Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

114. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, September 10, 1962.

SUBJECT

• “Preferred Sequence of Military Actions in the Berlin Conflict”

The attached paper on the “Preferred Sequence of Military Actions in the Berlin Conflict” is submitted for your approval prior to being tabled first in the Ambassadorial Group and then in the NATO Council.¹

The paper as it now stands reflects the agreed views of the Departments of State and Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It also takes cognizance of many of the substantive comments and criticisms submitted earlier by General Norstad (General Norstad’s message ALO 749, attached)² although all of General Norstad’s objections clearly have not been met.

Three basic differences remain. First, there is General Norstad’s objection to the concept of the sequence paper. General Norstad questions the political and military wisdom of our spelling out in any such form our view of the possible sequence of events in Berlin. He also thinks it unrealistic to attempt to predict such a sequence. Instead, he prefers the cataloguing of possible actions to meet the Soviet challenge without putting such actions in any specific order. Mr. Nitze, on the other hand—and this is also the view of the Departments of State and Defense and the JCS—denies that the sequence paper is intended to establish a hard and fast line of development. It is a conceptual framework for planning purposes, spelling out challenges from the other side.

Second, there is the question of procedure. General Norstad argues for an oral presentation rather than the tabling of a written document. Apart from his apparent concern about possible leaks, he claims that this effort will be misunderstood and lead to unnecessary confusion and division in NATO. Paul Nitze denies this. He insists that introduced in an appropriate context, and given a proper explanation of the sequence paper’s uses and limitations, a written document is a more manageable vehicle for these purposes than an oral briefing and less likely to be misinterpreted and/or misunderstood by the individual representatives in the Council.

Lastly, there is a remaining substantive difference which is somewhat camouflaged by the language of the paper. General Norstad objects strongly to the restrictions the sequence paper imposes on the use of nuclear weapons prior to Phase IV. As the responsible military commander in the field, he feels these restrictions tie him down unnecessarily and deny him the means he needs to carry out his mission. Like the French and Germans, although probably for different reasons, he tends to favor a selective use of nuclear weapons earlier in the scheme, after less extensive non-nuclear combatant action than the U.S. Government (as reflected in NSAM 109)³ would prefer. Nitze, however, claims that the use of nuclear weapons at a point in the sequence scheme which General Norstad seems to prefer, would not really serve the purposes allegedly intended. Moreover, Nitze denies that the language of the paper dealing with the use of nuclear weapons is over-restrictive. He considers that the language now incorporated at the end of paragraph 2 of the general introduction provides whatever leeway is really needed to deal with the problems as they develop.

McG. B.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin. Top Secret. Drafted by Klein.
1. Not attached to the source text, but a copy of this 6-page paper (BQD-M-30) is in Department of State, G/PM Files: Lot 69 D 258, Poodle Blanket. On September 8 Secretaries McNamara and Rusk had sent the President a joint memorandum attaching a copy of BQD-M-30 and stating that he should approve a U.S. position on a preferred sequence of military actions in a Berlin conflict based on it. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin) Kennedy, Rusk, McNamara, Tyler, Hillenbrand, Lemnitzer, Nitze, Bundy, and Klein met at 6 p.m. on September 10 to discuss the preferred sequence, and the President agreed to the position. (Notes by Klein; ibid.) On September 13 the Washington Ambassadorial Group discussed the paper further, numbered the paragraphs, and made some minor revisions. At this meeting Rusk stated that NATO acceptance of the preferred sequence could be an important signal to induce Soviet caution in Berlin and warned that the four Allied NATO Permanent Representatives should be prepared to deal with suggestions for new political initiatives from the other members of the Alliance. (Topol 337 to Paris, September 14; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9–1462) For text of the revised paper, see Document 115.
2. Not attached to the source text, but a copy is in Department of State, G/PM Files: Lot 59 D 258, NATO Military Plans.
3. For text, see vol. XIV, Document 185.