123. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany0
827. Priority—deliver 8 a.m. Eyes only for the Ambassador from Kaysen. FYI. The President requests that you call Globke and convey to [Page 335] him orally the following message with the request that in turn he convey it personally to the Chancellor at Cadenabbia as soon as possible. You may add whatever you think is appropriate in the way of reassurance that the number of people in the U.S. Government who are now aware of the situation is still limited and will remain so as long as possible. End FYI.
The President wishes the Chancellor to know of a potentially troublesome matter that has just come to his attention.
In the course of investigating the activities of registered agents acting for foreign governments in the United States, the staff of a Senatorial committee has come into the possession of an exchange of teletype messages, dated in October 1961, between General Julius Klein and Mr. Julius Epstein, who was at that time in the employ of General Klein. In these messages, General Julius Klein reported that during a conversation in the Chancellor’s office he was shown three cables sent by the German representatives in Washington and Paris to the Foreign Office. From the teletype it appears that General Klein, with the excuse that he could not read German rapidly, asked and received the Chancellor’s permission to take the cables to his hotel for more careful study. Before returning them the following morning, General Klein had photostatic copies made for his own purposes. The teletype to Epstein sets forth the text of the three cables verbatim and uncoded. These cables were No. 1007 of October 5, 1961, from the German NATO Delegation in Paris to the Foreign Office, and Nos. 2712 and 2714 of October 8, 1961, from the Germany Embassy here to Bonn.
When these teletypes came into the possession of the Senatorial committee, a member of the staff of that committee realized that these cables formed the basis of the articles that have recently appeared in Rheinische Merkur and Der Spiegel. These articles were written by the same Julius Epstein to whom the teletypes were addressed. Epstein is no longer in General Klein’s employment.
The cables contain a detailed account of discussions between the Four Powers following the President’s conversation with Foreign Minister Gromyko. This account is reproduced almost word for word in the articles, although with a greatly distorted emphasis.
In view of the fact that the staff of a Congressional committee now know the source of these articles, the Chancellor’s relations to the whole story may become public at any time. As is well known, the U.S. President cannot control the actions of the legislative branch. Further, so many people are involved in the proceedings of the committee that the risk of public disclosure is great.
The President, of course, is concerned that, in the event of a public disclosure, the matter should be handled on this side in such a way as to [Page 336] minimize its effects. He will do what he can, and would appreciate having by a private channel, if possible, any suggestions on this.
The President regrets that the Chancellor should be troubled by such matters at a time when together the Chancellor and he are carrying such a heavy burden of world problems.1
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9–2562. Top Secret; Priority; No Other Distribution. Drafted and approved by Kaysen. Repeated to Copenhagen eyes only for Bundy, who was en route from Berlin. The situation described in this telegram had been discussed by Rusk and Ball and Schroeder and Bundy on September 24 and by Ball and Kaysen (twice) and Kaysen and Bundy on September 25 before arriving at the decision to approach Globke on the problem. For a record of the Kaysen-Bundy telephone conversation, see Declassified Documents, 1982, 1351; records of the other telephone conversations are in Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192.↩
- On September 27 Dowling gave Globke the President’s message, emphasizing that Kennedy was bringing this unpleasant matter to the Chancellor’s attention because of their friendship. Globke suggested that Adenauer might wish to write to some of the Senators on the committee, and Dowling told him this might be helpful. (Telegram 917 from Bonn; ibid., Central Files, 762.00/9–2762) On receipt of Dowling’s telegram, Kaysen called him to say that letters from the Chancellor might cause further confusion. (Memorandum for the record, September 27; Declassified Documents, 1982, 1352) On September 28 Dowling passed this on to Globke, who reported that he too had been at a loss to devise an appropriate basis for such letters. (Telegram 929 from Bonn, September 28; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9–2862)↩