Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume V, Soviet Union

289. Memorandum on the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting⁰

Washington, undated.

Subject meeting consisted of presentations by Ambassadors Kohler, Bruce and Dowling.

Ambassador Kohler

General LeMay¹ asked Ambassador Kohler to cover any items that he felt might be of interest to the JCS, and Ambassador Kohler said that he would like to begin by giving a rundown of the impressions he had gained in his first four months as Ambassador to the USSR. He noted that prior to his recent return to Moscow, he had not been stationed there in 13 years. This intervening period permitted him, upon his return, to view the local scene in a more dispassionate way since his previous experiences in Moscow had become so conditioned and affected by day-to-day frustrations and exasperations. The changes which have occurred in the USSR these 13 years are upward in nature—slowly but steadily. The evolution in the development of the Soviet society during this period is remarkable. The physical changes are quite evident—the people are better dressed, there are more automobiles on the streets, etc. The atmosphere is far more relaxed and the air of pervading fear is gone. The era of waiting for the dreaded knock on the door in the night and the ever-packed suitcase is gone. There is a very striking ferment throughout Soviet society. Ambassador Kohler warned that all he referred to is relative to the situation under Stalin, and that it does not in any sense reflect a situation approximating that in any democratic nation. Khrushchev has no intention of relaxing controls to such an extent, and the Soviet Union is a highly controlled closed society. However, people are now free and willing to talk to Americans. The number of such exchanges with the U.S. diplomatic community has increased by a factor of ten over previous years. We know more about what is going on since people seek us out to talk.

Ambassador Kohler said that Khrushchev must rely on the party for control and that the Army is under party control. However, the basis of power is spread throughout various centers in the country. It is not strictly controlled in Moscow as under Stalin. Khrushchev does not possess the power to make tough decisions in the center and make them stand up to the degree that Stalin did. A good example is his recent crackdown on art and literature. People are fighting back against this decision publicly. The artists and writers may lie low for awhile but they will not change nor will they cease their activities.

Ambassador Kohler said that he, like many others, was surprised by the Soviet miscalculation in Cuba. He noted that there had been much speculation on the reasons for the Soviet move in Cuba as well as the manner in which it had been arrived at. These included guesses that it was a move forced by the military or that it was solely a political decision by Khrushchev. Ambassador Kohler said that these speculations on Soviet aims and possible internal differences are not justified or important. What is important is the very real relief shown by the Soviet leadership at the peaceful settlement of the Cuban problem. The whole structure of Soviet leadership was shocked to the core by being taken to the brink of war. They did not like what they saw and experienced, and they had absolutely no stomach for a showdown. This was unmistakable and their relief was real and genuine in every respect.

Ambassador Kohler said that he is not altogether certain where we stand in the aftermath of Cuba. The Soviets have indicated a desire to reopen talks on Berlin, they have pursued a campaign to picture Khrushchev as a man of peace, and they have extended the doctrine of peaceful co-existence. They probably are looking and hoping for some relaxation. Ambassador Kohler said that he did not expect any early Soviet move against Berlin. After Cuba the Soviets talked about Berlin but they did not take any initiative. For our part, we have also avoided taking any initiative. Two weeks ago the Soviets made, by implication, the most serious approach to us on Berlin that they have made since November, 1958.² The Ambassadorial Group is now studying this approach.

Ambassador Kohler said that there are limits on what we may expect in any easing of the Cuban situation. U.S. domestic pressures and public criticism will make it difficult for the Soviets to reduce their presence and activities in Cuba without severe loss of face. Soviet troubles with the ChiComs and their lack of success in geographical expansion in other areas through peaceful means will require them to maintain a militant position toward Castro. Khrushchev might have relaxed his pressures and activities in Cuba if he had been given more time. However, U.S. domestic pressure now has him on the hook. On the other hand, the Soviets feel they have a pretty good case in Cuba. If we threatened strong action against the USSR in Cuba now, we certainly could not expect to get the backing we got the first time around.

General LeMay asked how the Soviets are reacting to the Sino-Indian conflict. Ambassador Kohler replied that it has given the Soviets a real solid headache. They have floundered around and swayed on the tightrope they have tried to walk. They have also tried to support both sides. The Indian Ambassador in Moscow has been pushing the Soviets hard and he has achieved some success. He has gotten more out of the Soviets than was to be expected, particularly in the provision of MIG aircraft. The MIG deal means little or nothing militarily, but it has profound political and psychological significance. The provision of military aid by a communist country to the active foe of another communist country is an unheard of act. It is almost impossible to get Soviet leaders to discuss any aspect of the matter. The actual depth of the Sino-Soviet split is a question mark. It does not appear that the Soviets are attempting to formalize it. However, there is a real struggle underway at present among the Communist Parties and we do not have much information on the nature or details of this fight. The possibility of a hard split is a real one. It is obvious that the Soviets will not share economic wealth or resources with the ChiComs. It is also quite apparent that the Soviets will not permit the ChiComs to get them embroiled in a conflict with the U.S. except on USSR terms and under USSR controls.

