Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

126. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State ⁰

New York, September 29, 1962, midnight.

Secto 58. Paris for USRO. Following based on uncleared memcon.¹ Secretary saw Brandt together with Senat info officer Bahr evening September 30 for one hour 15 minutes. Practically entire discussion centered on Berlin.

In response to Sec’s question Brandt expressed thought that morale was not too bad in Berlin. Referring to Aug. riots and to criticism of Western powers published by some newspapers, Mayor said this was partly due to misunderstanding of what four-power status is, i.e. difference between four-power status based on agreements in regard to all Berlin and three-power commitments to West Berlin. This was not clear enough to Berlin and German people. It was not clear to them that sector wall was limit to guarantees.

In response Sec said in reality limit is what has come to be power to act. Assertion four-power rights can become very important, for instance, if Berlin question introduced into UN. We cannot accept talking solely about West Berlin and this we have always emphasized in our talks with Gromyko. True, steps were taken in 1948 and 1955 which removed any effective Western voice in happenings in east Berlin and east Germany.

Brandt said he would like to discuss:

1. Morale in city, and

2. Plebiscite.

Morale in city would be immensely helped if it would be possible to reach some arrangements with east Germans to counteract most inhumane aspects of wall. He had had 4-hour talk last week with Adenauer and they had just had new information from east Germans in discussing trade that perhaps they would be willing to discuss “other things” though they denied any connection or relation to trade east Germans inferred they had approval of “great ally”. This discussion on trade did not involve credits as previously proposed but larger swing in existing trade. Brandt favors extension greater swing and this will be discussed through Leopold-Behrendt channel.

Brandt expressed hope “other things” which east Germans might concede would be permission unite or bring closer divided families (a subject already being discussed through the Red Cross), permission for older people to join families even though not bound by closest blood relationship and finally permission West Berliners visit their relatives in east Berlin. There was another idea which West Berliners had discussed among themselves, namely proposal to establish visiting centers where relatives might visit for two or three hours at a time. Such centers might be established on sector border or in exclaves. Brandt apparently does not favor this idea referring to this as “prison conditions”. He does not expect very much out of this but said possible church leaders in east Germany could maintain some links with West.

Brandt said Leopold would be authorized discuss greater swing balance by letter from Erhard and “other things” such as movement of people by letter from Brandt and perhaps letter from Globke authorizing talks on all technical matters. Brandt said this was delicate matter and would be skating on thin ice but Chancellor knows about this. Sec commented that if by using this channel easements of this sort could be worked out, it should be tried even though it will not solve main problem.

Turning to plebiscite, Brandt said when Adenauer had brought up this idea in past, he had not favored it expressed opinion it might be useful rather soon have word from West Berliners. It would be good for psychological reasons to have West Berliners expressing their own views instead of others expressing views on their behalf. He had mentioned this to Bundy ² and also to the three Deputy Commandants. Could propose referendum for whole Berlin which, if refused, could be applied in West Berlin requesting vote on (a) continued Allied presence and (b) maintainance existing links with Bonn. Brandt thought plebiscite on these questions could play important role politically and morally.

Secretary said he agreed in one respect, i.e., if Berlin question comes before UN or if there is harsh confrontation with Soviets, one of our strongest points would be to say “ask the people involved.” When this idea had first been talked about between the President and Adenauer, there had been newspaper leaks and it was deemed not advisable to proceed. However, timing was important question. Khrushchev may or may not come in November. Question whether vote might be held before he comes or later will need careful consideration. In short, the question was when do you play this card. In response to Secretary’s question, Brandt said they would need three weeks after decision taken to hold plebiscite, actually to carry out vote.

Brandt then said he would like to touch on another idea. The Russians have been talking much about Berlin as a NATO base and asserting that Bonn cannot have any say in West Berlin. He wanted to ask whether we could go back to the 1955 agreements on FRG independence and examine again annexes how FRG relations with West Berlin could be defined.³ The Secretary remarked that we would have to look into this in detail before he could comment. (Sec suggests Dept. officers may wish discuss this point in more detail with Brandt when he visits Washington toward end week.)

Secretary said he wanted to make one point in regard to Allied vs. civilian access to West Berlin. While we do not see in existing agreements clear rights for civilian access, we have insisted in all our talks with Soviets that civilian access goes hand in hand with our own rights for access. Although there is perhaps theoretical difference, we have supposed that in certain circumstances we should have to incorporate civilian traffic into ours as exercise of our full rights. We cannot accept shut-off or close-down of civilian traffic.

