Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

128. Record of Meeting⁰

Washington, October 5, 1962, noon.

The President met in his office with Mayor Willy Brandt of West Berlin. Also present were Ambassador Knappstein, Mr. Bahr, Mayor Brandt’s press officer, Mr. Hillenbrand and Mr. Creel.

The President opened the discussion by asking Mayor Brandt how the situation in Berlin appeared to him at the moment. Brandt responded that at present it was good. Morale had recovered from the blow of the wall. The economy was in fairly good shape although perhaps not as well as it could be. He expected that in the near future some pressures would be exercised on access routes but it was difficult to forecast how.

The President raised the question of what we were prepared to do to maintain civilian access to West Berlin if the east Germans got control of the access routes. Mr. Brandt said he saw the problem in terms of how to respond in such a way as not to interfere with the viability of Berlin. He thought that many of the countermeasures we now contemplated were deficient on two counts. They were ineffective as a means of pressure on the Soviet Union, and they were bad for West Berlin’s economy. While we had to defend the principle of free access if possible, we had to pay some attention to the realities of the situation. The President asked if Mayor Brandt thought it was wise for us to blockade ourselves if the east Germans asked for visas. Mayor Brandt responded he would, of course, prefer not to accept visas, but if the choice was presented he would prefer to maintain access rather than resort to countermeasures. He suggested it would be possible to get a German traffic agency which corresponded to the IZT and operated at the same practical level. Perhaps the agency could in some way be combined with the Office for Interzonal Trade. In response to the President’s questions on how IZT now functions, the Mayor explained that the two negotiators were located in east and West Berlin and visited each other regularly. Special papers provided for their free access across the wall.

In response to the President’s question of what papers were involved in visits to the Leipzig Fair, Mayor Brandt answered that West Germans show a passport or identity card, together with a letter from the east German authorities giving permission to go to the Fair.

The President returned to the question of whether we could get an arrangement on civilian access connected with and corresponding to the arrangement on IZT. Mayor Brandt responded that this was a matter which should be explored urgently now, rather than waiting for the signature of a treaty. The President remarked that, of course, east Germany will ask for the greatest degree of recognition in connection with any such arrangement, and Mayor Brandt added that they will also ask for a larger volume of trade. The President expressed his view that West Berlin and West Germany should discuss this matter, come to an agreement, and take the lead in developing concrete proposals. He recited the history of our proposals on an international access authority and the German reaction thereto. Mayor Brandt expressed agreement with the President’s view on the desirability of German initiative in this matter.

Ambassador Knappstein remarked that we, of course, could not predict what form pressure on access would take; that it was obvious that the Soviets regarded military access as more important—perhaps they would start with it. The President responded by stating that military access was our problem; that we would move to an airlift and if this were interfered with, it would mean war.

He then returned to the problem of civilian trade and asked for a German initiative before the event. Mayor Brandt commented that speaking for himself and his colleagues in the Berlin Senate, he would consider it deplorable if the idea of an international access authority is dead. It is better to deal with Ulbricht as one of thirteen than as one of two. The Mayor said it was his own impression that something could be done on this basis and yet we could still preserve the formal theory of Soviet-Allied control.

The Mayor then raised the question of the desirability of 4-Power discussions in Bonn among the ambassadors of the Soviet Union, U.S., U.K., and France. He thought this would be a useful channel now that the Soviet commandant had disappeared from Berlin. Perhaps the 4 Powers in Bonn could agree to instruct German experts to work out a trade and access agreement. The President commented that this would be good if the Soviets in fact wished to lessen tension. At present, unfortunately, there was no evidence this was so. All our talks with Gromyko suggested just the opposite. The Soviets continue to raise the issue of troops which we have stated repeatedly is not negotiable.

The President returned again to the issue of civilian land traffic and some degree of acceptance of east German presence. He repeated his comments on the misunderstandings that had arisen in Bonn on our previous proposals and the desirability, accordingly, of a German initiative. He asked Mr. Hillenbrand to comment on this point. Mr. Hillenbrand distinguished between the German and Allied views on this question and pointed out there were some technical problems of German passport law which stood in the way of a denial policy at the moment. Ambassador Knappstein observed that if the Federal Republic accepted east German visas this would give the east Germans the opportunity to practice selective exclusion against visitors to Berlin. The President responded that they have that power now and they can always do it. We, in turn, can counter by using the air route. The really difficult problem was goods, and not people: people can fly; goods must go by rail, truck or canal. The President reiterated his view that it was much more advantageous for us to take the initiative immediately, than to be put in the position of responding once the Soviets had signed a peace treaty with east Germany. Ambassador Knappstein remarked how difficult it was to plan ahead on these matters.

