81. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to Secretary of State Rusk, at Paris0
66. Washington personal for Acting Secretary. Paris personal for Secretary.Deptel 830, repeated Paris 5140.1 Much appreciate suggestion I send President my views in connection with Vienna meeting but fear there is little I can say that would be helpful. Am not informed as to background [Page 169] considerations that led to arrangement of meeting at this time and am not entirely certain as to underlying expectations and hopes with which we are approaching it.
I do not share frequently stated view that Khrushchev needs to be personally assured at this time of our determination to resist any overt encroachment that would bring into play our obligation under UN or existing alliances. He is well acquainted with our situation in these respects and knows that we will not hesitate to react with determination if challenged in this manner. He does not, I am sure, propose to offer us such challenges, if he can help it, particularly such as would threaten to embroil us directly with Soviet forces. Whatever pressures he may be planning to exert on US in Berlin in coming period, they are not likely to be ones which, in his opinion, would present us with an overt and clear challenge of this nature.
It would not be useful for me to attempt to enter at this date into discussion of our positions on those great questions, such as Germany, Berlin, Korea-Japan, et cetera, in which Russian interests and our own are both normally involved, which constitute in my view center and source of deepest tensions. On other hand, I am skeptical of usefulness of any detailed discussion with Khrushchev of peripheral situations such as Laos, Cuba, and Iran. Soviet responsibility as a rule is not formally involved in these situations; and where Soviet policies have contributed to their exacerbation, these have been only one of many factors.
It seems to me evident that decisions of eighty-one parties meeting in Moscow last fall rested on agreed calculation, as between Russians and Chinese, that Americaʼs world position and influence could probably be effectively shattered in coming period, and the NATO group politically isolated by series of sharp indirect political pressures, ruthless exploitation of colonial issue, and all-out propaganda attack. I think it could usefully be emphasized to Khrushchev that a political program founded on such calculation is not only wholly inconsistent with any attempt to improve international atmosphere but could scarcely be expected to achieve completion without at some point creating situations where our military obligations would become involved and complications created beyond anyoneʼs control. It could be justly put to Khrushchev that inflammatory and insulting language in which recent Soviet statements have been cast constitutes alone a grievous disservice to any efforts to improve world situation and plays directly into hands of those who view with disfavor or despair the prospect of any improvement in Soviet-American relations.
In light of above, it seems to me general tenor of Presidentʼs approach could well be that (1) basic political problems dividing us from Russians and Chinese in European and East-Asian areas, outside of disarmament, are of such difficulty that much time and patient preparation of public opinion would be involved before any practical negotiating approach [Page 170] could be made to their solutions; (2) we would like to start on the long task of cultivating a suitable atmosphere and climate of opinion in which to tackle these questions; but (3) it is idle to attempt this in face of the impressions recently created by violent Russian statements, by obvious attempt to destroy United Nations Secretariat, and by equally obvious effort to exploit colonial and other issues with a view to blackening American image before world public, distorting American action and intentions, and sowing hatred and mistrust of American people.
Though aware that my views in this respect are at variance with those of many prominent American students of Soviet scene within and without government, I have still not seen evidence to convince me that Khrushchev is an absolute dictator of policy within the Communist orbit or that he does not have to take into account views of other people and parties. Do not believe that hints transmitted to us from time to time along this line (most recently to me personally by Soviet Ambassador here, yesterday) are wholly without substance. I think Khrushchev has, for various reasons, a greater interest in relaxation of tensions between Russia and the West than have his Chinese allies; that it was not without inner hesitations and conflicts that he was led last fall to accept the aggressive Chinese line on spreading of socialism by means short of all-out war; and that he could well use some help from outside in arguing for a somewhat more moderate and prudent course on part of communist parties. For this reason, I hope his personal position, and possible effects of Vienna talks on it, will not be left out of our consideration as we plan our approach to the meeting.
From the particular vantage point of Belgrade, it is evident that noncommitted world now stand at very crucial parting of the ways. If some relaxation of over-all world tensions is not achieved, it seems to me very likely that there will be serious split between that group of unaligned nations which is violently anti-Western and anti-American and that which would like to preserve decent relations with the West. This issue may be at stake in forthcoming Cairo meeting. To extent that Vienna meeting creates impression of improvement of Soviet-Western relations, Yugoslavia, whose influence together with that of Nehru2 may be decisive in determining trends within the nonaligned group, will be cautioned against association with anti-Western tendencies. If, however, no improvement in East-West relations is achieved at this time, position of Yugoslavia and other neutrals may be expected to become more difficult; and in this case, as things now stand, there would be small hope of drawing this country generally to the pro-Western camp.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/5-3161. Confidential; Niact. Also sent to the Department as telegram 981, which is the source text.↩
- Telegram 830, May 31, asked Kennan to send the President his advice, suggestions, and analysis for the meeting with Khrushchev. (Ibid., 611.61/6-261)↩
- Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India.↩