Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

107. Memorandum for the Record⁰

Washington, August 31, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Meeting in the Cabinet Room, August 29, 1962, to Review Berlin Contingency Planning¹

PRESENT

• The President, The Secretary of State, Mr. Ball, Mr. Brandin, Mr. Cash; Mr. Nitze; General Taylor, Mr. Bundy, Mr. Kaysen

The Secretary opened by remarking that General Clay would be in for a briefing on the subject in the morning before seeing the President. The President said he would get Clay’s reaction on the problem to be discussed today.

The Secretary then sketched our present situation. The Soviet Union is pushing the Western Powers out of East Berlin, and at the same time striving to make West Berlin a Four-Power city in which they have an active role. We are now nearly at the end of the first process; the second part is beginning to move forward more rapidly. The problem on which we must shortly make a decision is thus whether we should not begin to head off the Soviet efforts to increase their role in West Berlin. The Secretary’s first inclination was toward such action, lest there be serious consequences for the confidence and morale of the West Berlin population, which in turn would react on our position in West Berlin. The immediate problem in turn divides as follows: we might try: to increase our own presence in East Berlin, decrease the Soviet presence in West Berlin, or both. He is asking our Mission in Berlin and our Embassy in Bonn to supply us with a complete catalog of Soviet activities in West Berlin. These now go far beyond the activities related to BASC, Spandau and the War Memorial, and include, for instance, TASS offices and Polish and Czech Military Missions. For the present, the Secretary believes that we should keep to our plan of refusing to show identification of allied military personnel to East Germans in East Berlin. If, as a consequence, the Soviets refuse to permit entry of our military personnel into East Berlin, then we should respond by closing West Berlin to the Soviets.

The President asked whether we should make this trade on the particular point of showing identification. He also remarked that the War Memorial may be a particularly sensitive point with the Soviets, and it might well be an affront to them to be excluded from the War Memorial if we admitted them to West Berlin at all.

Mr. Bundy and Mr. Nitze then presented Ambassador Dowling’s argument. We have nothing to lose in East Berlin; our present minimal activity is of marginal significance. On the other hand, if we allow Soviet presence in West Berlin to increase, we run a double risk. First, the show of Soviet military power in West Berlin affects the West Berliners adversely in a way which harms Berlin’s long-term viability. Second, we may, through usage, create a situation in which it is easy for the Soviets to tie our access to West Berlin from West Germany with their access to West Berlin from East Berlin. The President again commented on the probable special sensitivity of the War Memorial. Mr. Nitze noted that the location of the Memorial was the result of a deal between the British and the Russians. He went on to suggest that while there may be no need to deny access to the War Memorial, we could require them to come to it by the Brandenberg Gate, which meant a journey of less than 100 yards in West Berlin. Further, we could require that they come in buses and not APC’s. The President thought the alternative: use of APC’s and the Brandenberg Gate, or use of buses and the Friederichstrasse Gate, a reasonable one to present to the Soviets.

The Secretary then directed the attention of the group to the draft telegram for Berlin and the European capitals, inviting their comments on the alternatives which the Secretary had stated (attached).² The President remarked that there was nothing to prevent the Soviets from doing what was sketched in the first paragraph of the message; namely, equate Soviet position in West Berlin with allied access to West Berlin. Mr. Bundy pointed out the importance of usage in this respect. Although there was nothing to prevent them from making this identification now, our acquiescence in the increasing Soviet presence in West Berlin would make such an identification more natural.

The President again asked whether we should not continue to permit Soviet access to the three special areas. Mr. Nitze urged the advantages of early action. Since the immediate tension had lessened, and the hostile actions of the West Berliners which had caused the Soviets to put their troops into APC’s are not continuing, this was an appropriate moment for us to ask the Soviets to return to buses. He referred to the arguments of Mr. Hulick in Berlin 282 (attached).³

The President asked why it would not be sufficient response to an East German request for papers from our troops, to deny ourselves entrance to East Berlin, and then admit the Soviets on credentials good only at the Brandenberg Gate. Mr. Bundy thought this would be an inadequate response, and that neither the Soviets nor the Germans would feel it sufficiently forceful. General Taylor remarked that relations between East and West Berlin were a microcosm of relations between West Germany and Berlin, and we should consider any action within Berlin in this light. Mr. Bundy pointed to the central question of what trade we were willing to make. In his judgment our access rights in East Berlin for their access rights in West Berlin was an advantageous trade. Mayor Brandt shared this view, and had indeed urged it.

The President asked whether a request for passes was an appropriate issue on which to hand such a trade. Mr. Bundy responded that the significance of the request was not as important as the problem of substantive judgment on whether or not the trade was in our interest. If it was, we should find the earliest occasion to make it. The Secretary pointed out the asymmetry of the “paper” issue. Since the Soviet Union and the East Germans wish to create a state frontier at the sector boundary, they would be happy to show whatever papers we asked for.

The President observed that he saw no specific danger in Soviet presence at the War Memorial, BASC and Spandau. Mr. Nitze and Mr. Bundy responded that the issue was not their presence. The issue was our control of the terms on which they could come to West Berlin. If we did not assert our control, then we would be moving rapidly to a Four-Power West Berlin. General Taylor asked Mr. Nitze whether we were not in fact already in this state; Mr. Nitze thought not yet.

Mr. Nitze asked that we return to the question of what should be done now. He would recommend that we request the Russians to return to the use of buses and indicate that we will not permit entry in APC’s. The President asked whether he would recommend that we require them to come through the Brandenberg Gate as well. Mr. Nitze said he was willing to wait on this point.