The President then raised the question of a plebiscite in West Germany. He said he favored a plebiscite and the important problem was one of timing. Should we do it immediately or should we wait until Khrushchev appeared at the UN and then respond to his actions there in this way? Mayor Brandt said that he himself wanted it as soon as possible, which would be a minimum of three weeks from the day the decision was taken. Unfortunately, a Berlin paper (Tagesspiegel) had benefited from a leak on this story and it was now a matter of public discussion. Mayor Brandt emphasized the advantages of a plebiscite for the Berliners themselves as a morale builder and argued this as a ground for rapid action. The President pointed out that the other side of the argument was, of course, the desirability of being able to respond to Khrushchev. Mayor Brandt said in that case, we might propose an all-Berlin plebiscite to Khrushchev and after he rejected it, have one in West Berlin. This course would have the difficulty that the questions raised in West Berlin would be different than those asked in east Berlin. The central questions are the presence of Allied troops and links to the Federal Republic. Neither of these is exactly appropriate to ask in east Berlin. The President said that this was a problem that required more thought. He wanted both sides to think about the timing and come to a conclusion as quickly as possible. Mayor Brandt observed that this would be difficult with the Quadripartite planning machinery. The President thought that agreement should be reached between the Federal Republic and West Berlin, there should then be a discussion between them and the U.S. and on this basis a decision should be taken. Mayor Brandt said that 15 December was the last date on which it would be useful to hold a plebiscite this year. It was hard to have it in the Christmas season. The President agreed and called for an early decision.

The President asked Mayor Brandt his evaluation of our contingency plans in relation to the difficulties that he, Brandt, expected in the near future. The Mayor responded that, while he expected some interference, it was difficult to predict the kind of interference and that he found it hard to respond to the President’s question.

The President turned to east Germany and the state of its army and economy. Mayor Brandt said he thought the army was not too reliable, but that properly deployed with Russian troops stiffening them, they would fight. They would probably fight Americans better than West Germans. In response to a question by the President, Mayor Brandt stated east Germany would never be able to defend itself without support from the Soviet Union no matter how the Soviets armed it, and the Soviets would not rely on it to do so. He said the east German economy was not significantly worse than it was last year but it certainly was no better. There had been a serious psychological deterioration since the building of the wall.

The President commented on two defects in our contingency plans. First, they proved not to provide for important contingencies, e.g., the wall. Second, there was a lack of political commitment. He was especially critical of the lack of political commitment on the military contingency plans. He then went on to remark that we had made our commitments to Berlin clear in terms of our increase in military strength and expenditures. The contrast with the French and even the Germans was clear. Unless we built up our conventional strength, our nuclear power would not really deter. It would be hard for the Russians to believe that we would pause for 60 days of mobilization and then begin a nuclear war. The geography of Berlin was such that the disadvantage lay with us because it was we who would have to make the first military move. This detracted from the credibility of our threat of nuclear war and made necessary readiness to use our conventional forces.

The President then summarized the discussion as follows:

1. Berlin was a key American commitment. Our actions were our assurances. If it were not for Berlin we could feel free to take action in Cuba. He thanked Mayor Brandt for his airport statement in which Brandt had said that it was unnecessary for him to ask us for assurances.

2. It was important to make every attempt at a peaceful solution. If we did not we would defeat our own aims because we would fail to maintain the viability of Berlin. In this position we had had the support of West Berlin, but opposition from the French and some opposition from Bonn. It is clear that at the moment the Soviet Union is doing nothing but repeating a clearly non-negotiable proposition on Allied troop withdrawal.

3. We would probably be faced by a decision on access shortly, consequent on Khrushchev’s signing a peace treaty. Therefore, it was vitally important that there be a German initiative on this matter now.

4. The asymmetry of U.S. commitments to NATO and those of the other larger NATO powers was striking. If the other major NATO powers did what we have done, Khrushchev would believe we were serious. Their joint population and wealth was such that they could do it.

After the summary the President repeated the importance of using our heads now and not waiting until the crisis. He then expressed his confidence in Mayor Brandt. Mayor Brandt responded by remarking that he, too, thought we were in a weak position when we feared to try new ideas. Our attempt to stand on the status quo always leads to the status quo minus. We had to act. The President agreed and repeated his remarks on the geography of Berlin, the access issue, and the consequent desirability of taking action on access now.

Mayor Brandt and the President then conversed privately in the garden for about ten minutes. The whole meeting lasted an hour.

C.K.¹

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany. Secret. Drafted by Kaysen. The time of the meeting is taken from the President’s Appointment Book. (Ibid.) A similar record drafted by Creel is ibid. A summary of the meeting was transmitted to Bonn in telegram 925, October 6. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/10–662) For Brandt’s account of this meeting, see Begegnungen und einsichten, pp. 94–95. Brandt had also discussed Berlin with Tyler, Hillenbrand, and Creel at 10 a.m. (Memorandum of conversation; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/10–562)
1. Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.