300. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Brubeck) to the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)0

SUBJECT

  • Improvement of Communications with Embassy Moscow

Gromykoʼs discouraging response to Ambassador Kohlerʼs most recent approach to him on the above subject (Moscow telegram 2096, February 26)1 confirms our earlier impression that the Soviet Government is reluctant to grant our Moscow Embassy a leased teletype line or permission to use a radio transmitter. Soviet reasons may include the probable loss of foreign exchange and fear that a radio transmitter or leased line could enhance our Embassyʼs cryptographic security.

In a telephone call to the Department Bromley Smith inquired about the possibilities for pressure against Soviet interests in the United States in the communications field.2 As far as the Department can discover, the U.S.S.R. has only two vulnerable points. The U.S.S.R. Mission to the United Nations leases a teletype line to Moscow from RCA, and TASS in New York does the same. The Soviet Embassy in Washington does not lease a teletype line but probably sends at least a portion of its communications over the line leased by USSR-UN.

Some weeks ago, the Department undertook informal consultations with the Federal Communications Commission in an effort to determine some appropriate method of acting against these two USSR-leased lines. These consultations suggested that the legislative authority available to the F.C.C. provides ample authority to require an American common carrier to revoke leased circuit privileges under conditions similar to those now existing, even though the carrier is required by its public tariff to make such facilities available to any subscriber. Consequently, on February 8 the Department addressed to the Commission a letter proposing “that the Federal Communications Commission take such steps as are feasible and necessary to condition the license of all international United States carriers so that they, upon notification by the Federal Communications Commission, are authorized to deny service and facilities to any foreign government which does not provide, upon request, equivalent [Page 638] treatment and facilities to the United States Government as is provided to them in this country by the United States carrier.”3

The Commission considered the Departmentʼs request and directed its staff to prepare an appropriate rule to implement that request. Such a rule has now been prepared by the Commissionʼs staff. It is intended to consult with the affected carriers as soon as possible in order to avoid any possible misunderstanding and to secure their maximum cooperation.

As soon as the authority is available, the Department has in mind bringing indirectly or informally to the Soviet Governmentʼs attention the possibility of retaliation against the teletype lines leased by USSR-UN andTASS. It seems possible that this implied threat of retaliation may lead the Soviet Government to grant a leased teletype line to our Moscow Embassy, it is also quite possible that the Soviet Government will continue to refuse.

In the latter event, the Department would wish to reexamine the situation carefully before actually involving retaliation. Action against the TASS line would undoubtedly result in loss of the teletype lines now leased in Moscow by at least two United States news agencies. Action against the line leased by the USSR-UN might well create complications with the United Nations. Moreover, it seems unlikely that the U.S.S.R. would give way before direct threat on an issue where the position is strong and where it does not have anything vital to lose. It also seems undesirable for us to retaliate in unconnected fields, because US-USSR relations are too important and potentially dangerous to be complicated for a relatively minor issue. If we reach that point, the President may wish to consider the possibility of a personal communication to Khrushchev.

J.T. Rogers4
  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series,USSR. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information.
  2. See footnote 4, Document 299.
  3. A record of this telephone conversation, February 26, is in Department of State, Central Files, POL US-USSR.
  4. Not found.
  5. Rogers signed for Brubeck above Brubeckʼs typed signature.