340. Telegram From the Embassy in France to theDepartment of State0
443. Eyes only Secretary from Ambassador. I have had the opportunity of a good talk with Bill Tyler and I send you these views with some hesitation since I am sure they have already occurred to you. In addition I am admittedly drawing upon my many years of experience in the Soviet field and therefore stepping somewhat outside of my present area of responsibility. However, this is in the belief that my views on the consequences of the test ban agreement and certain caveats in connection with [Page 719] future deals with Soviets may be sufficiently useful to warrant the message. There is of course the added factor of the effect upon our European Allies and our European policy of the manner in which we conduct our future relations with the Soviet Union.
We should recognize that in itself the Soviet agreement to a test ban in the three environments represents no concession whatsoever on their part. I was particularly glad to see the President make this point so definitely in his speech of last night.1 We have therefore no moral or any other obligation to make any quid pro quo in any other field. I emphasize this point since I seem to detect in some of the Soviet propaganda a tendency to regard the test ban as a Soviet concession to be compensated for by the U.S. and U.K. in other fields, especially the non-aggression pact. This, as you well know is a favorite Soviet device to pretend concession where none exists in order to extract a quid pro quo when none is merited. In the circumstances it is extremely important that we so comport ourselves with our Allies to avoid any semblance of impression that we have incurred any indirect obligation with the Soviets in regard to non-aggression arrangements. We should also avoid any appearance of indecent or anxious haste in an attempt to move forward in the entire field of relations with the Soviet Union. It has never been true in Soviet policy and is not now true that certain occasions must be seized or the opportunity is lost. Soviet policy is too realistic and based upon long-range considerations for that. It is therefore not a question of seizing a temporary fleeting opportunity. In fact I should think that we should proceed very cautiously with any further discussions with the Soviet Union and wait for them to give us indications of any serious change in current Soviet policy and not feel that we must take the initiative in order “to show good faith”.
An approach such as I have outlined above seems to me extremely important to keep steady our relations in Europe, as there is a strong tendency, particularly in France, to believe that we are ready to patch up our differences with the Soviet Union, even at the expense of European interests. This I gather is also feared in Germany.
While I certainly would be the last person to wish to ignore any real or serious opportunity for a meaningful solution of any of the outstanding problems with the Soviet Union, I am sure you understand that if we are too single minded in our relentless pursuit of improvement in relations with the Soviet Union we will render correspondingly more difficult the problem of the development of Atlantic association and most of the questions at present before NATO.
[Page 720]There are certain other aspects of the general situation which I could touch upon, but I have selected only those points which appear to be most actual. If you consider it wise you might care to show this telegram to McBundy.