306. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)0
SUBJECT
- Cuba Coordinating Committee—Covert Operations in Cuba
Attached is an agenda1 which was discussed at a meeting of the Cottrell Committee on April 1. The meeting was attended by Secretary Vance, Joe Califano, Dick Helms, Dez FitzGerald, and Bob Hurwitch.
- 1.
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Balloon Operations Over Havana—The plan is well under way. Assuming the winds are right, CIA proposes to release balloons containing 300,000 to 500,000 leaflets on May Day (before daylight). The balloons will not be visible by radar or by the naked eye. The leaflets will (1) attack Castro’s henchmen, and (2) contain cartoons illustrating sabotage techniques.
The decision on the balloons is scheduled for another review during the week preceding May Day.
- 2.
- Training of CIA-Sponsored Cuban Exiles on Military Reservations—CIA and the Army are now working on this one to find appropriate installations.
- 3.
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Russian Language Programs—The Committee decided in favor of instituting three programs (Radio Liberty, Radio Caribe, and an intrusion program). It decided against setting up an [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] on the grounds that it is an unnecessary duplication.
In approving the three programs for Special Group consideration, the Committee recognized that they will probably be of marginal value only; however, they will cost us very little, financial or otherwise.
- 4.
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Sabotage of Cuban Shipping (19 ships)—The Committee discussed three forms of sabotage—limpets, incendiaries in the cargoes, and abrasives in the machinery.
The Committee decided against limpets [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] and even though it would be a dramatic morale booster. Unfortunately, there is no certain way of controlling a limpet; it could sink a ship and the sinking could be billed as a U.S. submarine attack. Secretary Vance came down hard against sinkings.
[Page 749]The Committee will recommend to the Special Group the incendiaries which would be timed to go off in international waters and the abrasives in the machinery. While the propaganda boost might be nil, they are easier to effect than limpets and could really hurt Castro.
The Committee gave CIA the option of using either its own Cubans or of using DRE as a cut-out.
- 5.
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Redirection of Cuban Exile Group Operations—The Committee discussed this one briefly—i.e. what is an acceptable target?Dick Helms pointed out that although these groups may start out to get a non-Soviet target, once you let them go, you can never really be sure what they will do. Bob Hurwitch seemed to favor the approach that attacks and sabotage should appear to come from inside rather than from outside Cuba.
The Committee came to no decision on this one. More thinking is needed.
- 6.
- Propaganda Inside Cuba to Attack Soviet Troops—While Secretary Vance expressed some concern about the possibility that this would lead to a conflagration between the Cubans and the Soviets (what would we do), the Committee decided in favor of this course of action. While the results will probably not be startling for our side, the costs and risks are small. (I’m not sure a conflagration would be such a bad thing for us, even if it did occur. How much chance would these 5,000 combat troops have against the huge and well-equipped Cuban army? I don’t think the Russians would dare try to impose their will by force; they would have to grin and bear it.)
Comment:
- 1.
- In considering specifics of a covert program, I think we should keep in the back of our minds the possibility that we may want to turn our policy around sometime in the future. This does not necessarily mean that we would rule out covert operations—rather, we would probably want to direct them towards splitting the Cuba/Soviet tie (e.g. a “Russki Go Home” campaign) instead of forcing Castro to embrace the Soviets more tightly (e.g. inactivation of Cuban shipping which would lead to further Cuban dependence on Bloc shipping). In this regard, we may wish to consider carefully the gains and risks involved in directing more violent efforts against selected Russian targets within Cuba. I have a feeling that the risks are not as great as they seem.
- 2.
- Assuming we continue our present policy or consider a turn-around policy very far down the road, I like an active covert program. It seems to me that a good sabotage program is one of the few tools we can use to really hurt Castro economically. Our present policy of isolating Cuba from the Free World is not going to bust Castro. Instead, I suspect that the Cuban economy is at its low right now. With no effective U.S. covert intervention, it will probably grow healthier from here on as the [Page 750] Cuban economy moves from the difficult transition stage between economic dependence on the West and economic dependence on the Bloc.