Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume V, Soviet Union

67. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union⁰

Washington, May 6, 1961, 1:03 a.m.

1919. Eyes only for Ambassador from Secretary. Your 2710 and 2714.¹ You should tell Gromyko that the President agrees with the considerations which Gromyko set forth to you concerning a meeting. The President remains desirous of meeting Khrushchev. He hopes that it will be possible to adhere to the original schedule of early June in Vienna but is not at the moment in a position to make a firm decision on this point. However, he will be able to give a definite reply prior to Mr. Khrushchevʼs return to Moscow on May twentieth.

FYI—In addition to the problem of the relationship of the meeting with Khrushchev to the De Gaulle visit, there are, as you indicated in your comments, a number of other considerations which the President must have in mind before making a definite commitment. Chief among these is the situation in regard to Laos but we should well before May twentieth have a clearer indication of the probable course of events. If for example the Laos subject is in the process of pacific negotiations at the proposed Geneva Conference, this would be a circumstance which would render the meeting easier from the point of view of public opinion here and abroad. If on the other hand the conference does not take place and the situation is again exacerbated in Laos, it would not be desirable for the President to be meeting with Khrushchev.

The President is taking up in a confidential personal message with De Gaulle² the question as to his reaction in the light of the Paris visit to a meeting with Khrushchev immediately thereafter and this will be an important initial factor in the Presidentʼs ultimate decision. What you should seek to convey to Gromyko is the Presidentʼs continued desire to meet Khrushchev and leave no impression of any holdback in this respect but merely emphasize that there are a number of considerations which have to be examined before a definite date can be set.

For domestic political reasons the President would have to be in a position of indicating certain specific subjects that he was to discuss with Khrushchev. Obviously one would be the nuclear test talks since according to present plans they will still be in session in early June. Since it would be desirable to have more than one subject, we would appreciate any suggestions that you have concerning other questions which President might discuss with Khrushchev, with some prospect of progress, to be publicly announced along with test ban topic. The fact of public announcement would obviously exclude a number of questions in particular Berlin, but possible upcoming disarmament talks apart from test ban might be conceivable.³ End FYI.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/5-461. Secret. Drafted by Bohlen, cleared by Kohler, and approved by Rusk.
1. Documents 65 and 66.
2. The text of this message, dated May 5, was transmitted to Thompson in telegram 1920 to Moscow, May 6. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.11-KE/5-661)
3. In telegram 2736, May 6, received in the Department of State at 3:14 p.m., May 6, Thompson reported that he had given Gromyko the message at 3:30 that afternoon. (Ibid., 611.61/5-661)