234. Editorial Note
During the first 3 weeks of September 1962, Director of Central Intelligence McCone, who was on a honeymoon holiday in Europe, received daily briefing cables on the situation in Cuba from Deputy Director Marshall Carter. McCone concluded that the development of a costly surface-to-air defense system in Cuba could only be explained if it was designed to mask and protect the introduction of medium-range ballistic missiles. In a series of cables to Carter, McCone pressed his concerns and supported an expanded program of reconnaissance flights over Cuba. Return cables from Carter indicated that CIA analysts had considered McConeʼs concerns but concluded that the Soviet Union would not run the risk of provoking military reaction from the United States. In Special National Intelligence Estimate 85-3-62, September 19, the conclusions of which were cabled to McCone the same day, the intelligence community stated that a decision to introduce medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles into Cuba “would indicate a far greater willingness to increase the level of risk in US-Soviet relations than the USSR has displayed thus far.” The next day, in his final cable in the series, McCone responded that “an offensive Soviet base in Cuba will provide Soviets with most important and effective trading position in connection with all other critical areas and hence they might take unexpected risks to establish such a position.” A report of the arrival of Soviet MRBMs in Cuba, subsequently accepted as the first definitive such report, was received on September 21. For more information and the text of SNIE 85-3-62, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume X, pages 1052–1053, 1070–1080, and 1083–1084.