Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume V, Soviet Union

280. Current Intelligence Weekly Review⁰

Washington, January 18, 1963.

Khrushchev in East Germany

The main purpose of Khrushchevʼs moderate speech to the East German party congress on 16 January¹ apparently was to demonstrate the USSRʼs desire and readiness to overcome the acute differences with Peiping which are weakening and demoralizing the international Communist movement. He called for a cessation of polemics and for patience and moderation in discussing these differences.

This line may be primarily a tactical maneuver to prove that the Chinese are solely responsible for the disarray in the Communist movement if they continue, as Khrushchev may expect, to attack Soviet leadership and strategy. Khrushchevʼs restraint, however, could also reflect heavy pressures on him from other bloc and foreign Communist leaders to avoid carrying the conflict with the Chinese and Albanians to an open and avowed break.

Proposals for a Conference

A pause such as Khrushchev has requested had become necessary if the Soviet leader was not yet prepared to face up to the consequences of a break. The increasingly open and aggressively direct accusations which they were trading in their propaganda media, if continued, would have brought about a showdown guaranteed to split the movement asunder. This development was causing serious concern in Communist parties around the world, and their leaders, some Soviet and some Chinese supporters, expressed that concern by proposing the convocation of some form of international conference.

Both the Chinese and the Soviets had reprinted these proposals in their press, but continued their attacks on one another. As late as 15 January, the opening day of the East German congress, the Soviet bloc press, including Pravda, contained bitter criticism of the Albanian and Chinese views and leaders. Within these attacks, however, was the anguished cry from foreign Communist parties for unity—a unity which the other side was threatening by its unwarranted actions.

The difficulty arises in the differing definitions of what form an international conference should take and under what rules it should be convoked. The Soviet Union, supported by a majority of the Communist parties, favors reaching conclusions on the basis of majority rule. The Chinese, encouraged by the successes they scored in the last international conference, want one that would arrive at resolutions on the same basis as previously—that of unanimity.

A recognition of the difficulties in arranging for a congress was indicated in the proposals made by Togliatti and Indonesiaʼs Aidit.² Both had suggested that a conference should be called, but each had noted that preparations for such a conference would be long and drawn out. Togliatti recommended bilateral meetings as the first stage in the process. The Italian and Chinese parties have already agreed to meet and discuss their sharply opposing views. Aiditʼs suggestion included a reference to the necessity for careful preparation which might take place “over a year or two” before a conference. Both the Soviet and the Chinese press had reprinted this line.

Khrushchev gave implied endorsement to such proposals, urging that no meeting take place until the polemics cease and “people have a chance to cool down.” He noted that a meeting now would “entail the danger of a split,” since “fighting has a logic of its own, and political passions can reach a boiling point.”

Chinese Response Awaited

The future course of the dispute will depend greatly on the line taken by the Chinese delegation to the East German congress. The practice has been to have the Chinese speak directly after the Soviet speaker at bloc party congresses. At the East German congress, however, Polandʼs Gomulka followed Khrushchev and echoed the moderate line taken by the Soviet leader. This apparent change in procedure may have been requested by the Chinese so that they might have time to assess the significance of Khrushchevʼs unexpected ploy and to prepare their response. It might also have been stage-managed by the Soviet supporters so as to demonstrate to the Chinese that they intend to agree to Khrushchevʼs request for a moratorium in the polemics.

If the Chinese respond to Khrushchev in kind, the result will be a sharp reduction in the direct attacks on one another. Differing assessments of strategy and tactics, however, will continue. Khrushchev, himself, gave a spirited defense of Soviet views on peaceful coexistence, the nature and effects of nuclear war, his handling of the Cuban crisis, and the proper way for a revolutionary party to come to power. The dispute will clearly continue but on the higher and more “principled” plane that Communists are fond of requesting.

Continuing Search for Support

Both sides will continue to drive for support from other Communist parties. One of the tactics which the Soviet Union was using during the two weeks immediately preceding the congress was to demonstrate the strength of the support which existed in the Communist world for its positions. The Soviet press devoted an unusually large portion of its pages to reprinting the speeches and resolutions of other Communists which condemned the positions of the “dogmatists.” The Chinese engaged in a similar by-play.

Peipingʼs continuing effort to mobilize support was also evidenced by the arrival in Peiping since the first of the year of leading Communists from New Zealand, Indonesia, and Japan. The Chinese are also trying to win over important factions in parties such as the Ecuadorean, where the controlling leaders are Soviet-oriented. Both sides are vying for support from North Vietnam.

A pause in the exchange of polemics between the two sides will not bring a comparable pause in this type of activity. Although Khrushchev has moved to reduce the escalation of the open dispute for the moment, it is almost certain that developments from both within and without the Communist world will revive more direct attacks on one another.

Continued Moderation on Berlin and Germany Issue

The cautious and defensive tone adopted by both Khrushchev and Walter Ulbricht in their discussion of the Berlin and German problems at the party congress provides further evidence that the USSR does not contemplate any new threats or proposals with regard to Berlin in the immediate future.

In his address, Khrushchev contended that, although four years have passed without the signing of a peace treaty, the bloc had achieved important gains. He cited the Berlin wall as “a most important step” in strengthening East German sovereignty and said the peace treaty is “no longer the problem it was before the protective measures” in Berlin were taken.

Although Ulbricht had told the congress the day before that the Soviet premier would report on the Soviet-US talks on Berlin, Khrushchev ignored this subject. He confined himself to repeating the latest Soviet proposal for placing Western forces in West Berlin under the UN flag “for a certain period of time.”

The current line in Soviet propaganda and press media reinforces the view that Soviet leaders envisage a continued hiatus in talks on Berlin until they feel strong enough to resume serious negotiations. A public lecturer in Moscow on 15 January emphasized the settlement of outstanding differences through negotiations and stated that “it would be foolish to renounce negotiations” so long as both sides continue to demonstrate interest in talks. And in his 10 January discussion with Secretary Rusk, Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov asked the US to come up with new proposals on the German question.³

In his own address before the congress on 15 January, the East German party boss also was moderate in his elaboration of the Berlin problem. He even omitted several sharp anti-US passages which appeared later in the printed version of his address. Ulbricht—to make recent Soviet proposals more palatable to party functionaries—represented the formula under which Allied forces would remain in West Berlin under some form of UN aegis as only the first step in a “gradual settlement” of the Berlin problem. He insisted that any solution would have to respect East German control over the access routes.

Soviets Seek Khrushchev-Brandt Meeting

While Khrushchev is in East Berlin, Soviet representatives have been exploring the possibilities of arranging a meeting between him and West Berlin Mayor Brandt. According to an official of the West Berlin Senat (city administration), Soviet Embassy officials in East Berlin suggested on 14 January that Brandt come to see Khrushchev. A formal invitation from Khrushchev was issued on the 17th.

The USSR could exploit any such meeting in order to reinforce its contention that West Berlin should be made into a free city and become, as Khrushchev asserted in his congress speech, “an example of peaceful coexistence between states with different social orders.”

0. Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79-S01060A. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared by CIAʼs Office of Current Intelligence. The source text comprises pp. 1-3 of the Weekly Review section of the issue.
1. For text, see Pravda and Izvestia, January 17, 1963, and Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. XV, No. 3, February 13, 1963, pp. 3-7, and No. 4, February 20, 1963, pp. 13-20. Extracts are printed in Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 831-833.
2. Palmiro Togliatti, Italian Communist Party Secretary, and Aidit Dipa Nusantara, leader of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).
3. See Document 278.