Brandt observed difficulty was people do not have clear definition of what is meant by three points Western vital interests: Allied presence, access to Berlin and viability. Asked whether we could not put down on paper clear definition of what is meant by these three points. Cited difficulties arising if east Germans suddenly introduced visa requirement and pointed out they could do this in various ways by which many people in Germany or outside would not really understand import. Brandt had impression four-power group in Washington had been “going too fast” on ground access measures while relying more on air access. Thought it perhaps not good to talk too much on countermeasures.

Sec expressed thought that principal support for expanded civil access to Berlin lies in self-interest of other side in trade agreements. Brandt thought this was true only to certain degree since if Khrushchev made a political decision to go ahead then he would have already taken into account economic countermeasures. Sec remarked Khrushchev had other things to worry about too. Soviet bloc has annual trade of four and half billion with OeCD countries. Khrushchev has said to recent visitors that after signing peace treaty he would cut off military access. If he does there would be “roaring crisis” but it is possible Soviets first target will be military access.

Brandt raised question whether West has given sufficient answer to Soviets at this session GA. He agreed we must not do anything to bring UN into the question at this time. But many friends from non-aligned countries had asked what they could do for West Berlin, for instance, Malayans on recent visit asked what they might do for Brandt in New York. Sec said he would like to state in extreme confidence that UN relation to Berlin problem was point of difference between US, French and FRG. When it was question involving US in war, our policy was to give great deal of attention to UN. UN is one reason why we are not isolationists. De Gaulle and Adenauer had allergy to UN and thus we have reached no common view though under certain contingencies there was general agreement we would go to UN. Sec again emphasized confidential nature his comments.

Brandt stated Adenauer attitude toward America much better than even month ago. Sec added our principal burden is psychological. Some people seem think that unless we repeat every month our assurances, they lose meaning. On the other hand, we believe constant repetition inflates words and they become cheap. Sec complimented Brandt on response to press inquiry he had not come to obtain additional assurances, “we don’t need assurances.” This was best thing Brandt could have said.

Brandt asked whether in future talks with Soviets we might consider proposing talks at Ambassadorial level in Bonn between three Western Ambassadors and Soviet colleague. Soviet officials on cocktail circuit in Berlin had inferred this might be acceptable idea. Brandt added that at some point experts from east and West Germany could join in discussion technical matters. Sec said he would be glad to look into this idea. If there were a meeting between President and Khrushchev this suggestion might help save Khrushchev’s prestige.

Brandt then referred to his forthcoming lectures at Harvard which would be mainly concerned with european integration. He would say something on Berlin and since one or two things might be critical he would like to tell the Sec beforehand. He would make point welfare Berlin was more important than wall and hence in present circumstances they could not encourage disturbances or revolt in east Germany. However, there was one exception, if there were military attack against West Berlin he could not ask east Germans to remain quiet. Sec agreed.

In subsequent discussion whether east German Armed Forces reliable and would fight against Western forces or against FRG forces, question arose re contingency planning for actions to be taken in east Germany if and when access was blocked. (Sec asked Department consider possibility briefing Brandt more fully on contingency planning this point.)

Info Officer Bahr remarked difficult understand when access problem would arise, for instance, would it be when passports or visas required. Sec said FRG must think more about this question of recognition. When we had proposed international access authority, there was sharp reaction from Bonn. We resented this reaction since we were least involved when 11 NATO members have east German trade missions in their countries. Brandt commented he did not know what de facto recognition is though he knows there are certain de facto relations. Sec said we would not extend de jure recognition to east Germany. But we do not wish attempt define de facto recognition which means nothing in law. Furthermore there are certain advantages in not trying to define this point. Brandt referred back to his idea having Ambassadors meet in Bonn and at certain point bring in German experts. Wondered whether Khrushchev might tell Ulbricht keep quiet and consider this recognition. Sec said two things bear on this, 1) astonishing failure of east Germany, and 2) speaking entirely frankly, free Germans have not yet developed proper confidence in themselves. The great gravitational force is to the West. He was not suggesting new policy but thought more channels could be opened up and it would be possible to achieve more. Important that barriers do not come from our side.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/9–2962. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, and Berlin. According to another copy, this telegram was drafted by Davis. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2150)
1. SecDel/MC/82. (Ibid., CF 2152) The conversation took place at 6 p.m.
2. See Document 122.
3. For text of these agreements, signed at Paris October 23, 1954, and entered into effect in 1955, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. V, Part 2, pp. 1435 ff.