently looking to long future rather than for any imminent improvements.

Secretary stressed that picture of Western determination as it appears to Khrushchev must appear somewhat confused. NATO force and logistical inadequacies likely to operate against certainty that West will fight for Berlin. Danger is that Western Powers so sure Khrushchev will not fight over Berlin that they are not willing to take the concrete measures necessary to evidence their firmness.

Schroeder observed that decisive point to Khrushchev could not be accretions to european forces but US determination and willingness use nuclear deterrent. He (Schroeder) therefore welcomed indications US prepared to go it alone in defense of Berlin should that be necessary.

Secretary agreed US nuclear deterrent ultimately decisive but to be persuasive to Soviets US people and their Government must have conviction their european Allies are making comparable effort.

Schroeder noted his belief that free and demilitarized city proposal had really been intended by Khrushchev as compromise proposal. He probably now working towards some sort of sliding scale of Allied presence as further compromise with some possible UN role added.

In discussion of possible Soviet tactics in UN, Secretary made point we should not fear UN action on Berlin. We would have many assets in such discussion. Should not, however, bring to UN prematurely and thus lose step which might play important subsequent role. Secretary also recalled Gromyko’s apparent interest in last talk in New York in shifting discussion to access despite our having made quite clear that Western presence in city is nonnegotiable.

Schroeder doubted that Soviets were at this point actually prepared to accept Berlin as is and discuss improvement of access, but emphasized FedRep support for concept of International Access Authority. He reported on current discussions within IZT framework of east German credits, emphasizing that FedRep forthcomingness could only be expected if there were compensating political improvements on part GDR. east Germans were now examining FedRep proposal for 250 million DM increase in IZT swing arrangement. (In aside Schroeder remarked that enthusiasm of economics Ministry had apparently led to change of Leopold’s instructions to raise FedRep offer from 100 million DM to 250 million DM.)

Meeting concluded with Schroeder’s exposition and subsequent discussion of his doubts re present contingency planning for possible GDR demand for passports and visas to cover German civilian travel to and from Berlin.³

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2175. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted and approved by Hillenbrand. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, Berlin, and USUN.
1. A copy of this 9-page memorandum of conversation is ibid., Central Files, 762.00/10–1562.
2. Schroeder visited Washington October 13–18. In his first meeting with Rusk at noon on October 14, Schroeder raised the question of the Adenauer November 7–8 visit, the Secretary’s meeting with Gromyko (see Document 129), transfer of nuclear weapons, India’s possible participation in a German peace treaty, the Federal Republic’s relations with satellite countries, New Guinea, and Yugoslavia. Memoranda of these conversations are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2175. A copy of the October 10 letter from the President to Chancellor Adenauer inviting Schroeder to visit the United States is ibid., Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. At 11 a.m. on October 15 Dowling, Tyler, and Hillenbrand, at the Foreign Minister’s request, briefed him on Berlin contingency planning. A memorandum of this conversation is ibid., Central Files, 762.00/10–1562.
3. At the Secretary’s dinner for Schroeder at 8 p.m. on October 15, the two discussed the idea of a Berlin plebiscite and Berlin contingency planning. Memoranda of these conversations are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2175.