Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume V, Soviet Union

354. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State⁰

Moscow, September 10, 1963, 7 p.m.

861. I called on Gromyko this morning to inform him of my departure tomorrow for Washington, to inquire as to his own travel plans, and to ascertain any ideas he might have on arrangements for continuation talks with ourselves and British. I also sought to draw Gromyko out on UN subjects bound to come up, such as outer space and expansion of Security Council and ECOSOC, as well as on bilateral and trilateral issues on which discussions already initiated when Secretary in Moscow.

In talk lasting more than hour Gromyko was affable, relaxed and quite positive in his expression of hopes of progress. He will depart Moscow early Sunday morning arriving NY about 6:30 p.m. local time. Although he had no specific suggestions on schedule of talks I gained impression he is anxious to begin discussions as soon as possible and carry them on so long as they offer some hope of progress. Date of return is open. In what impressed me as considered expression of official Soviet view, Gromyko as I left said that as result Test-Ban Treaty, situation offers real chance for progress and he hoped that we would take maximum advantage of opportunity. In his view, if forthcoming round of talks could produce good results, this would be good for the US, the USSR and generally for the world.

I began substantive discussion by bringing up UN subjects. I indicated that while we had hoped progress might be made in formulating outer space rules, we had been somewhat disappointed to note a recent article by Korovin (Embtel 812)¹ which seemed to reflect a rejection of our suggested step-by-step approach. While only vaguely familiar with article Gromyko pointed out that Korovin does not occupy official govt position and therefore cannot express official Sov views. On other hand ideas expressed by Korovin, as leading Sov scientist, must be regarded as reasonable. The SovGovt view remains substantially same as before: i.e. any formulation of outer space rules must provide for prohibition of satellites for spying, propaganda or military purposes. Within this general framework, Sovs would not rule out step-by-step approach to the problem; in any case he preferred to leave this question to the judgment of experts who he understood were now discussing the problem in NY.

I then inquired if Gromyko had given any reconsideration to question of enlarging Security Council and ECOSOC in order to meet desires for representation by Afro-Asian bloc. Gromyko took the initial position that progress toward this end could be brought about only through revision of charter and that this was impossible so long as we insisted on retention of the “Chiang Kai-shekist clique” in Chinaʼs permanent seat. Pointing out that Sovs feel strongly that Chinese should be legally represented in the UN and that present arrangement in Sov view was unlawful, he saw little point in pursuing further a question which had long been at issue between us. Gromyko felt that a possible alternative solution to problem of increasing Afro-Asian representation might be redistribution of nonpermanent SC seats and possibly also ECOSOC slots but he wished to make clear that if this method should be adopted there could be no surrender of seats by “socialist countries.” I pointed out that others felt same way as Sovs about their established positions. I therefore failed to see how redistribution would meet the problem in view of the vastly increased size of the UN and urged that some other solution should be found to meet the legitimate aspirations of the Asians and Africans for representation.

Turning to subjects on which discussion had already been initiated, I inquired if Gromyko would be prepared in his ENDC co-chairman capacity to continue examination of such disarmament proposals as budget freeze, surprise attack and observation posts which already begun in Geneva. Gromyko replied that he would be prepared to discuss all questions which were on ENDC agenda, as well as those which had been discussed in Moscow during Secretaryʼs visit, especially NAP.

With regard to NAP, I said, as Gromyko aware, consultation with our allies had been initiated and they had raised precisely those questions which Secretary had foreseen, particularly need for linking NAP with situation of Berlin and access thereto. Gromyko commented that access was related to broader question of German Peace Treaty and if we should insist on relating it to NAP there would be little chance of progress. I reminded him that at Pitsunda Khrushchev had seemed to agree with Secretaryʼs view that NAP should be crowning move in series of separate steps toward the gradual elimination of tension. Gromyko acknowledged that Khrushchev had expressed such idea but that what he meant was that ideally all problems should be resolved first and then NAP concluded. This in the Sov view however was idealistic, not practical. Gromyko agreed that a more feasible approach was to proceed step by step but again stressed that linking access with NAP was out of question.

I referred to Presidentʼs recent conversation with Dobrynin² and stressed we continued to be disturbed at way Soviet Union shirked its co-chairman responsibilities in Laos and adopted partisan attitude, most recent example of this being Sov decision to publicize Souphanouvong³ charges while continuing deny same privilege to Souvanna Phouma charges of last June, or to act on them. Gromyko said that on subject of Laos he could add little to what he and Khrushchev had already said to Harriman and Secretary; Soviet Union stands for a neutral, independent Laos but dispute between Princes was in Sov view an exclusively internal Laotian affair in which Sovs did not intend to interfere. Meanwhile, Gromyko wished to draw attention to serious incidents of last few days in Vientiane which according to Sov information were result of aggressive action by Phoumi forces against small PL contingent. I pointed out that while I was not informed in detail as to Vientiane situation there was established machinery for investigation of such incidents and charges and by agreement of co-chairmen this should be set in operation. It was not true as Gromyko had said that we always sided with Phoumi and denied right of Souphanouvong to be heard. In fact, we supported Souvanna Phouma as we had both agreed to do; unlike Sovs, we have not unilaterally aired Phoumiʼs side of story; we believed that when charges or accusations are leveled by any element in the Laotian body politic all should be objectively examined by the ICC on the basis of recommendations by the Geneva co-chairmen, especially those put forward by head of govt.

Again citing Presidentʼs conversation with Dobrynin I asked Gromyko if his govt had given consideration to Presidentʼs broad, imaginative proposal for joint cooperation in outer space projects and if he would be prepared to discuss this subject while in NY or Washington. Gromyko said Sovs agreed in principle with idea and he would of course be prepared to examine any specific proposals US might have in mind. On other bilateral issues Gromyko said he would be prepared to exchange views on trade question and civil aviation. He also agreed that further possibilities of cooperation in the atomic energy field could be explored by Petrosyants⁴ with Seaborg in the course of his Nov visit to US, and other measures to broaden exchanges could be dealt with in upcoming exchange negotiations in Moscow.

In concluding the conversation I said to Gromyko it would be helpful if I could take back with me some encouraging word with regard to Embʼs communications problem. Almost plaintively Gromyko said he would look into the matter again but at this point could promise nothing. Meanwhile he wished me to understand that no policy question was involved here, that only “technical difficulties” stood in way.

Kohler

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.
1. Telegram 812, September 6, summarized a letter to the editor of International Affairs by Yevgeni P. Korovin, Chairman of the Soviet Committee of Outer Space Legal Questions. (Ibid., SP 5 USSR)
2. See Document 350.
3. Prince Souphanouvong, Vice Premier of the Royal Laotian Government.
4. Andronik M. Petrosyants, Chairman of the Soviet State Committee on Atomic Energy.