270. Editorial Note
On November 29 and 30, 1962, Soviet First Deputy Chairman Anastas Mikoyan, who had been in Havana following the missile crisis, visited Washington. In a conversation on November 29 lasting over 3 hours, Mikoyan and President Kennedy discussed at length the Cuban situation and briefly Laos before turning to U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations. At this point:
“The President said that it is strange that there are two countries such as the Soviet Union and the United States which are powerful and wealthy, and which have no direct conflicts of interest to separate them. In spite of that, they find themselves perpetually in a state bordering on conflict. At the same time many other parts of the world are facing problems of hunger and underdevelopment. It would be good if the Soviet Union were to devote its efforts to the pursuit of its own interests, in the same way in which the United States devotes its efforts to the pursuit of its own interests, and abandon the belief that it is its job to kindle revolutionary fires all over the world. This would be worth more than 40 non-aggression treaties.
“Mr. Mikoyan said that revolutions are not caused by the Soviet Union. It is not the Soviet Union which was the cause of the Cuban revolution; [Page 588] as a matter of fact it knew much less about this revolution than did the United States. He already had said the same thing in January.
“The President said that he did not accuse the Soviet Union of having fomented the Cuban revolution.
“Mr. Mikoyan said that there will be revolutions regardless of what either the Soviet Union or the United States do.
“The President said that this may be true, but that it was still important for the two countries to understand each other better. How could the Soviet Government believe that the United States would not react on finding that there were 40 missiles emplaced in Cuba? How would the Soviets have reacted if the United States had emplaced 40 missiles in Finland, especially if the government of that country had been as inimical to the Soviet Union as Castro is towards the United States?
“Mr. Mikoyan said that there are United States missiles in Turkey very close to the Soviet Union. In spite of that he feels that Soviet citizens may sleep with tranquility, as long as the missiles in question are in American hands. This is because he trusts President Kennedy.
“The President said that he has always been of the opinion that American missile bases such as those in Turkey do not make sense. Several have been deactivated and for the last twenty months the United States Government has worked at deactivating more. This is why the emplacing of Soviet missiles in Cuba has come as such a shock.
“It is quite clear that the two governments have misjudged one another. This is a type of misjudgment which neither they nor the world can afford.
“Mr. Mikoyan said that he liked the spirit of what the President just said. That is why it is necessary to talk problems over and to agree.
“The President said that it was not enough to obtain verbal agreements. They also must be implemented. It would be better perhaps if—as in the case of Laos—the Soviet Union would not always insist that it is fulfilling its obligations. It would be better if it were ready to admit its shortcomings as the United States is ready to admit its own shortcomings, and work harder to correct them.
“Mr. Mikoyan said that problems had to be taken up one by one.
“The President said that in doing so it must be remembered that the two countries have very few genuinely divergent interests, and yet there are many conflicts between them. There is something very wrong with such a situation.” (Memorandum of conversation; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Mikoyan Talks. For text of the memoranda of conversation on Cuba, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume XI, pages 545–565.)
The following day Mikoyan and Secretary of State Rusk, in a meeting lasting over 2# hours, discussed Berlin, a Latin American atom-free-zone, [Page 589] a nuclear test ban, surprise attacks, and a NATO-Warsaw non-aggression pact. For text of the memorandum of discussion on Berlin, see ibid., volume XV, pages 449–452. Memoranda of the conversations on the next three topics are scheduled for the microfiche supplement to volume VII. With regard to the non-aggression pact:
“Mr. Mikoyan said he wanted to raise one more question. During the conversation with the President at the White House last night, the Cuban question had taken up so much time there had been no chance for a thorough discussion of the question of a NATO-Warsaw non-aggression pact. The President himself had raised the question. Why do we not proceed to conclude such a pact? Mr. Mikoyan observed he could inform Chairman Khrushchev about this upon his return to Moscow. He asked if the American side was in a position to give him an answer. It would be good if he could receive a definite answer, and perhaps it might be possible tonight. He would be seeing Attorney General Kennedy at supper with the Udalls.
“The Secretary remarked it was true that we have an interest in finding a way to reduce the dangers of confrontation between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. He had discussed this question in general terms with Gromyko during the past year. However, it was a problem related to timing to other issues. The United States has not been delegated authority by the other countries to negotiate a pact on their behalf. Nevertheless, we were prepared to discuss the idea informally; the basis for a pact and the circumstances in which such an agreement might be possible.” (Memorandum of conversation; Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/11-3062)