Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath

387. Memorandum for the Record⁰

Washington, undated.

The President reacted to the attached memorandum of December 9 from Mr. Attwood by asking Mr. Moyers what instructions had been given to Attwood. Where he got the memo I do not know.

I reviewed for Mr. Moyers the actions taken since December 9 and reported that consideration of using Attwood in negotiations with representatives of Castro had been under review almost weekly. Timing of a contact had not been considered right.

I recommended that, in the light of the recently announced USSR-Cuba trade agreement and the renewed Russian pledge to aid Cuba by all means if an invasion should be launched,¹ any contact between Attwood and Castro representatives should be avoided lest we convey to the Cubans we were reacting defensively to the latest Russian actions. I said that a no-contact-now policy reflected the current situation and did not forestall use of Attwood at a later date if a decision was made to do so.²

BKS

Attachment

³

Memorandum From William Attwood to the Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson)

New York, December 9, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Latest Cuban Developments for your talk with the President

As you know, President Kennedy in September authorized me to establish a discreet contact with the Cuban UN representative to verify reports that Castro—if not his Communist advisers—was prepared to go quite far in meeting our terms for normalizing relations.

McGeorge Bundy has the chronological account of what this initial contact led to during October and November. At all times I was in contact with the White House. We never indicated to the Cubans that we wanted to make a deal but only that we were prepared to listen.

Finally, on October 31, Castro invited me to meet him in Cuba and guaranteed both discretion and security. We replied that we would prefer preliminary discussions here at the United Nations to make sure there was something worth talking about.

On November 18, Castro’s right-hand man, Rene Vallejo, informed me by telephone that instructions were being sent to the Cuban Representative, Dr. Lechuga, to discuss an agenda with me.

On December 2, Lechuga told me he had received a letter from Castro authorizing him to talk with me about certain problems “in a general way”.Lechuga said that in view of the President’s death he did not know whether we still wished to have such a talk. I told him I would let him know. I then reported this to Gordon Chase in Bundy’s office and am now waiting for further instructions.

Personally, I feel that we have nothing to lose by finding out what is on Castro’s mind and what he wants to talk about.

0. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Contact with Cuban Leaders, 5/63-4/65. Top Secret. Prepared by Smith. A copy was sent to Chase.
1. Announced in Khrushchev’s December 13 speech before the the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in which he declared that “revolutionary Cuba will not remain defenseless if the aggressive militaristic circles of the U.S.A. attack it.” For text, see The Current Digest of Soviet Press, vol. XV, No. 49, January 1, 1964, pp. 3-13. The trade agreement for long-term purchases by the Soviet Union of Cuban sugar was signed by Castro and Khrushchev on January 21, 1964, but apparently was announced earlier.
2. On December 11 Chase sent Bundy a memorandum on Attwood’s activities. Attwood told Chase there was no pressure to reply as “Lechuga, and the Cubans in general, probably feel that the situation has changed since President Kennedy’s assassination. Deep down, they probably don’t expect anything hopeful from us.”Attwood told Chase that Lechuga “seemed somewhat reluctant to bring up the subject of a letter he had received from Cuba.” If the contact was to continue, Attwood wanted to call Lechuga within a couple of weeks, otherwise the matter “would lose momentum and wither on the vine.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Contact with Cuban Leaders, 5/63-4/65)
3. Secret.