281. Memorandum of Conversation0
SUBJECT
- Publication of Letters
PARTICIPANTS
- Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR
- The Secretary
- Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large, Department of State
The Secretary said he had asked the Ambassador to come in in order to express his surprise that the Soviet Government had decided, with inadequate consultation, to publish three of the letters exchanged between the President and Mr. Khrushchev.1 The Secretary said we considered it important that the President and Mr. Khrushchev maintain a channel in which they could talk privately. There was a wide gap in the ideology of the two countries which made it difficult to reach understanding on important questions without getting involved in our ideological differences.
The Secretary also pointed out that he did not wish to argue the point unduly, but confidence between the two men had recently received a shock which underlined the importance of their being able to remove misunderstanding through private communications. The Secretary expressed the hope that we could assume that the publication of these letters would not constitute a precedent with regard to private communications exchanged through this channel. There were other ways in which exchanges of a more public nature could be conducted, but he stressed the importance that one side should not decide unilaterally on publication of private exchanges, but that this should only be done on the basis of joint discussion.
In reply, the Ambassador said he had no specific instructions, but he was sure his Government considered these private exchanges valuable. [Page 611] In this particular case, not a single word had been published in the Soviet Union or said by their statesmen. These exchanges were handled there cautiously and very few people in Moscow knew about them. When Mr. Foster had discussed the postponement of the resumption of disarmament talks with him, he had urged that Tsarapkin be instructed not to say anything about the New York talks, and both he and Fedorenko2 had been instructed not to say anything. Then, within eighteen hours, Mr. Foster had proposed a communiqué.3 While the text of the communiqué was not particularly objectionable, this appeared to be a sudden change of line on our part.
The Secretary pointed out that in view of press speculation, we had tried to avoid reference to the exchange of letters.
Dobrynin pointed out that Mr. Foster had made reference to the negotiations on television, whereas there had been no word from the Soviet side. He also pointed out that Chairman Khrushchev had previously had occasion to complain about references in our press to correspondence between him and the President. There had been exact statements quoted from the Chairmanʼs letters, although not printed as quotes.
The Secretary said he could understand Moscowʼs viewpoint, but that nothing had been said here about the test ban talks that referred to the letters. From time-to-time reporters could guess and write speculative stories. We had tried to divert attention from the exchange of letters. It had been necessary to say something in view of the press speculation. He was glad to hear that the Soviet side considered that these exchanges should be private.
The Secretary mentioned that a Soviet Ambassador in another country had made references to these exchanges, indicating that the Soviets had virtually reached agreement with us on a number of subjects.
Mr. Dobrynin said that he was virtually certain that no Soviet Ambassadors were being informed about these exchanges, although it was always possible that if one visited Moscow, he might pick up some information.
The discussion then turned to the question of timing of the release of the letters on testing.
- Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Thompson on January 21.↩
- On January 19 Dobrynin had called Thompson and then gone to his home around 4 p.m. to say that, because of the publicity in the American press about talks in New York on a test ban agreement, the Soviet Union had decided to publish Khrushchevʼs letters to Kennedy of December 19, 1962, and January 7, 1963, and the Presidentʼs letter to the Chairman, of December 28. (For summaries of the letters, see Document 274.) At 5 p.m. Thompson informed Rusk of the conversation and suggested that the Secretary of State call in the Ambassador and tell him that he was “terribly disturbed” by the publication. (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations) A memorandum of Thompsonʼs conversation with Dobrynin is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Dobrynin Talks.↩
- Nikolai T. Fedorenko, Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations.↩
- For text of the communiqué, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 942-943.↩