General LeMay asked if the Soviets will attempt to take advantage of the present political difficulties existing in NATO. Ambassador Kohler said that while they would attempt to gain some propaganda advantages, they would not pursue any serious course of action. First, they have serious difficulties within their own camp and second they take a far more jaundiced view of the Franco-German accord than we do. The Soviets believe that Adenauer is using De Gaulle and manipulating him to his own ends. They believe that Adenauer persuaded De Gaulle to veto UK entry into the Common Market. However, there is no prospect of a Paris-Moscow accord. This does not appear to be in the cards.

General LeMay asked what importance the Soviets give to Africa and how they feel about their present position in that continent. Ambassador Kohler said that the Soviets have priority objectives and great aspirations in Africa and have devoted a great deal of effort and resources to accomplishing them. They appear disappointed in their relative lack of success to date. This failure also tends to disprove Khrushchevʼs theory of peaceful victory through economic and political penetration. African diplomats in Moscow have indicated that the Soviets are disillusioned over the relative lack of success they have had in Africa, particularly in view of the high hopes they had at one time. The suppression of Communist Parties in various African nations has been a setback they did not expect. Their greatest disappointments have come from developments in Egypt, Morocco, Mali, Guinea and Ghana. The lack of progress in Africa probably increases Soviet determination to hang on to their present position in Cuba.

Admiral Ricketts³ asked Ambassador Kohler to give his views on ultimate Soviet objectives in Cuba in the aftermath of the missile withdrawals. Ambassador Kohler said that the situation changes as circumstances alter. However, the Soviets essentially regard Cuba as a base, as a toehold and a platform for various activities. The Soviets are somewhat worried over their position in Cuba as a result of their differences with Castro. They find his adoption of the ChiCom line to be a burdensome problem. He demanded a very high economic price from them and they are paying it. On the one hand they keep troops in Cuba because they distrust Castro and on the other hand their troops are used to support him. In summary, the Soviets have real problems in Cuba and they are following a holding operation for the present.

Admiral Ricketts then asked how Ambassador Kohler viewed current Soviet-Yugoslav relations. The Ambassador replied that the view from Embassy Moscow is not the same as that from Embassy Belgrade. From Moscow, it appears that Tito won a total victory—this does not coincide with Ambassador Kennanʼs view but that is the way it appears from Moscow. Tito gave only a little, if at all, and he gained a great deal. He may end up with observer status in the Common Market as well as in the Bloc organization. The present state of affairs would appear to justify Titoʼs policies and should enhance him as an example to the leaders of satellite nations. He, in effect, is having the best of both worlds with no loss of freedom. The implications of this will not be lost on Gomulka.⁴

General Shoup⁵ asked if Ambassador Kohler believed that Khrushchev was “calling the shots” in Viet Nam and if so, what his probable reaction would be to the application of U.S. pressure on Hanoi. Ambassador Kohler replied that he could not be specific on this question but he did feel that two general considerations ruled MoscowʼsSEA policy. First, Moscow did not wish to see the ChiComs win the present struggle among the Communist Parties in the area. Second, Moscow prefers to keep a relative calm in the area and desires to prevent any ChiCom actions which would involve them in open conflict with the U.S.

General LeMay asked how the Soviets had reacted to the MLF proposals and the planned removal of Jupiter missiles from Italy and Turkey. Ambassador Kohler stated that the Soviets had given factual reporting to the Jupiter withdrawals and had not attempted to link them with Cuba. Just last night they had made representations to Secretary Rusk on the MLF.⁶ This move was to be expected in addition to standard news treatment and various other personal approaches. The Soviets are anti-anything which even implies possible German involvement with nuclear weapons. They feel that the MLF is a step in this direction. However, they are far more afraid of a German-French bilateral than they are of the MLF. If given a choice they would greatly prefer the MLF to a real hard Franco-German accord. They are opposed to the Common Market for many reasons, not the least of which is the fact that it is not in keeping with their economic and political theories. If faced with an effective Common Market, the Soviets would prefer to see the UK as a member in order to offset to a degree the German role in the organization. Mr. Nitze asked if the Soviets would take any hard steps against the MLF and Ambassador Kohler said that they probably would not. They know that it is a long way from being a reality and, accordingly, no signs of concrete action seem likely.

[Here follow presentations by Ambassadors Bruce and Dowling.]

0. Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, State/JCS. Secret. The source text is a Department of State draft, not cleared with the Department of Defense.
1. Major General Curtis E. LeMay, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force.
2. See Document 285.
3. Admiral Claude V. Ricketts, Vice Chief of Naval Operations.
4. Wladyslaw Gomulka, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workersʼ Party.
5. General David M. Shoup, Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps.
6. See Document 288.