The President asked whether we have ever sent tanks or other armoured vehicles into East Berlin. Mr. Brandin responded that we have sent tanks only as far as the Friederichstrasse checkpoint. Our own patrols in East Berlin have been made in jeeps; the soldiers do carry side arms. Secretary Rusk remarked that if the Soviets come through the Brandenberg Gate, the use of APC’s is no longer an issue, since they in fact are not going through any significant part of West Berlin. The President asked Mr. Nitze to repeat his argument, and Mr. Nitze again stated that the central issue was our control of Soviet access for West Berlin. In answer to the President’s question as to whether this was in doubt, Mr. Nitze cited the Soviet protests on the issue of our escorts for their APC’s as evidence of their efforts to erode our control. General Taylor and Mr. Nitze said that we had yielded to this protest, in part at least, by agreeing to describe our accompanying vehicles in other terms than as “escorts.”

The President asked whether we should tie permission for the Soviets to use APC’s to acceptance of our escorts. General Taylor responded that we should not accept any restrictions on the use of our own vehicles in West Berlin.

The President summarized the issues as follows. Should we do something now or wait? Should we confine the Soviets to the use of the Brandenberg Gate and permit APC’s? Should we give the Soviets the choice of coming in buses or using the Brandenberg Gate, or should we give them only the alternatives of exclusion or the use of the buses through the Brandenberg Gate? Should the War Memorial be in the category of BASC and Spandau as points to which we would continue to permit Soviet entry even if we excluded them from the rest of West Berlin, or should it be treated along with the rest of West Berlin? The Secretary indicated that he would have the outgoing telegram re-drafted to request comment on these questions. He agreed that as presently drafted it seemed to reflect decisions on some of them, which in fact have not yet been taken. In response to the President’s question, he said that the draft had not been discussed quadripartitely.

Mr. Nitze pointed out that if we are going to make any request, we must be prepared to respond to Soviet refusal to accede to it. He would recommend that we block their access to West Berlin if they do not accede to whatever request we think appropriate. The President again raised the question of whether we should take the initiative in making a request or wait to respond to some Soviet move. His own inclination was to wait. The Secretary pointed out that we were dealing with a symbolic, rather than in a substantive realm. The problem essentially is how do we give the Soviets an unmistakable signal as to our intentions within West Berlin. Mr. Nitze thought it was better to take the risks of action now than to defer them.

The President then remarked that he saw no harm in the APC’s as such, since we could stop them at any time. They did not limit our vital rights of access or military presence. Further, we could stop them at any time. The Secretary responded that this was just the problem. General Taylor observed that although the initial use of the APC’s might have been a natural reaction of the Soviet Commander to the violence offered to his troops, their use was no longer justified. The President said that the reaction of the West Berliners to the APC’s was understandable and not unexpected, but in itself was not a sufficient reason for us to take action. Further, it might have been easy if we had prevented the entry of the APC’s at their first appearance, but now we were in a different position. Mr. Nitze pointed out that the West Berliners’ feelings were not the issue, but rather our confrontation with the Soviets. The President again raised the question of whether we should take the initiative, and indicated that he preferred to respond to a Soviet move that went outside the existing rules.

The Secretary raised the question of whether it might be useful to move in the opposite direction by putting more American and other Western troops in East Berlin. Mr. Nitze and Mr. Bundy pointed out the possible difficulties our troops could create for us. The arrest of a number of American soldiers, in the absence of a Soviet Commandant in Berlin, might well put the President in a difficult position.

Mr. Bundy went on to review the problem of passes. He pointed out that last year we engaged our prestige on the issue of whether American military personnel would show passes to East Germans, and we succeeded in making our point. If we now retreated from this position, the Soviets and Germans both would read it as weakness. The President agreed that American military personnel should not show passes to get into East Berlin and that we should rather deny ourselves entry. He observed that on the Autobahn the situation was of course different. Mr. Bundy remarked that if we denied ourselves access to East Berlin, in order to avoid showing passes to East Germans, we must at that point cut off Soviet access to West Berlin. Without Soviet presence in East Berlin, there was no justification for a Soviet presence in West Berlin. He repeated Mayor Brandt’s point that we no longer have any important interest in access to East Berlin, and therefore we should not trade anything in West Berlin for access to East Berlin.

The President asked whether the alternative might be to limit the Soviets to the three areas mentioned, and again raised the question of timing. Mr. Bundy gave his view that now was the time to deal with the APC’s. The President expressed his preference for staying on our pres-ent position for the moment. General Taylor pointed out that we had a middle course of action; namely, requiring that the Soviets use the Brandenberg Gate for APC’s going to the War Memorial. The Secretary said that this was also the notion of the British Commandant. He observed that we probably could get Allied agreement to restrict access to the three places mentioned under specified contingencies. Mr. Bundy remarked that in order to come out with this result, we had to push for a great deal more, rather than merely ask for it.

The President suggested that the message be revised to reflect the discussion and sent out. In response to the President’s question, the Secretary gave his judgment that it was not an appropriate moment to send General Clay back to Berlin.

CK ⁴

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin, BQD-CC. Top Secret. Drafted by Kaysen.
1. The meeting was held at 5:46 p.m. (President’s Appointment Book; ibid.)
2. Not found. The telegram as transmitted at 9:10 p.m. is printed as Document 108.
3. Telegram 282, August 28, analyzed the shift from initial Soviet bellicosity in presenting APCs with armed guards at Checkpoint Charlie to compliance with the U.S. regulation on Soviet movements in West Berlin. The telegram suggested that this was not a Soviet “backdown,” but more likely a desire not to precipitate a crisis over access to West Berlin. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8–2862)
4. Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.